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EDITED BY

M. PLATNAUER, M.A., B.Litt.

AND

W. K. C. GUTHRIE, M.A.

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CORRIGENDUM TO VOL. XXXIV, Nos. 1, 2 (p. 42)

It has been pointed out to me that in my article on 'The Augustan Rules for Dactylic Verse' (*C. Q.*, XXXIV, p. 42) I misrepresented an observation of Maas as reported by Wilamowitz in his *Griechische Verskunst*, p. 53. Wilamowitz' words are: 'Wenn Tibull und Ovid den Pentameter so bauen, dass die vorletzte Silbe betont wird, tun sie das nach dem Vorgange gleichzeitiger griechischer Epigrammatiker.' This means, of course, that the Greek writers mentioned ended with a paroxytone word, not necessarily with a disyllable, as I assumed it to mean, and I apologize for the oversight.

L. P. WILKINSON

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PLUTARCH'S BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES IN THE ROMAN LIVES

THE object of this article is to set forth certain evidence that emerges from a study of three of Plutarch's *Lives*, the *Titus*, the *Paullus*, and the *Cato Maior*, evidence which indicates that these *Lives* are based upon a definite type of biographical composition, and to suggest its possible origin and date. Since E. Meyer's[1] article on the *Cimon* of Nepos and Plutarch, biographical sources have generally been assumed for the Greek *Lives*, and there has been a tendency to make the same assumption for the Roman *Lives* also, without, however, setting forth the evidence that might justify it. Uxkull Gyllenband[2] maintained that biographies of Greeks and Romans, the sources of Plutarch, were written in the second century B.C., but he gives no evidence for his contention, which is indeed refuted by the observations of Jacoby.[3] Mühl[4] argued with some force that Plutarch's source for the *Marcellus* was a biography. There is good reason to doubt his conclusion that Plutarch has used a biography of Poseidonius; but the arguments advanced by Klotz[5] for the thesis that the source was the annalist Valerius Antias are still less convincing. Liedmeier[6] postulates a biographical source for the *Paullus*, but without doing more than asserting the general improbability that Plutarch here used a multiplicity of sources. It seems therefore desirable to collect such evidence as there is of a biographical source in these three Roman *Lives* of the second century B.C., and it is with such an attempt rather than with *a priori* considerations that I am here concerned.

No one of these three *Lives* can be called comprehensive in the sense that no public office of the character is omitted, yet in all three of them Plutarch mentions certain minor offices of the subject, and we may well inquire how he came to know of them. The outstanding examples are as follows:

Titus, i. 4, 5. Χιλίαρχος ὑπατεύοντι Μαρκέλλῳ συνεστρατεύσατο. . . . . Τίτος δὲ τῆς περὶ Τάραντα χώρας καὶ Τάραντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δεύτερον ἡλωκότος ἔπαρχος ἀποδειχθεὶς εὐδοκίμησεν οὐχ ἧττον ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις ἢ κατὰ τὴν στρατείαν. διὸ καὶ πεμπομένων ἀποίκων εἰς δύο πόλεις, Νάρνειάν τε καὶ Κῶνσαν, ἄρχων ᾑρέθη καὶ οἰκιστής.

Cato, xii. 1. Τιβερίῳ μὲν οὖν Σεμπρωνίῳ . . . ὑπατεύοντι πρεσβεύων συγκατειργάσατο. *Titus*, xx. 1. καὶ γὰρ ἐχιλιάρχησεν αὖθις μετὰ τὴν ὑπατείαν.

Paullus, iii. 1, 2. πρώτην γοῦν τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀρχῶν ἀγορανομίαν μετελθὼν προεκρίθη δέκα δυεῖν ἀνδρῶν συναπογραψαμένων, οὓς ὕστερον ἅπαντας ὑπατεῦσαι λέγουσι. Γενόμενος δὲ ἱερεὺς τῶν Αὐγούρων κ.τ.λ.

Livy mentions only two of these offices, Titus' command at Tarentum, xxix. 13. 6, and Paullus' aedileship, xxxv. 10. 11, the first one so briefly and drily that it is impossible to suppose that he was Plutarch's source, the second more fully but differently from Plutarch.[7] It is unreasonable to believe that the annalists normally mentioned such offices as the military tribunate, unless in some way they were exceptional or outstanding; if their practice may be inferred from that of Livy, they did not necessarily mention the holders of minor offices even if they were persons who afterwards

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[1] *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii. pp. 1 ff.
[2] *Plutarch und die griechische Biographie*, pp. 103 ff.
[3] *Historische Zeitschrift*, cxxxix, 1929, p. 586.
[4] *Poseidonios und der plutarchische Marcellus*, 1924.
[5] *Rheinisches Museum*, lxxxiii, 1934, pp. 289 ff.

[6] *Plutarchs Biographie van Aemilius Paullus*, pp. 169, 171, 191, 213, 223, and elsewhere throughout.
[7] Livy says nothing of the future of the unsuccessful competitors, while Plutarch fails to mention the dedication of the shield which made Paullus' tenure of office *insignis*.

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became distinguished. But there was nothing either exceptional or outstanding in these examples of Plutarch's, and their mention by an annalist would have had little or no point.

But if Plutarch could not have found these facts in Livy or an annalist, where could he have come upon them? The only type of literature to which these details are relevant is a biography, and the only person to whom the search for them would be of interest is a biographer. Such facts were certainly to be found in the *elogia* and the *commentarii*,[1] which latter would have dealt in greater detail with the various offices. A biographer would naturally go to such sources for his information, if he had access to them, and thus these minor offices would find a place in biography which was refused them by the historian and the annalist.

The mention, then, of these minor offices by Plutarch seems to suggest a biographical source, composed by persons who could have had access to the archives of the noble families. Next come Plutarch's accounts of censorships and triumphs, for which he might be indebted to an annalistic source. Plutarch's aim was to portray the character of his subjects,[2] and in his selection and rejection of material he was largely guided by that aim; on the whole he has succeeded, but we may reasonably ask whether accounts of triumphs and censorships in general contribute to the elucidation of character; whether, to take particular examples, the detailed account of Paullus' censorship in xxxviii. 9, of Titus' censorship in xviii. 2, of Titus' triumph in xiv. 1. 2, throw any light upon their several characters. That triumphs in themselves did not appear to Plutarch to be illustrative we may infer from his omission of the details of Cato's triumph, xi. 4, and of all mention of Paullus' first triumph. They might seem to him worth inclusion if the material was near at hand, and if he found himself short of other and more interesting facts, but they were not worth the trouble of independent research, even if he could have known that research would reveal, for example, a censorship of Titus. I can only suppose that he mentioned these details because they were ready to hand, and because he felt that a biography could not properly ignore them; in other words, that he included them because he found them in a biography from whose traditions he felt himself either unable or not disposed completely to break.

Apart from these general indications of a biographical source there are particular points in each of the three *Lives* under consideration which we may take in turn and examine. In the *Titus* these indications are fewest, but they are instructive, and we may most conveniently begin with it. In i. 5 there is a reference to Titus' being elected ἄρχων καὶ οἰκιστής of colonists πεμπομένων εἰς δύο πόλεις, Νάρνειάν τε καὶ Κῶνσαν. It is difficult to know to what Plutarch is here referring; according to Livy, xxxii. 2. 6–7, colonists were sent to Narnia in 199, and Titus' name is not among the triumvirs; Consa's request for a draft of colonists at the same time was refused, and not granted until 197, when, in fact, Titus was in Greece.[3] On the other hand, Titus was appointed triumvir to reinforce the colony of Venusia in 200, and of this Plutarch says nothing. Klotz[4] argues that Plutarch's source is here an annalist, but we are still faced with the fact that Plutarch's statement is demonstrably false,[5] and that there was no reason why an annalist should have bothered to invent the story. If the sole

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[1] See below, pp. 6 f.

[2] Cf. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie*, pp. 146–92; Hirzel, *Plutarch*, pp. 47–73.

[3] No annalist who was describing Titus as in Greece in 197 could have attributed to him the leading of a colony in Italy. The fact that the annalists described the events year by year would of itself protect them from making this mistake.

[4] *Rheinisches Museum*, lxxxiv, 1935, p. 49.

[5] If we are to find historicity in it, I can only conjecture that in discussions before the Senate's decision was taken it was suggested that Titus should be given this duty, but that either he was chosen for Venusia instead or he was already in Venusia at the time and had not returned; in any case, the suggestion was not followed up. If this is the truth, then surely only family archives would remember the incident?

basis for it was a suggestion which was not carried out, the only persons who would have troubled to remember it would have been his own family; they might well have made something resounding out of it in the *Laudatio*. This story can only, I think, have come to Plutarch by way of a biography which was based on family records. In ii. 1, 2 Plutarch describes Titus' election to the consulship, and his account, although it follows the general lines of Livy's, diverges from it in two important points. Plutarch says that Titus omitted the lesser offices which men generally held before becoming candidates for the consulship: τὰς διὰ μέσου καὶ συνήθεις τοῖς νέοις ἀρχὰς ὑπερβάντα, δημαρχίαν καὶ στρατηγίαν καὶ ἀγορανομίαν κ.τ.λ. Livy, xxxii. 7. 10 says: 'iam aedilitatem praeturamque fastidiri'. A little farther on the story continues: τῶν δὲ ... δημάρχων ... δεινὸν εἶναι λεγόντων, ἄνδρα νέον εἰς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχὴν εἰσβιάζεσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, κ.τ.λ.; the passage in Livy, xxxii. 7. 11, runs thus: 'Patres censuerunt, qui honorem, *quem sibi capere per leges liceret*, peteret, etc.' Titus, being a patrician, was not eligible for the tribunate, nor had the tribunate at this time assumed the importance which it later did; so that its mention here is a blunder, made perhaps by Plutarch himself,[1] or perhaps by his source. Plutarch is wrong in the second case also: the *Lex Villia Annalis* was not passed until some eighteen years after Titus' election, and, as Livy makes clear, the law allowed Titus to be a candidate at this time.[2] It must have been the source that was responsible here, since Plutarch would have no incentive arbitrarily to make his hero behave illegally; others might, but Plutarch is looking for moral excellence, and this does not help his purpose. Nor can an annalist have had anything to gain by making these two alterations in the tradition, but a biographer might for one of two reasons: he might think that this version somehow brought glory on Titus, by making him pass by three minor offices and then be elected consul by the people in spite of the law. Alternatively, he might hope to discredit Titus by this perversion of the truth; it might even be rhetorical exaggeration by some one who was a biographer rather than a historian, and who merely thought it sounded better. But I think we are bound to conclude that the second alteration at all events must owe its origin to a writer who was focusing his attention on Titus, i.e. to a biographer.

In xviii. 2 Plutarch gives an additional fact about Titus' censorship, the enrolling of citizens at the instigation of Terentius Culleo, which is not in Livy, xxxviii. 28. 1–4; he could admittedly have found it in an annalist. But xix contains a detailed description of the quarrel between Titus and Cato, which has a marked biographical air. In Livy the opposition of the nobles to Cato's acts is kept impersonal (xxxix. 44. 8–9); here it has crystallized in the person of Titus, who is angry because of his brother's expulsion from the Senate; he instigates prosecutions aginst Cato, and finally emerges triumphant, because the people insist on Lucius' taking his place in the theatre among the Senators. Exactly what truth there is in the last part of the story it is difficult to say; since there was no appeal against the censor's decree,[3] we can hardly suppose that the nobles would create such a dangerous precedent which might well sometime prove a boomerang. Probably Titus and his brother hired a gang of rowdies to shout for Lucius in the theatre,[4] and there the matter ended, with no credit to either of them. But the family might have written up the incident in this way to clear to their own satisfaction the stain from Titus' brother, and to show a final triumph for Titus in a

[1] As Klotz, op. cit., p. 49, thinks.

[2] Cf. Tac., *Ann.* xi. 22: 'ac ne aetas quidem distinguebatur quin prima iuventa consulatum ac dictaturas inirent.' Also Cic. *Phil.* v. 17.

[3] Cf. Mommsen, *R. St.* ii.³1, pp. 356, 422–3; Lange, *Römische Altertümer*, i, p. 808.

[4] As I have seen suggested somewhere. If it

had been spontaneous, one might ask why the people did not instantly show their displeasure; one might also suppose that Scipio Asiagenus would have won some sympathy, and that the nobles would have been more anxious to return him his horse than to receive Lucius Flamininus back into their ranks.

brush with Cato in which history must have awarded the laurels to Cato. The whole story brings personal rivalry and antagonism so much to the front that it has every appearance of being taken not from an historian's or an annalist's account but from a biography of some sort favourable to Titus.

In *Paullus*, iii. 1, Plutarch tells of Paullus' election to the aedileship—δέκα δυεῖν ἀνδρῶν συναπογραψαμένων, οὓς ὕστερον ἅπαντας ὑπατεῦσαι λέγουσι. In iv. 2 we have an account of Paullus' achievements in Spain which can only, by comparison with Livy's version, xxxvii. 46. 7–8, 57. 5–6,[1] be called false; an important defeat has become a victory—δὶς . . . ἐνίκησε τοὺς βαρβάρους—, and the numbers of slain and captured have been considerably exaggerated.[2] Both these details are of more interest to the biographer than any one else; to whom else would it be of interest to know that Paullus defeated twelve men all of whom later became consuls? It was common enough to falsify records of campaigns, and that has certainly been done here. Passing over slighter indications in this *Life* which are admittedly in themselves not compelling, we reach the final chapter, xxxix. 10, where Paullus' estate is given as 'scarcely 370,000 (denarii or drachmae)'. Nissen,[3] followed by Schwarze,[4] says that the amount is given in denarii, and that it is therefore not derived from Polybius, who gave it, xxxi. 28. 3, as ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα. But Plutarch was in the habit of equating the denarius with the drachma,[5] and it is equally true therefore to say that he has given it in drachmae; it would be a reasonable procedure to use this common denominator, drachma-denarius, to express in Roman terms Greek sums of money. None the less, it is hard to see why 'more than 60 talents', i.e. 360,000 drachmas, should become in Plutarch 'scarcely 370,000'. The rest of the chapter also shows small divergencies from the Polybian narrative, yet it cannot be denied that they are on the whole very alike, and that Plutarch's source used Polybius as his basis. Now to what sort of book would the matter contained in this chapter be relevant? Clearly only to a biography of Paullus. And to what sort of book would Plutarch turn in preference to Polybius for facts which are almost certainly derived from Polybius?[6] It must have been a book in some way better adapted to his purpose, yet one on whose information he felt he could rely. Such a book must surely be a biography, here using Polybius, but making slight alterations.

The existence of a biographical source underlying the *Cato* has never been doubted, but its nature has never been precisely determined. Soltau[7] believed that the large biography by Nepos was the basis, but there is a very important divergence between Plutarch and Nepos (see below, p. 5); Münzer,[8] followed by Beloch[9] and others, has maintained that certain parts at any rate are derived from Cicero's *Cato*, but this hypothesis fails to take notice of the theme which runs through all three *Lives*, and must be derived from a common source. To take Plutarch's *Life* first, there are certain untrue statements made about Cato's public life; briefly they are these: he was with Fabius at the sack of Tarentum in 209;[10] he was quaestor to Scipio in 205, and joined

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[1] Since Livy's source appears to be Valerius in the one place, Claudius in the other (as I am informed by Dr. A. H. McDonald of Sydney University, who has made a study of these books of Livy), there seems to have been a measure of agreement between the annalists as to Paullus' initial defeat.

[2] Plutarch says περὶ τρισμυρίους ἀνελών, Livy, ' caesa decem et octo milia armatorum, tria milia trecenti capti '.

[3] *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der 4ten und 5ten Dekade des Livius*, p. 305.

[4] *Quibus Fontibus Plutarchus in vita L. Aemilii Paulli usus sit*, 1891, p. 83.

[5] Cf. A. Sickinger, *De Linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et reliquiis et vestigiis*, 1883, pp. 54–7.

[6] Since Plutarch used Polybius for a great part of this *Life*, and would therefore know whether it was based on Polybius. But the facts of Polybius would be more conveniently and more simply arranged in a biography.

[7] *Fleckeisens Jahrbuch*, 1896, pp. 123 ff.

[8] ' Atticus als Geschichtsschreiber ', in *Hermes*, xl, 1905, p. 65.   [9] *Römische Geschichte*, p. 129.

[10] ii. 3. 4. See Fraccaro, ' Sulla Biografia di Catone Maggiore sino al consolato e la sua Fonte ',

with Fabius in the attack on Scipio at that time;[1] he was succeeded in Spain by Scipio in 194, who through jealousy intrigued for the office.[2] Cicero, too, has Cato at the sack of Tarentum in 209; he says nothing of his quaestorship or of Scipio's succeeding him in Spain. Nepos[3] has the correct tradition for the years 214–207, according to which Cato was in Sicily with Marcellus; he has him quaestor to Scipio in 205, but says nothing of his attack on Scipio, though he may have mentioned it in the full biography; he makes Scipio intrigue *unsuccessfully* to be appointed Cato's successor in Spain.[4] These statements in Plutarch are all untrue, and therefore, we must assume, deliberately invented for a purpose. Nor is that purpose far to seek; they aim at making Cato an associate of Fabius (one of the old school and an opponent of Scipio) and the enemy of Scipio; in other words, these have been invented by a political writer at some later date when Cato had come to personify the opposition to Scipio, and when the history of these years was conceived of as simply a clash of personalities. How long they took to appear, whether they all appeared at once, we cannot say; the general building up of Cato's personality to fill the role of 'antique virtue' may perhaps suggest a Greek hand, but that is unimportant. What seems clear is that there was a biography, of which Cicero, Nepos, and Plutarch all made some use, a biography which presented Cato as Scipio's opponent, and either itself invented or made use of already invented incidents for its purpose. Cicero says nothing of Cato's quaestorship or Scipio's jealousy of his success in Spain, obviously because any such mention would have been exceedingly bad taste, when one of the interlocutors in the dialogue was the younger Scipio. Nepos, not content to accept the tradition blindly, was able to substitute the correct account of Cato's actions during 214–207, and discovered that Scipio did not succeed Cato in Spain; he had no means of knowing whether he had schemed to do so or not, and therefore left that part in. Cato's quaestorship, having been actually unimportant and undistinguished, had left very little trace behind,[5] and there was no way of proving or disproving the story, which he therefore accepted. Plutarch swallowed the whole story, and the fact that he alone says that Scipio did succeed Cato in Spain disproves the use of Nepos or Cicero for these events.[6] Finally there is the detailed account of Lucius Flamininus and the favourite in Gaul which caused Cato to banish him from the Senate.[7] The story is told in Cicero[8] and Livy,[9] who also quotes Valerius for a variant. Klotz[10] seeks to maintain that Plutarch's story is merely a conflation of Livy's and Cicero's accounts. Against this hypothesis it is enough to quote Nissen,[11] ' Und wollte man auch die Nachrichten bei Livius und Cicero aufs Vielfältigste permutiren und combiniren, man würde doch nimmer die plutarchischen herausbringen können '. Plutarch's story is more detailed than any of the others, yet that greater detail is not due to any combination of two or more sources he names; the story he gives is the story he found in his source. We cannot trace the story to its origin; it had become a *cause célèbre* by the time of Valerius, who gives one version without having read Cato's speech,[12] from which we must conclude that it had been written up and become well known before his time. We can see the

in *R. Accademia Vergiliana di Mantova, N.S.*, vol. iii, pt. i, 1910, pp. 112–3.

[1] iii. 5. 6. See De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, vol. iii, pt. ii, p. 517, note 113. Fraccaro, op. cit., pp. 120–6.

[2] xi. 1. 2.

[3] *Cato*, i. 2. 3.   [4] ii. 2.

[5] Cf. the only mention in Livy, xxix. 25. 10.

[6] To maintain that he derived just that from another source is merely perversely to multiply sources, and examination shows that the multi-

plication cannot end there; there are other facts in Plutarch which cannot be derived from Nepos. I do not wish to suggest that Plutarch did not read Cicero or Nepos, but that neither of them was his main source.

[7] xvii; cf. *Titus*, xviii.

[8] *Cato*, 12. 42.

[9] xxxix. 42.

[10] Op. cit., pp. 51–2.

[11] Op. cit., p. 297.

[12] Livy, xxxix. 43. 1.

artists at work on it; not content with recording Lucius' removal from the Senate and quoting, if necessary, extracts from Cato's speech, they told a detailed story of the actual incident, giving the conversation of Lucius and the youth, which must be pure fiction. And this must go back at the latest to the last part of the second century, and probably before. For if the incident had not become traditional by then, it would have been pointless to build it up so long after the event when all the characters were long dead, and the Quinctii had ceased to be an office-holding family whose reputation must be impugned by political adversaries. It may therefore be conjectured that the story first found its place in literature sometime between 150 and 120, and that it was written by some pro-Catonian writer for the obvious purpose of bringing discredit on the Quinctii and honour on Cato; and furthermore we may say that if it was not actually biography that was written, it was something much more akin to it than to history. Whether Plutarch's source was this original work we cannot say, but it is unlikely; his was probably a later biography, which, though it was not written for the same political objects as the earlier one, nevertheless included certain material from it.[1]

THE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE BIOGRAPHER

We must distinguish sharply between two sorts of material which we attribute to the biography: first, the information about offices, etc., which even when false can be understood simply as a falsification by some one in favour of the subject; and secondly, the palpably false information such as we have in the *Cato* and in the *Titus*, ch. xx,[2] and the detailed accounts such as that of Lucius Flamininus and the lover, which, though true, has been elaborated for a purpose. With this second sort of information I shall deal below.[3] For certain of his facts at any rate the biographer used an annalist. In *Titus*, xiv. 2, Tuditanus[4] is quoted for the details of the triumph, and it is reasonable to suppose that he would derive many, if not all, such details as accounts of censorships from an annalist. The only alternative would have been to consult the *annales maximi*, which would have been a needless exertion, since he would only have found there what could be found more easily in the annalists, and the fact that Tuditanus is quoted here makes it probable that annalists were used habitually for information of such major offices or official events as would have found their way naturally into their narratives.

But there were other details for which annalists could not be, and others for which they were not, the source; such things as the minor offices and the falsifications *in maiorem gloriam* of the subject. For all this there was only, I think, one source to which the biographer could have gone, the *laudationes*, the *elogia*, and the private archives of the noble families.[5] In the *laudatio*, we know, falsification in favour of

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[1] Space forbids the enumeration of the many other indications of a biographical source for the *Cato*, but we should note the small but important detail in xvi. 1 τῆς δ' ὑπατείας κατόπιν ἔτεσι δέκα, a precision which is conformable neither to a solely political biography nor to Plutarch's normal ways, since he is generally quite uninterested in matters of chronology, and must have found the calculation ready-made.

[2] One of the stories of Titus' mission to Prusias must be false, and must have been invented either to exonerate him to a certain extent and embroil a Scipio, or to contrast him unfavourably with Scipio, whichever we choose to say is invented.

[3] pp. 7 f.

[4] I see no reason for accepting Cichorius' suggestion, *Wien. Stud.* xxiv, 1902, p. 588, followed by Klotz, op. cit., pp. 48, 50, that 'Ἀντίαν be read for Τουδιτανόν (MSS. τουιτανόν, τὸν ἰτανον).

[5] Cf. in particular: F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie*, p. 225; Marquart Mau, *Privatleben*, i, pp. 357-60; F. Münzer, *Römische Adelspartien und Adelsfamilien*, p. 190, n. 1, p. 263, n. 1, p. 297, n. 1, pp. 383 ff., p. 392; Schanz-Hosius, *Römische Litteraturgeschichte*, pt. i, pp. 38-40; D. R. Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography*, pp. 189-247; Teuffel, *Römische Litteratur*, i, pp. 139-41; F. Vollmer, 'Laudationum funebrium Romanorum historia et reliquiarum editio',

the subject was not uncommon,[1] a circumstance which, according to Cicero, had a bad effect on Roman historical writing. Some of the *laudationes* certainly, probably most of them, were written down,[2] and could, therefore, be consulted. They would give full if inaccurate accounts of the most important incidents in the man's life, and would be at some pains to defend those actions and incidents which had met with disfavour or incurred disapproval.[3] They would also probably mention some minor offices, especially if it was possible to show that in some way the tenure had been distinguished by some commendable action or by the holder's general conduct.[4] The *elogium* consisted of a dry chronicle of the curule magistracies (others also, later), priestly offices, and triumphs. Brevity excluded detailed narrative, but anyone interested could perhaps find further details in the family archives.[5] For such things as the leading of a colony, however, the *elogium* might be the only source. Nor was exaggeration absent; in the *elogium* of Paullus we find: *ter triumphavit*. This implies that Paullus triumphed over the Spaniards, though in fact he did not,[6] and we noticed that Plutarch's account of the Spanish campaign showed a similar falsification in favour of Paullus. The *commentarii magistratuum*, which became part of the literary possessions of the family,[7] whatever their precise contents,[8] would contain sane and valuable material for a biographer, and give him an insight into certain details for which he could look vainly in an annalist. And finally the family *stemmata* would simplify the biographer's task of discovering the ancestors and descendants of his subject, and the short family tree at the beginning of some of the *Lives* may well be the fruit of diligent research by the earlier biographer among family *stemmata*.

The second sort of material is quite different. This consists of statements which are either invented or perverted, and in all cases with the object of bringing someone into repute or disrepute, or allowing one person to score at the expense of another. In other words, they are invented for personal reasons. For this the explanation is clear. History was looked upon generally as personal, and the history of the years 200–150 was essentially regarded as the clash of 'ancient' and 'modern', i.e. of Cato and Scipio. There were undoubtedly political cliques in Rome during these years, which gathered round the persons of Scipio, Titus, and Cato;[9] and since in the pursuit of their different policies they not seldom fell foul of one another, it was obviously in the interests of those who supported the contending politicians to show their own hero in as favourable a light as possible and thus indirectly vindicate themselves. Now it was at this time that the nobles began to interest themselves in writing, and not least in historical writing,[10] and thus they had an excellent opportunity for attaining their end. By writing up an event in a certain way they could bring fame on their hero and the reverse on his opponent; this was of course really an extension only of the practice of the leading families who had increased the fame of their members, sometimes perhaps to the detriment of others. But once the process had begun,

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Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, 1892, Supptbd. xviii, pp. 445–528; and the relevant articles in *P.W.* See also the article by Ulrich Knoche in *Neue Jahrbücher für antike und deutsche Bildung*, 1939, pp. 193 ff.

[1] Cf. Cicero, *Brutus*, 16. 62; Livy, viii. 40. 4.

[2] Cf. Vollmer, pp. 467–8 and *P.W.* xii. s.v. *laudatio*, col. 993. Leo, p. 45, thinks they were preserved for future occasions, and only published when speeches became literary.

[3] Cf. Stuart, p. 214.

[4] Perhaps the description of Paullus' augurship in iii derives from a *Laudatio*.

[5] Cf. Von Premerstein in *P.W.* v. s.v. *Elogium*,

col. 2442.

[6] Pais, *Fasti Triumphales Populi Romani*, pp. 145–6, thinks that Paullus celebrated the lesser triumph on the Alban Mount for his Spanish success, and in this he may well be right.

[7] Cf. Cicero, *Sulla*, 42.

[8] Cf. Von Premerstein in *PW.* iv, s.v. *Commentarii*; Teuffel, p. 137.

[9] See further Gelzer, *Die römische Nobilität*, pp. 102–15; Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*; Schur, *Scipio Africanus*; McDonald in *J.R.S.* 1938, pp. 153 ff.

[10] Cf. Knoche, op. cit., p. 205.

no arbitrary limits could be imposed; any means were fair that achieved their purpose, and one excellent means was naturally to invent situations in which their hero distinguished himself, or his opponent behaved badly, or to counter a story which though true had been misrepresented, by suggesting that his opponent also had been present at the time. In other words, there grew up around the leading politicians a body of literature written by their political adherents and the members of their families for the purpose of vindicating them in the eyes of the educated Roman public. This literature was obviously historical in manner, if not wholly true to fact, but it was also biographical, and it is impossible to differentiate between the two elements; it was history seen through the eyes, for example, of an adherent of Cato, in which the hero was the centre of the picture, and other notabilities were made to assume an unfavourable aspect. The attention of these writers tended probably to concentrate on certain particular incidents, in which either the hero or his opponent had left himself open to attack by his enemies, and their method of dealing with the situation varied according to the circumstances. Thus the incident of Lucius Flamininus has been worked into a detailed story because the facts themselves are sufficiently damning; the only defence was to pretend that the people had demanded his reinstatement, and with but a slight stretch of the imagination that could be effected, and so the completed version took shape. Titus' behaviour in hounding Hannibal to his death had given the Scipionic clique a good chance to contrast Scipio's broad-minded and tolerant policy with Titus' petty fears and rather miserable jealousy, a contrast which Hannibal drew as he swallowed the poison. Titus' reputation suffered, and the best defence of his action was to suggest that in truth the Senate had sent a mission which included both Titus and a Scipio whose sole duty it was to get rid of Hannibal; Titus thus becomes a dutiful and loyal citizen.[1]

The incidents which have been invented about Cato suggest something more closely akin to a biography as their literary vehicle. There is an appearance at least of continuity about them; the inventor seems to have been trying not to defend Cato against particular charges but to show his whole political life as one of opposition to Scipio, and to achieve his purpose artistically he made Cato first the friend of Fabius, Scipio's old opponent, then invented the various clashes between the two in the quaestorship and in the governorship of Spain. This clearly goes beyond mere defence; it is attack, planned on the widest front possible; symbolically such a representation corresponds to the facts, inasmuch as the history of these years did appear as one of continuous warfare between Cato on the one side and Scipio, Titus, and others on the other. We obviously cannot be precise about the form of this biography of Cato, nor can we say whether it was exceptional or not; I believe that it differed only in degree from similar writings about other important persons. The type of writing of whose existence we have such clear traces could most easily be cast into a biographic form of sorts; not a complete biography, since those who wrote were not concerned with the presentation of character; but it would deal with his public life, and not even that need have been treated systematically; it would be sufficient, perhaps even advantageous, to select incidents for detailed treatment and arrange them perhaps according to topics or in some other way which would suit the purpose better; and conversely the writer might give some attention to his opponent's failures—or what could be made to appear as failures. Such literature was probably written in the second half of the second century; it is unlikely that it would begin when the protagonists were still alive and when the facts would be fresh in men's minds; they must allow a sufficient lapse of time for the truth to have grown dim. And, on the other hand, we must suppose that the incidents were still of sufficient

[1] Cf. Sallust's *Catiline*, xxii. 2–3, for an example of invention for political purposes at a later date.

living interest, and that the personal politics were still hotly enough debated among the next generation, for it to be worth while to go to such pains as they did in their own interests. We may therefore suggest tentatively that this second sort of material originated some time between 150 and 100, and that it was the work of nobles who either for political or family reasons had cause to occupy themselves in this way.

FORM AND ORIGIN

We may now return to the immediate biographical source of Plutarch. In the *Titus* we have not a single incident from Titus' private life, though Plutarch would assuredly have given us such incidents if he had known of them. Certainly he is not silent about Paullus' private life, but the only facts which Plutarch gives are also to be found in Polybius, whom we know Plutarch to have read with some care; it looks, therefore, as though either Plutarch had been thrown on his own resources or his source was written a sufficiently long time after Paullus' death to have been forced to depend on literary material for his facts. The public life, we may suppose, was given in some detail; at any rate, the mention of some minor offices suggests that others as unimportant or more important were not passed over. The silence of Plutarch on certain offices which we know from elsewhere the subject held cannot be taken as proof of their omission in his source; we can show that Plutarch omits facts where Polybius, his source, included them. We may also notice that the only mention of Cato's praetorship is in vi, where Plutarch gives an example of Cato's ἐγκράτεια ' when he was praetor '.

I believe, therefore, that the biography contained all or most of the public offices held by the subject. We may next notice the difficulty which Plutarch has in adapting much of his biographical material to his own use. Frequently he has to content himself with the bare mention of the office; at other times he has to draw the attention of the reader to the importance or significance of the office by an account of its functions or the honour it bestowed on its holder: he is seldom able to adapt it and by a selection of points and incidents to make it an illustration of character. This seems to argue a certain objectivity in the account, which left Plutarch little but dry facts. This suggestion is perhaps confirmed by certain points which we may observe. First, we frequently find in Plutarch comparatively long intervals of time between one chapter and the next, where he proceeds from one office to another. Plutarch may have been unaware of the interval himself, but that does not alter the fact. Apparently the biographer was not concerned to show how the interval was filled, and Plutarch has perforce to adopt the same procedure. And there is a second fact: *Titus*, ii. 1, starts thus: τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπῆρε μάλιστα κ.τ.λ. to seek the consulship without having been aedile or praetor. τοῦτο refers to Titus' leading of colonists to Narnia and Consa, and this a reference to Livy (xxxii. 7. 9) will show to be untrue. Plutarch's source described the public offices in chronological order; connexion, if any, was secondary. Plutarch's purposes required a continuous narrative of sorts, and he sometimes has to forge his own links. Furthermore, in *Titus*, i. 5, we find this: Τίτος δὲ . . . εὐδοκίμησεν οὐχ ἧττον ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις ἢ κατὰ τὴν στρατείαν.[1] Now Plutarch would have given us an example of Titus' justice, if he had had one to give, since it would have helped to illustrate his character, and we can only explain his silence by supposing that he had no example; his source must have contained the same empty phrase.

From all this we may infer that it was written some considerable time after the men lived, when the characters had become part of history and intimate stories about their private life had ceased to be told. It is possible that we have a *terminus post quem*

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[1] It looks very much as though this phrase went back eventually to a *Laudatio*, which could applaud ordinary competence only by general phrases.

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for the *Cato* and the *Paullus*, though in neither case can much weight be set on the evidence. In *Cato*, i. 3, he speaks of Cato as Priscus; now Cato was only called Priscus to distinguish him from the younger Cato, and if we were sure—which we are not—that Plutarch took this from his source, that would date the source at the earliest to 60 B.C. onwards. In *Paullus*, xxxviii. 1, he refers to the reimposition of *tributum* (43 B.C.) which would likewise give us a *terminus post quem* for his source. But in neither case am I disposed to make a great deal of these indications by themselves. So far as we can see, these biographies had only an artistic purpose, i.e. they were not written to subserve political ends; if tendentious material was included, that was only because such material seemed to give fuller accounts than did other sorts. They aimed at being fairly complete accounts of the public life of the character, arranged in chronological order, and the writers were at some pains to achieve completeness; not content with annalists' accounts they went to family archives and there discovered notices of minor offices and glowing descriptions of more important ones. All this implies a diligent, even if at times uncritical, enthusiasm for the task, and this there is no reason to doubt that they possessed. Whether Plutarch's immediate source was written in Greek or Latin we cannot say, but one thing is certain: the form and content of the biography strongly suggest that the impetus to write came from the Romans; no Greek writing for a Greek audience would handle his theme like this. The Greeks liked to find a personality, build it up, and present it to the world. Even if Cato and Scipio were treated by Greeks—which is very probable[1]—they were treated as characters, as Alcibiades and many another had been, and the character was presented in as artistic a way as possible; but we should not look for chronology in such a work. They may have appeared in collections περὶ ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν. Curius Dentatus appeared in such a collection by Megacles,[2] but that would not approach the task as this biography did. Only a Roman would want such a biography, whether he asked a Greek to do it or not. In lack of more precise indications we cannot suggest the date in any but the most general terms, some time between, say, 100 B.C. and A.D. 30.

To recapitulate shortly the arguments and conclusions of this article: there are in the *Paullus*, *Titus*, and *Cato* of Plutarch indications that the basic source was in all cases a biographical work. These indications consist on the one hand of information about minor offices and falsifications *in maiorem gloriam* of the subject, and on the other of inventions made for personal and political objects. The origin of the first sort was probably family records, etc., of the second political and biographical literature of the second century, and both were brought together in Plutarch's sources by writers of the first century B.C. who were writing chronological biographies, which included most if not all the public life of the subject and made some attempt to be exhaustive. Whether they were written in Latin or Greek we cannot say.

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[1] In fact one of Plutarch's biographical sources for the *Cato* was, I believe, Greek, and that is one reason for the apparently haphazard arrangement of the *Life*; the Greek source gave no indication of time, and so Plutarch does not know where he should put some things. See above, p. 5.

[2] Whenever he lived; cf. *PW*. Bd. xv, s.v. Megakles, No. 9, col. 126-7. Where did he find the story? Could it have been in Cato's *Origines* that it first appeared?

WHEN DID LIVIUS ANDRONICUS COME TO ROME?

(Passages cited from ancient authors: (*a*) Cic. *Brut.* 72; (*b*) Cic. *De Sen.* 50; (*c*) Cic. *Tusc.* i. 3; (*d*) Gell. XVII. xxi. 42 and 44; (*e*) Livy vii. 2; (*f*) Suet. *Gramm.* 1; (*g*) Jerome, *ad ann.* 187 B.C.; (*h*) Cassiod., *ad ann.* 239; (*i*) Livy xxvii. 37. 7; (*j*) Festus, p. 333 M.; (*k*) Livy xxix. 37. 3 (*ad ann.* 204); (*l*) id. xxxi. 12. 10 (*ad ann.* 200); (*m*) id. xxxiv. 54 (*ad ann.* 194); (*n*) id. xxxvi. 36 (*ad ann.* 191).)

In the middle of September, 47 B.C., Cicero obtained a copy of Atticus' recently published *Liber Annalis*, which he was consequently able to use in preparing his *Brutus* (46 B.C.) and his *Tusculans* and *De Senectute* (44 B.C.). Atticus himself had consulted Varro's works on questions of literary history (Schanz, p. 330). Cicero, reading his friend's work, found himself in the thick of a controversy about the beginnings of Latin literature.

One of the first Romans to interest himself in matters of literary history had been the dramatist Accius (born 170 B.C.). His researches had led him to the conclusion (*a*) that the poet Livius had been captured when Tarentum was taken by Fabius Maximus (209 B.C.), and that he had produced a play (presumably his first) in 198 B.C. In rough agreement with this chronology are (1) the remark of Porcius Licinus, *c.* 100 B.C. (*d*), that the Muse had come to Rome during the *second* Punic War; (2) the view of Valerius Antias, *c.* 100 B.C. (*n*) that the first dramatic performance in Rome was given in 191 B.C.; (3) the assertion of Horace (*Ep.* II. i. 162) that it was not till after the Punic Wars that Rome became interested in Greek drama; (4) Jerome's statement (*g*) that Andronicus reached fame as a writer of tragedy in 187 B.C. At least one modern writer (Niese, 'Zur Geschichte des pyrrhischen Krieges', *Hermes*, xxxi) is inclined to accept Accius' chronology.

We do not know whether Accius himself shared the belief that Andronicus had been the first Latin dramatist—a belief which seems to have been generally held and which is nowhere assailed in extant literature. (If he did, then obviously he must have believed that the other dramatists lived even nearer his own time.) Atticus, following Varro, had attacked this chronology, asserting that Andronicus had produced a play as early as 240 B.C.—an assertion which Cicero claims to have verified by personal inspection of an early document. Cicero further points out that by 198 B.C., Accius' date for Andronicus' first play, Ennius had already passed his fortieth year; and as Ennius was later than Plautus and Naevius, Andronicus, Rome's first dramatist, would have been later than them too—which was absurd. In two other passages—(*b*) and (*c*)—Cicero repeats his statement that Andronicus' first play was produced at the earlier date. This date is upheld by Gellius (*d*), while Cassiodorus (*h*) assigns the event to the following year, 239 B.C.

We can thus appreciate Cicero's admission that the date of Andronicus' first play was a matter of controversy ('est enim inter scriptores de numero annorum controuersia'). The authority of Accius, a dramatist and literary historian, with regard to a literary event which he assigned to the generation preceding his own birth, must be regarded as weighty; indeed, all the writers whose views on the subject we know seem to have accepted it, down to the age of Cicero. It would play havoc with the accepted chronology of early Roman literary history; a stronger objection is that Plautus speaks of the (second) Punic War as still going on (*Cist.* 197–202), and if Plautus had really been earlier than Andronicus, it is not easy to see why the Romans of a later age should have transferred the honour of priority from the popular Italian dramatist to the little-read foreigner. Accordingly, when Cicero claims to have confirmed the view of Atticus by personal inspection of an early document, we are ready to believe him.

How did Accius overlook the records (which Cicero claims to have consulted) of a performance by Andronicus in 240 B.C.? How did he come to assign to 198 (1) that first play of Andronicus which Cicero assigns to 240, (2) the particular performance of ludi Juventatis which Livy assigns to 191? How can Accius have found a record of a play by Andronicus in 198 when, according to the implications of (b) and (l) his life can hardly have been prolonged beyond 204 (when Cato had ceased to be *adulescens*) and almost certainly not beyond 200 (when another poet was chosen to write the state hymn 'as Livius had done in the memory of the previous generation')?

Modern students, almost without exception, accept Cicero's refutation of Accius' statement that Andronicus had been taken prisoner at the capture of Tarentum in 209 B.C. They endeavour to explain Accius' error by supposing that he confused two captures of Tarentum—the first in 272, at the close of the Pyrrhic War, and the second in 209—and that Andronicus had really been taken prisoner in 272. This is pure hypothesis; neither Cicero nor any other ancient author connects Andronicus with the Pyrrhic War. What Cicero says is that Andronicus was *not* taken prisoner at Tarentum in 209, and the evidence on which Cicero relies is the record of a performance by Andronicus in 240, as well as the fact (universally admitted, it would appear from Cicero's language) that Andronicus was the first Latin dramatist. If Varro, Atticus, or Cicero had known anything about the capture of Andronicus at Tarentum in 272, it is hard to see why they did not use such knowledge to refute Accius still more directly. The implication of Cicero's words is that the earliest recorded event in the career of Andronicus was the production of a play in 240 B.C.

Moreover, it seems to be increasingly recognized that the supposed 'first capture' of Tarentum in 272 is itself uncertain (see Niese, op. cit.). The town seems to have made a treaty with Rome which allowed it to remain a semi-autonomous community, with its walls intact and its fleet still in its possession. It lent ships to Rome in 264 (Polyb. i. 20. 14); it was Rome's ally till Hannibal captured it in 212. 'Rome did not treat the city as one captured by force, but accepted it as a *socius naualis*, though not with full autonomy' says Tenney Frank (*C.A.H.* vii. 655); unfortunately he adds 'and captives must have been taken, since we happen to know that Livius Andronicus, Rome's first writer of tragedies, was as a child brought in captivity to Rome from Tarentum'. This is an outrageous circle in argument; the only evidence that Andronicus came from Tarentum is the statement of Accius; and Accius says nothing about Andronicus being a child at the time of his capture—on the contrary, he says that, eleven years later, Andronicus produced a play. When, therefore, we read in Fraenkel's article on Livius Andronicus (*P.W.*, 1931) that the date when Andronicus came to Rome is unimportant, we can point out that the *Cambridge Ancient History* bases its account of the fall of Tarentum on this event.

The only evidence, apart from Accius' almost universally rejected statement, which could suggest that Andronicus was ever taken prisoner at all is Jerome's assertion (g) that Andronicus was at one time a slave in the house of Livius Salinator. Jerome's remark, brief as it is, is generally held to contain two mistakes (as to date and praenomen), and Fraenkel (op. cit.) rejects it altogether. But even if we accept from Accius the connexion of Andronicus with Tarentum, and from Jerome Andronicus' servile status, we cannot explain the enslavement by referring it to a 'capture of Tarentum' which never took place.

Leo sees the difficulty, and admits that we cannot be sure that Andronicus came from Tarentum; believing, however, that a connexion with Tarentum is probable, and granting at the same time that Andronicus cannot have been made prisoner when the town was captured—since the town was not captured—he prefers to suppose that Andronicus was made prisoner at some time *before* the end of the war. If Leo had tried to develop this line of argument he would surely have confessed that it only

increases the great difficulty with regard to the accepted chronology of Andronicus' career, which is the wide gap between the Pyrrhic War and the two usually accepted dates—Andronicus' performance of a play in 240 and his commission to write the State hymn in 207 (see (*i*) and (*j*) above). Ribbeck's supposition that he was born about 278 and carried off to Rome at the age of six meant that he was thirty-eight when he produced his first play, and seventy-one when he was commissioned to write the State hymn. These ages are quite high enough; manifestly we cannot greatly increase them. Yet Ribbeck's chronology sacrifices to a large extent the attractiveness of the view which connects Andronicus, who brought Greek drama to Rome, with Tarentum, the centre of dramatic activity in Magna Graecia. If he left Tarentum for Rome at the age of six, he can scarcely have brought with him much knowledge of Greek drama, still less any practical acquaintance with the Greek theatre. If we keep 278 as the approximate date of birth but suppose with Leo that he was made captive *before* the end of the war, we bring him to Rome as a mere infant. Two suggestions have been made to overcome this difficulty. La Ville de Mirmont (*Études sur l'ancienne poésie latine*, p. 33), keeping the canonical (though hypothetical) dates 278 and 272, supposes that among the other captives there were some who could instruct the young Andronicus in his native language and literature, or at least that the booty included Greek manuscripts which the child could study in Rome. Surely it is more probable that a child of six, arriving in Rome as a slave, would have been swallowed up in the menial duties of some great household where his fellow slaves, even if they could converse fluently in Greek of a kind, would have been persons of little culture, quite unable to inspire a child with a knowledge and love of Greek literature. We are told that he acted as tutor to his master's sons, that he lectured on Greek literature, and that he introduced Greek tragedy, comedy, and epic to Rome. Surely such evidence presupposes in him a good Greek education; could he have picked it up from his fellow slaves, or from his own reading, in the Rome of the early third century? Fraenkel (op. cit.) suggests that he could have maintained contact with his native Tarentum, even after his arrival in Rome. Is this likely in the case of a slave?

Leo allows that Andronicus may have completed his school education before leaving Tarentum, but without considering the consequences of such a suggestion. Let us suppose that Andronicus was born in 287. He would then have been about fifteen by the end of the war (assuming—and it is only an assumption—that Tarentum continued the struggle until the death of Pyrrhus in 272), and must, *ex hypothesi*, have already severed his connexion with his Greek birth-place. He would have been forty-seven when he produced his first play, and eighty when he received his commission to compose the State hymn. At the age of fourteen or thereabouts he might indeed have acquired command of his native language and considerable acquaintance with his native literature; but something more was required if he was to produce Greek plays on the Roman stage—a practical knowledge of the Greek theatre; and this he cannot have obtained, for in 280 B.C. all public amusements in Tarentum had been suppressed by Pyrrhus (Plut. *Pyrrhus*, 16). We are told, indeed, that this harsh treatment drove many Tarentines to leave their native town—but Andronicus, if he arrived in Rome as a slave, can scarcely have been one of these voluntary exiles; and we must remember that he was still active seventy-three years later.

It appears, then, that Andronicus cannot have been captured in Tarentum either during or at the end of the Pyrrhic War. Still less can he have been captured there in subsequent years, when the city was an ally of Rome. We must therefore sacrifice not only Accius' date (209) but Accius' statement that he was captured at Tarentum. If he was a Tarentine, he cannot have been captured; if he came to Rome as a captive, he cannot have come from Tarentum. This is all that is left to us of Accius'

statement; and we still have Jerome, who may perhaps be right at least in ascribing to Andronicus a period of servitude.

Jerome tells us that Andronicus acted as tutor to the sons of Livius Salinator, and was set free by his master in recognition of his abilities. Accius held that Andronicus' first play had been produced at games vowed by Livius Salinator during the battle of Sena. Livy tells us that in the year of Livius Salinator's consulship Andronicus was chosen to write the State hymn. Assuming for the moment that Jerome's statement is correct, let us set down the Livii Salinatores whose names we know from this period:

(1) M. Livius (Salinator), *decemvir s.f.* in 236 B.C. and—in all probability, I think—the M. Livius who was one of the elderly ambassadors sent to Carthage in 218 B.C. (Livy XXI. xviii. 1; *P.W.* xiii. 1. 891, 894; de Mirmont, op. cit.).

(2) M. Livius Salinator, son of (1), consul for the second time in 207 with M. Claudius Nero, with whom he shared the credit for the victory over Hasdrubal. In 204 Salinator was censor with C. Claudius, and set about the building of the temple to Juventas which he had vowed on the field of battle. The two censors passed regulations affecting the supply of salt: hence, according to Livy, the nickname 'Salinator'. (See (k) and (n).)

(3) C. (or M.) Livius Macatus (referred to by Cicero as Salinator in *De Sen.* iv. 11 and *De Orat.* II. lxvii. 273). In 212 he lost the town of Tarentum but held the citadel.

(4) C. Livius Salinator, son of (2). In 198 he was recalled from a naval command. He was praetor for the second time in 191, and was then sent as ambassador to detach Prusias from Antiochus. In 188 he was consul.

The most likely patron for Andronicus is evidently (1), who if an old man in 218 might have been born about 280. Andronicus would then have been the tutor of (2), born about 260 if he was to be of age for the consulate in 219. Livy's anecdote about the origin of the title Salinator in 204 need not distress us; Schulze (*Lat. Eigennamen*) connects Salinator with Salius, etc.; it was probably an ancient cognomen in the Livian gens. We can well understand that the consul of 207 would remember his old teacher when the question arose as to who should write the state hymn. On the other hand, if Accius had for some reason believed that (2) was the *patron* of Andronicus instead of being his pupil, his chronology would have been seriously affected. We can guess at possible reasons for such a mistake: (2) was far the most famous Livius Salinator; the popular derivation of 'Salinator' from *salina* and the salt-laws of 204 may have been current in Accius' day; Accius may have derived his information from the annals of the Collegium Poetarum, founded in 207. These and other reasons may have prevented Accius from pursuing his researches much further back than the year 207; he would thus have failed to discover the 'early document' mentioned by Cicero which recorded the performance of a play by Andronicus in 240; the composition of the hymn of 207 would, of course, have been officially mentioned, and this may have been the only reliably recorded event in the career of Andronicus during the period to which Accius confined his researches. The poet's name, Livius Andronicus, would itself be evidence that he was of Greek origin and had secured the protection of some member of the Livian gens. A Livius Salinator had been in Tarentum when the town was recaptured by Fabius Maximus. To bring Andronicus to Rome as a result of the capture of Tarentum in 209 would seem to be in harmony with his Greek origin and his connexion with Livius (Salinator), and would also make it just possible for him to compose the hymn in 207. But Accius knew further that Andronicus had written plays, and would have searched his records from 209 onwards to find some account of a performance of one of these plays. It is very possible that he found no such account; his records may have begun with the foundation of the Collegium Poetarum in 207, and Andronicus seems not to have lived later than 204.

In view, however, of the known connexion between Andronicus and the Livian gens, and of the generally accepted priority of Andronicus in Latin drama, any reference to games given by a Livius Salinator, or to scenic games no matter by whom given, might naturally be seized upon as evidence for the foundation of Latin drama by Andronicus. The following dates might accordingly have interested students such as Accius:

204: Livius Salinator (2) begins building of temple to Juventas. First performance of Megalensian games, according to Livy xxix. 14.

198: Livius Salinator (4) returns to Rome. Performance (according to Accius) of the ludi Juventatis vowed by (2), including a play by Andronicus. For Accius, then, these would be the first scenic games given in Rome.

194: C. Atilius Serranus curule aedile (a namesake of his had undertaken vota in 218, apparently in connexion with a lectisternium to Juventas—Livy xxi. 62). Seats of senators divided from people in the theatre (presumably at the ludi Romani). First scenic Megalensia, according to Livy xxxiv. 54.

191: second praetorship of (4). Performance of the ludi Juventatis vowed by (2), according to Livy xxxvi. 36. Megalensian games—the first scenic games held in Rome, according to Valerius Antias—see (n). (Had Antias come across the original of the didascalia to the *Pseudolus*, produced at these games?)

188: consulship of (4).

187: Andronicus at the zenith of fame as a tragedian, according to Jerome.

If de Mirmont is right in connecting the consulship of (4) in 188 with Jerome's assertion that at about this time Andronicus was famous as a tragedian, we may explain Accius' reference to a performance by Andronicus in 198 by the record of ludi Juventatis and perhaps the presence of (4) in Rome during this year. What seems to emerge clearly is that there was controversy as to the date of the first scenic games—some said they were the Megalensia of 194, some voted for the ludi Juventatis of 198 or 191. The early document recording the scenic ludi Romani of 240 seems to have remained unknown until the time of Varro.

That the source of Accius' error may have been some confusion between two members of the Livian family is not a new suggestion; but the very possibility of such an error tends to confirm the tradition that Andronicus was connected with the Livian gens. The Livian and Claudian families had connexions with the semi-Greek south: Pacuvius Calavius, who betrayed Capua to Hannibal, was the son-in-law of Appius Claudius and the father-in-law of Livius Salinator (2).

Since we have been forced to abandon the theory (for which there is, indeed, no ancient evidence) that Andronicus came to Rome during or at the end of the Pyrrhic War, it follows that he must have come at some later time. If he came from Tarentum, he may have come as a freeborn man or as a slave, but he cannot have come as a war-captive. What evidence have we as to his status?

There is first his name. Cicero, Livy, and Suetonius call him simply Livius. The praenomen appears in Gellius, Festus, and Cassiodorus as L(ucius), in Jerome and Nonius as T(itus). The cognomen occurs in a passage of Gellius (18. 9. 5), where he tells us that he has found in a library a 'really old' manuscript of Livius Andronicus entitled 'Οδύσσεια. Apparently Gellius is quoting the name of the author as he found it on this copy. That Livius, the author of the *Odyssey*, is the same person as Livius the dramatist, is attested by Cicero (*Brut.* 18. 71); there seems no reason, therefore, for doubting the cognomen Andronicus (given him by Priscian also, *GLK.* 2. 321. 7; late writers would naturally feel the need to distinguish the poet Livius from the historian). The statement of Jerome that the poet was freed by Livius Salinator affords a simple explanation of the nomen; unfortunately there is no such easy

explanation for the praenomen, given variously as Lucius or Titus, for neither of these praenomina was borne by any of the Livii Salinatores known to us from this period. On this point writers are at a loss. Mommsen remarks that the later rule with regard to the praenomen was not yet applied; de Mirmont suggests that the poet may have had two patrons, from one of whom he took his praenomen while deriving his nomen from the other (cf. *ad Att.* IV. xv. 1); as a parallel de Mirmont cites the case of the poet Archias, who on receiving Roman citizenship took the nomen Licinius from his patron L. Licinius Lucullus, but added the praenomen Aulus from some unknown source. The praenomen Titus may well have been applied to Andronicus from confusion with the historian; but Teuffel suggests that L(ucius) may have been derived from the first letter of the nomen. It is conceivable that the poet bore no praenomen at all.

What about the cognomen? Only two other writers of the early period, Caecilius and Terence, are said to have been slaves. Gellius (4. 20. 13) tells us that 'Caecilius was a slave and was *therefore* called Statius' (a *seruile nomen*); 'afterwards this name was changed into a sort of cognomentum, and he was called Caecilius Statius'. Statius was, therefore, the slave-name bestowed by the Roman master on the young Insubrian captive. The case of Terence is even clearer; his master was Terentius Lucanus (whose praenomen is not recorded); the poet's cognomen, Afer, is manifestly the slave-name given by the master to the young 'African'. But Andronicus is a genuine Greek name, which was borne by a number of more or less distinguished people, including the actor who coached Demosthenes in elocution. Surely it was the name which the poet bore in his native town, and which he retained as a cognomen after adopting the nomen of his Roman patron; in that case Licinius Archias would be a closer parallel than Caecilius Statius or Terentius Afer. But Archias was not a slave who adopted his master's nomen on emancipation; he was a freeborn Greek who adopted his protector's nomen on receiving Roman citizenship.

The suggestion that Andronicus came to Rome as a freeman has been made before, and has been met by the objections that (*a*) it involves setting aside two separate pieces of evidence as to his slave-status (Schanz), (*b*) it does not allow of his coming to Rome sufficiently early to account for his mastery of Latin (Leo). I have laboured to show that Accius' statement cannot be used to prove *both* that Andronicus came from Tarentum *and* that he was a captive; if, therefore, we cling to the Tarentine connexion, the only witness for his servile status is Jerome. As for Leo's argument, we are told that Ennius, who prided himself on his knowledge of Greek, Latin, and Oscan, did not come to Rome until he was thirty-five (Nepos, *Cato*, 1. 4). Tarentum and other Greek towns presumably presented as good opportunities as Rudiae for learning what was now the dominant language of the peninsula; at least it seems easier to suppose that Andronicus learned Latin in Tarentum than that he acquired a knowledge of Greek theatrical practice in Rome.

Apart from Jerome's statement I find nothing to suggest that Andronicus was of servile status when he arrived in Rome. We are told that he acted as tutor to the sons of Livius Salinator (but this also comes from the questionable statement of Jerome). We hear further that he lectured on Greek literature, that he founded Latin tragedy, comedy, and epic, and that in his old age he was commissioned to write the State hymn, and was rewarded by the foundation in his honour of the 'Poets' Club'. It is true that Caecilius and Terence are said to have been slaves. But they were associated with comedy alone; and we hear of no other slave or ex-slave as a dramatist until we come to the mime-writer Publilius Syrus. Livy records it as a fact worthy of mention that Andronicus, like the other playwrights of his time, 'acted in his own plays'. By Livy's day the gulf between actors (who belonged to the lowest ranks of society) and playwrights (members of the literary class) was great. The implication of Livy's

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remark is surely not that all early playwrights were slaves or ex-slaves, but that Livius and the other early dramatists, though men of respectable position, did not think it beneath them to act on the stage.

Jerome or his authority may have found it recorded that Andronicus had acted as tutor to the sons of Livius Salinator, and have taken this as implying slave-status —a natural point of view in imperial times. I do not agree with de Mirmont that we should reject the traditions of Andronicus' teaching activities. Greek was now becoming a necessary part of a gentleman's education, and Roman fathers must have been glad to find a respectable Greek willing to instruct their sons. The drama which Andronicus introduced may not have yielded from the start a sufficient livelihood to its founder; there was as yet probably only one occasion in the year when plays could be performed. His translation of the *Odyssey* reads like what it certainly became, a school text-book. We can scarcely suppose that there was a reading public in third-century Rome whose patronage could maintain an author. As every one seems to agree that Andronicus was no longer a slave by the time he entered on his dramatic career, we must face the problem of how he maintained himself; and it is hard to find a better answer than the traditional one. The statement of Suetonius (*f*) couples him and Ennius as poets of Greek origin whose teaching activities consisted in the interpretation of Greek texts and the reading aloud of their own Latin compositions. De Mirmont dismisses this statement because the reference to Andronicus and Ennius as 'the earliest teachers' conflicts with Plutarch's evidence that the first teacher of grammar in Rome was Spurius Carvilius, who introduced the letter *G* into the Latin alphabet and who was the freedman of the first Roman to divorce his wife, Sp. Carvilius Ruga. Here I suspect that we are stumbling on another Roman controversy as to dates—at least, I find it hard to explain otherwise why Gellius, in his review of early literary history, should insert a reference to the first divorce in Rome (*d*). The special qualification of Andronicus and Ennius was, as Suetonius points out, that they were 'poets and half-Greeks'; they were therefore able to lecture with authority on Greek literature and to interpret it with the aid of their own Latin translations. Carvilius may have belonged to quite another category of teachers. Even in the matter of the domestic tutorship Ennius may present a parallel. He enjoyed the patronage of M. Fulvius Nobilior, whose son, Quintus, was brought up by his father to enjoy literature, and was responsible for conferring citizenship on the poet (Cic. *Brut.* 20. 79). Dare we connect Ennius' praenomen (Quintus) with that of his younger patron, whose taste in letters he must have helped to form? If so, the parallel with Andronicus and the Salinators becomes close, and we are tempted to fancy that, just as Cicero says of Quintus Nobilior: *Ennium . . . ciuitate donauit,* so what Jerome found in his authority was not *libertate donatus est* but *ciuitate donatus est.*[1] As for the parallel between Ennius and Archias, it has already been pointed out by Cicero himself (*Arch.* 10. 22).

The central fact in the life of Andronicus, according to the orthodox view, is that in 240 he produced the first play ever seen in Rome. Up to then, if we can believe Livy, the stage was occupied by the dramatic satura, a plotless medley of song, dance, and clownery, performed by professional histriones. Andronicus was, according to Livy, the first to substitute for the satura a play with a plot; and undoubtedly the play which he produced was an adaptation from Greek tragedy or New Comedy. (Cassiodorus says he produced a tragedy *and* a comedy (*h*).) It is sometimes said (e.g. by Warmington in his Loeb edition) that for some time Andronicus competed with the native composers of saturae before taking the decisive step of substituting for the satura a Greek play in translation. Such an interpretation is not warranted by Livy's text (*e*), which simply tells us that Andronicus was the first to

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[1] The copyist's eye may have been caught by *liberos*.

substitute for the satura a play with a plot, and that 'some years afterwards' he found his voice becoming unequal to the singing of the cantica in his plays. Livius' advantage over the native composers was that he knew and could exploit the resources of Greek drama. As a writer of saturae he would have been handicapped by his foreign extraction; in spite of what Leo says about his mastery of Latin, the testimony of Cicero, Horace, and Livy (who were thinking of his style) is that his plays were not worth a second reading, that his hymn was too uncouth for quotation in a polished history, and that his *Odyssey* was like some rude product of primitive sculpture, deserving from a more sophisticated age nothing better than good-natured toleration.

But if it is unlikely that Andronicus would have sacrificed his one advantage, his knowledge of Greek drama, by trying to compete with native craftsmen in their own field, it is also unlikely that he would have waited for several years in Rome before entering on his dramatic activities. These activities consisted not merely in translating plays but in acquiring and training a company of actors, supervising all the details of production and himself taking a leading part in the performance. I cannot see how he could have ventured to enter on such a career without some previous knowledge of the Greek theatre; and this knowledge he could scarcely have acquired except on a Greek stage. In other words, Andronicus must have begun as an actor in Tarentum or some other Greek town; and we may recall that other Andronicus who was an actor in Athens at the time of Demosthenes.

But if he came to Rome as a trained actor, it is unlikely that he would have allowed his talent to rust through years of inactivity; it is even conceivable that what brought him to Rome was the desire to make his fortune on the barbarian stage. Some patron he must have had; possibly the Livii, always interested in matters of culture (*P.W.* xiii. 1. 812), made it possible for their foreign protégé to give his novel performance. On reflection we shall, I think, be forced to grant (1) that the introduction of Greek drama in the first year of peace must have been suggested by some one in authority, and (2) that Andronicus was selected for the task because of his known qualifications. The innovations in the ludi publici seem to have been connected with matters of public policy and to have been entrusted to imported performers. The circus games were founded to celebrate the first victory over the Latins, and the competitors were fetched from Etruria (Livy i. 35). The advance from circensian to scenic games was due to the desire to appease the wrath of heaven, and was achieved by the importation of Etruscan dancers (Livy vii. 2). The advance from song, dance, and clownery to drama proper coincides with the first year of peace after a great war; the performance was a Greek play in translation, the translator a Greek by birth. Tenney Frank (*Life and Literature in the Roman Republic*, pp. 30–1) suggests that the Senate, wishing to entertain the home-coming soldiers, asked King Hiero of Syracuse to attend the games and also to lend an actor to help with the staging. This is at least a recognition of the need for expert assistance, such as could not have been supplied by a mere 'schoolmaster' (the term by which Tenney Frank refers to Andronicus). But Livy tells us that Andronicus acted in his own plays; he was therefore something more than a 'schoolmaster'. It is surely simpler to see in *him* the expert Greek actor who was needed on this occasion, and to suppose that he was brought to Rome for the purpose from his native town. Lejay points out that one of the consuls in this year was the son of the first Roman to interest himself in literature, Appius Claudius Caecus. We have seen that the daughter of Appius Claudius was wife of a leading man in semi-Greek Capua and mother-in-law of Livius Salinator. If the Claudian and Livian families had connexions with the Greek south, they may have formed the idea of bringing Greek drama to Rome and have selected a suitable man for the task, a trained actor conversant with the Latin tongue.

If his arrival in Rome preceded by only a short period the first performance of a

Greek play, it follows that all his activities as a dramatist and actor, tutor and lecturer, composer of epic and of choral lyric must have been crowded into the years 240–204 or thereabouts. These activities would arise naturally, one out of the other; thus the cantica in his plays would have been in the minds of the authorities when they selected him to compose the State hymn. Throughout his career Andronicus, as a foreigner, must have realized the advantages of having a powerful protector; the position of tutor to the family of Livius Salinator would suit him admirably, and the need for a school text-book may have led to his translation of the *Odyssey*.

In endeavouring to answer the question 'When did Livius Andronicus come to Rome?' I have been forced to consider not only the date of but the reason for his arrival in Rome, and his social status not only at that time but in subsequent years. On these subsidiary matters our evidence does not seem to warrant a dogmatic conclusion; but on the main point I believe I have at least shown that the statement made with such assurance by almost all our historians of Latin literature is untrue.

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PLUTARCH ON THE STOICS

In *Hermes*, lxxiv (1939), p. 1 Professor M. Pohlenz publishes an article entitled 'Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker' which throws much light on these important sources for Stoicism. I had myself made a study of these works, and for the most part find myself in complete agreement, but in my opinion something can be added to his inquiry into Plutarch's sources; and I venture to think that the subject repays attention not so much for itself as because it illustrates an important principle, namely, that investigation of sources must be accompanied by literary appreciation: one must look not only for the flaws that will admit the dissecting knife but also for the intended structure of one's subject.

Let us take first *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*. In spite of its title this work, after the first eight chapters, deals almost exclusively with inconsistencies to be found in the writings of Chrysippus; some of these are little more than conflicting *obiter dicta*, but for the most part an attempt is made to find inconsistencies with or in the more important Stoic doctrines. About seventy verbal citations are made from over thirty[1] works by Chrysippus, and it is highly probable, as was observed by von Arnim,[2] that Plutarch had not collected these himself; had he done so, he would hardly have failed to show elsewhere in his writings the knowledge of these books that such a task would have given him. It is to be assumed then that Plutarch had before him a collection of inconsistencies in the works of Chrysippus; how much more it contained besides what he used there is no means of telling: but I shall suggest that it is the source of a little new material in *de communibus notitiis*. It is equally impossible to tell how much commentary it contained, if it contained any at all. But it is possible to form some idea of the use which Plutarch made of it. Professor Pohlenz's analysis may be tabulated as follows:

A. 1–8. Miscellaneous matter provided by Plutarch.
B. Basing himself on his source, Plutarch treats in turn Logic, Ethics, and Physics.
  a. 9–10. Logic.[3]
  β. 11–30. Ethics.
    i. 11–13 and 17–21. Inconsistencies arising out of the distinctions between ἀγαθά, ἀδιάφορα including τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, and κακά.
    ii. 14–16. Defence of Plato against Chrysippus' attacks—a 'störende Abschnitt' based on Plutarch's work in three volumes, now lost, κατὰ Χρύσιππον περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
    iii. 22–30. Miscellaneous material: 'Plutarch has collected every possible kind of inconsistency without regard to systematic arrangement.'
  γ. 31–47. Physics.
    i. 31–40. περὶ θεῶν.
    ii. 41–5. Single points of physics.
    iii. 46–7. περὶ εἱμαρμένης.

With this analysis I agree in the main, but I hope it is not unfair to say that there appears to lie behind it an assumption for which I see no justification, namely, that order indicates use of a source and disorder Plutarch's own activity. It is perfectly

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[1] It is not certain whether περὶ δικαιοσύνης, and περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Πλάτωνα refer to one work or more than one. Pohlenz rightly refuses to recognize a περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς 'Αριστοτέλην.

[2] *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (*SVF*), Praefatio, pp. xi, xiii.

[3] In fact a misnomer: the section is concerned with methods of teaching to be adopted by the Stoic; none of the works quoted are from the λογικὸς τόπος, of which a list is preserved by Diogenes Laertius; nearly all are known to belong to the ἠθικὸς τόπος.

true that *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* exhibits organization by subject-matter in parts
and no such organization in other parts. But this difference of treatment is deliberate;
it forms the literary structure of the work. The analysis just given is well enough in
its way, but it was made to show the sources, the materials out of which the book
was constructed. It sometimes makes its divisions at points which Plutarch does
nothing to mark, and which the reader would not notice. Thus there is nothing to
mark off A from B, or Bα from Bβ. An analysis of the *literary* form will take a different
shape:

I. 1–6. Inconsistencies connected with public life. There are connecting particles
between the chapters.

II. 7–11. Miscellaneous inconsistencies. There are no connecting particles
between the chapters.

III. 12–22. A section which is in fact, though not explicitly, devoted to incon-
sistencies arising out of the doctrine of ἀγαθά and κακά. It contains a digres-
sion in defence of Plato (14–16). There is connexion between the majority
of chapters. But it leads insensibly into the next section, just as it arose
insensibly out of the preceding one.

IV. 22–30. Miscellaneous inconsistencies which, with one exception,[1] are accu-
mulated without connecting particles. I place 22 in both sections, because
though it is connected with what goes before by καὶ μήν and by considering
the lessons to be drawn from animals, it does not belong to the τόπος περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

V. 31–40. A closely-knit section on the gods,[2] arranged according to the three
attributes popularly ascribed to them: benevolence, immortality, blessedness.

VI. 41–5. Miscellaneous inconsistencies in physics. There are no connecting
particles.[3]

VII. 46–7. Continuous discussion of εἱμαρμένη.

It thus appears that the literary structure of *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*, the structure
felt by the reader, is an alternation between inconsistencies heaped up without
arrangement and inconsistencies gathered under a head. The corresponding sections
are roughly balanced in length. Plutarch avoids monotony and prevents his reader's
attention from wandering by not holding him too long to the same subject and con-
secutive order, and then again, as soon as the discontinuous method of writing
threatens to be found unpleasantly desultory, by returning to continuous treatment
of a main topic.[4] The longest continuous section has within itself for variety's sake
that digression which in our first analysis appeared as a *störende Abschnitt*.

When we consider the structure of the whole book thus exposed, a structure cer-
tainly given to it by Plutarch, we may begin to wonder whether the orderliness of
those parts which exhibit order was not also given to them by Plutarch; and an
examination of the digression will show a method of work that may strengthen that
suspicion. Von Arnim actually argued from the digression that Plutarch's material
was already arranged; 'neque enim ordinem quem ipse instituerat aliena inserendo
turbasse censendus est'. This principle of criticism might lead to some striking results

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[1] c. 29, which clearly does not come from the
source-book (Pohlenz, pp. 11, 32).

[2] Connecting particles are twice missing; on
this see below, note 2 on next page.

[3] Unless one is to be restored by conjecture at
the beginning of 43, where the meaningless ἤ of
XgBF¹, omitted by F²Π, may conceal ἔτι (sigla
of the new Teubner edition; my own collations).

[4] I cannot agree with von Arnim that this is
the procedure of a madman: 'quae vero per
librum de repugnantiis regnat ratio ut partim
in ordinem res digerantur partim inordinatae et
inconexae relinquantur, eam a sani scriptoris
mente abhorrere iudicamus, qui quidem in tota
libri conformatione a se ipse pendeat.'

if applied to Thucydides or Herodotus; but leaving these speculative possibilities on one side, let us consider the digression more closely.

Chapters 14–16 form a closed section; introduced by the words ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀντιλογίαις ἥκιστα φροντίζει τοῦ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ καὶ διάφωνον, they show that Chrysippus fell into inconsistencies in attacking Theognis and, above all, Plato. There are many quotations from his works entitled περὶ δικαιοσύνης and περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποδείξεις, and since Plutarch says in 1040D ἃ μὲν οὖν ῥητέον ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος ἐν ἄλλοις γέγραπται πρὸς αὐτόν, which must be a reference to the περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Χρύσιππον of the 'Lamprias-catalogue',[1] Pohlenz very reasonably concludes, following von Arnim, that Plutarch here made use of material collected for that work. But these quotations are confined to chapters 15–16,[2] in which no other books are cited; chapter 14, on the other hand, has quotations from περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι only, and the subject is not justice,but whether it is desirable for the wicked to go on living. But this subject is, as comes out clearly in the corresponding passage of de communibus notitiis (c. 11), closely associated with the Stoic doctrine of ἀγαθά, κακά, and ἀδιάφορα, which is the unifying topic for chapters 12–13, 17–21 both on my analysis and on that of Professor Pohlenz. It is probable then that we should ascribe the quotations of chapter 14 to the collection of inconsistencies, the more so as chapter 17, which follows on the digression, takes one of its pair of inconsistent quotations from the same book of Chrysippus, cited by its alternative title προτρεπτικά. If this is so, we see that the digression is no mechanical intrusion of extraneous matter, but involves the calculated conjunction of elements from two sources.

Let us now turn to the section 22–30, in which Professor Pohlenz finds 'every sort of inconsistency without regard to systematic arrangement'. The presence of two chapters is particularly surprising: chapter 24 gives a quotation from περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, according to which Chrysippus appealed to the authority of the Academy and Lyceum for the usefulness of dialectic; why, then, asks Plutarch, does he not also recognize their authority on ethics? In chapter 28 we have contradictory passages from περὶ ῥητορικῆς on the subject of style. These chapters certainly seem out of place among others devoted to ethical doctrines. But perhaps their appearance here is to be explained by the fact that both the books cited belong to the ἠθικὸς τόπος, and we may hazard the guess that the arrangement of passages in the collection of inconsistencies used by Plutarch followed the order of the books from which they were excerpted.

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[1] No. 59.

[2] Confined, that is to say, in this digression. Plutarch also quotes from Chrysippus περὶ δικαιοσύνης in chapters 13, 17, and 36 to reinforce contradictions already given by other quotations; he is clearly adding to his source from his own reading. c. 32 begins with the statement that some Pythagoreans criticize Chrysippus for writing in his book περὶ δικαιοσύνης that cocks are useful to wake us, eat scorpions, and give an example of bravery, but that they must be eaten to keep their numbers down. But Chrysippus, continues Plutarch, mocks at such criticism, for he declares in περὶ θεῶν γ´ that Zeus brings about wars to keep down the human population. Yet elsewhere in the same book he says that the gods do nothing disgraceful. It is clear that the passage from περὶ δικαιοσύνης is not inconsistent with either of the other quotations, but is introduced by way of ornament; and we shall conclude that it comes from Plutarch's own reading. The rule

of connexion between chapters generally observed in this section is broken here and again at chapter 38, which similarly introduces an outside school of philosophy into the debate: πρὸς τὸν 'Επίκουρον μάλιστα μάχεται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ θεῶν, εὐεργετικοὺς καὶ φιλανθρώπους ἐπινοοῦντες. καὶ τούτων πολλαχοῦ γραφομένων καὶ λεγομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔδει λέξεις παρατίθεσθαι (Plutarch did not want the trouble of looking the quotations up!). καίτοι (καὶ τὸ gB) χρηστοὺς οὐ πάντας (ἅπαντας gBE) εἰκὸς (A. D. Nock: εἶναι) τοὺς θεοὺς προλαμβάνειν (γβE: προσλαμβάνειν O). ὅρα γὰρ οἷα 'Ιουδαῖοι καὶ Σύροι περὶ θεῶν φρονοῦσιν κτλ. . . . φθαρτὸν δὲ καὶ γενητὸν οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διανοεῖται θεόν . . . except Chrysippus at times! In either case there is no connecting particle because Plutarch is employing the device of seeming to start on a new topic and unexpectedly bringing the reader round to the main subject.

It is noteworthy that in the 'unorganized' sections of *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* there are several cases of adjacent inconsistencies being based on quotations from the same work: 9 and 10 περὶ βίων δ′, 11 (probably) and 12 περὶ κατορθωμάτων, 26 and 27 ἠθικὰ ζητήματα ϛ′. This is exactly what one would expect of a book of inconsistencies as originally compiled; for the compiler would have to read through a number of books in order, noting down inconsistencies as he observed them.

No prudent man will dogmatize on the nature of a lost book, but the evidence I have put forward seems to make it probable that Plutarch by selection and arrangement gave form to a formless collection of inconsistencies; and, after all, one may credit him with a desire to write something better as well as shorter than the book on which he mainly relied.

It may be added that the last chapters (46–7) contain no quotations, and seek to draw out hidden inconsistencies in the Stoic doctrine, not to place obvious ones side by side. Schmekel (*Die mittlere Stoa*, p. 182) pointed out their difference in character from the rest of the work, and argued that they were based on the same source as Cicero's *de fato*. There are certain similarities, it is true, but the dissimilarities are greater; the most important is that the whole of Plutarch's last chapter is based on the Stoic doctrine that the sage may rightly give false impressions to the fool; of this there is not a trace in Cicero. Both writers derive their arguments from Academic polemic against the Stoics, but apparently not from the same book. The same may be said of the coincidences in phrases and arguments between chapters 31–40 and Cicero, *de natura deorum* iii, the order and arrangement being quite different in the two places. It should not be forgotten that a modern academic philosopher is certainly not likely to trust more to his memory than his ancient counterpart; but yet, if he were removed from his books and bidden to write a criticism of Mill's theory of pleasure or Leibniz's belief in innate ideas, he would be able to write at some length and some of his arguments would be found to bear a close similarity to those which could be discovered in printed books. It must, however, be noticed that chapters 46–7 of *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* are in their nature not unlike certain sections of *de communibus notitiis* for which it seems likely to suppose the use of a written source (see below).

The dialogue *de communibus notitiis*, about which I shall write more briefly, referring the reader to Professor Pohlenz's treatment, starts from the Stoic claim to build their philosophy on the 'common conceptions of mankind'; an Academic professor of philosophy, Diadumenus, who seems to be an imaginary figure, undertakes to prove to an ignorant but inquiring pupil that in fact Stoic philosophy and common conceptions are constantly at variance. The first part of the dialogue (down to chapter 30) is clearly constructed out of diverse elements which it is not possible to distinguish with certainty. So far as it has any unity[1] it is to be found in the discussion of the Stoic conception of good things and their refusal to include in that category τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, which are here controversially called τὰ κατὰ φύσιν pure and simple. Much of the material is taken from *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*, many quotations from which are made to do duty again in this dialogue, either in paraphrase or in full. It suits dramatic realism, of course, that Diadumenus should not always quote the exact words or the exact reference.[2] Chapters 6–10 seem to me to be probably Plutarch's own construction; they contain much material from *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* and

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[1] There are fresh starts at c. 11, c. 13, c. 20 (superficially disguised), and in the middle of c. 22 (καὶ μήν): this last is the most abrupt.

[2] It must not be thought undramatic when he does. Pedants might give their references even at dinner-parties, see Epictetus II xix. 8: ἀλλ'

ἂν ὦ κενός, μάλιστα ἐπὶ συμποσίῳ καταπλήσσομαι τοὺς παρόντας, ἐξαριθμούμενος τοὺς γεγραφότας. 'γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος θαυμαστῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν. καὶ Κλεάνθης δὲ ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν περὶ τούτου καὶ Ἀρχέδημος. γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Ἀντίπατρος οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δυνατῶν κτλ. . . .'

have a connexion of thought such as it is not unreasonable to ascribe to him. The first three chapters of this group are arranged in the form of a climax: (6) the sage reckons some good actions less valuable than others; (7) the sage reckons some good actions as without any value; (8) sometimes the sage may reckon a good life in its totality as valueless. With more attention to the internal inconsistency of Stoic doctrine than to its absolute absurdity, and thus revealing the source on which he is drawing, Plutarch proceeds to show that this does not agree with the great gulf set between the good life of the sage and the miserable existence of all other men; and in chapter 9 he turns to the inconsistency of this gulf with the idea that a man who has progressed to the limits of virtue can thereafter become a sage without immediately knowing it. The idea of 'progress' having thus been introduced, chapter 10 considers the absurdity of considering the 'improving' man equally wicked with the most abandoned scoundrel. On the other hand, the somewhat intricate argument of chapters 14–19 (on the necessity of evil) and 26–7 (on the end of life), which are, except for the quotation at the beginning of chapter 14, entirely without citations from Chrysippus or parallels with *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*, is probably based on unknown written sources; that 26–7 go back originally to an Academic contemporary of Antipater was rightly deduced by von Arnim from their strange conclusion ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσὶν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι, μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν, but he went beyond the evidence in supposing that Clitomachus had been used, and used not only here but throughout the book, and in *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* as well.[1]

The second half of the dialogue is concerned with physics, and is distinguished from the first by the fewness of its quotations from Chrysippus and the fact that there is little repetition of material from *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*, this being confined to chapters 31–4 and 46. Four sections, chapters 30, 37, 40–3, and 48–50, are noteworthy as being not really suitable to Plutarch's purpose;[2] in these chapters Stoic doctrines are shown not so much to be contrary to common opinions and absurd in themselves as to lead to logical impossibilities when analysed. It may be concluded that Plutarch was not very successfully adapting some book of different aim, a book which may perhaps have also been used for any or all of the sections 14–19, 26–7, and *de Stoicorum repugnantiis* 46–7.

There are in this part of the dialogue four new quotations from Chrysippus for which a reference is given. Two are a pair of contradictory quotations on Time and could be dispensed with from their chapter (41 fin.);[3] they are presumably taken from that collection of inconsistencies which formed the basis of *de Stoicorum repugnantiis*.[4] The other two passages are both from φυσικὰ ζητήματα α', and both occur inorganically at the end of chapters (37, 45). Now there is reason for supposing that Plutarch knew

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[1] Cf. Pohlenz, p. 32.

[2] παρίημι δὲ πολλὰς ἀτοπίας αὐτῶν τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐφαπτόμενος (c. 44 init.) nearly confesses as much as regards 40–43. The structure of *de communibus notitiis* is defective at many points, and Hirzel (*Der Dialog*, ii. 223 note) suggested that it was a work of Plutarch's extreme old age; certainly he cannot have given much trouble to it. At 1077 F I do not know whether to suppose that there is a lacuna before ἀλλὰ μήν, or simply to see lack of revision which has left a sentence in the air.

[3] At 349,21 (Bernardakis) I think the words καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος have fallen out after ὑπάρχοντος. Other minor corrections of the manuscripts (there are only two, of the 14th cent.,

copied from the same original, and full of corruptions), might be added here: 286,2 perhaps τοῦτο τῶν ἔργων, 289,16 τὸ ⟨τὸν⟩ ἔννουν, 293,4 αὐτὸν, 309,12 γοῦν, 339,4 θάτερον. καὶ μηδέτερον αὐτῶν αὖ πάλιν δυνατὸν εἶναι, συμβαίνει δ' ἀμφότερα, 339,21 ἀπαγορεύσει, 349,5 τούτων ⟨δ'⟩. I hope to deal with some major corruptions in another article.

[4] It may also have supplied the quotation from περὶ ἀγαθῶν γ' in c. 25, which is mutilated but perhaps recorded an agreement with the unorthodox Herillus; this might well have been included in the collection of inconsistencies. The same chapter contains also a new reference to περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Πλάτωνα, no doubt from Plutarch's own reading.

this book at first hand. His little work *de primo frigido* contains much clearly based on a Stoic source (948D ff.), and in one place he quotes Chrysippus verbally (952c), introducing the quotation with words implying that he knew the whole of Chrysippus' treatment of the subject.[1] We know, however, that the subject was dealt with by Chrysippus in φυσικὰ ζητήματα α' (*de Stoicorum repugnantiis*, 1053F; *SVF*, ii. 429). If the surmise that Plutarch took these two quotations from his own reading is probable, it may serve as the basis for another. The chapters which immediately follow the first of these quotations (38 and 39) contain a couple of quotations from some unnamed work and record difficulties in which Chrysippus became involved because of his belief in infinite divisibility; both deal with points of detail rather than important elements in the Stoic system, and this is particularly true of the second, which concerns Chrysippus' attempt to solve a problem connected with the division of a cone and first propounded by Democritus. The chapters are really too specialized for the scheme of *de communibus notitiis*, and this is the more noticeable because chapter 37 has promised a discussion of στοιχεῖα.[2] I suggest that Plutarch, having turned to φυσικὰ ζητήματα α' for his quotation at the end of 37, could not resist picking out a couple of points from the same book. The subjects of both quotations are suitable for a work entitled ζητήματα, for Chrysippus' λογικὰ ζητήματα and ἠθικὰ ζητήματα both seem to have been collections of miscellaneous difficult problems.

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[1] μόνον ἐμνήσθη τῶν κτλ.

[2] This chapter is in fact concerned with κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, but that might be regarded as a necessary preliminary; for not only are the elements mixed with one another in this way (*SVF*, ii. 155), but they are formed by such a mixture of ὕλη and θεός (*SVF*, ii. 310, 475, etc.). The proper treatment of στοιχεῖα does not come till c. 48; having once digressed from his subject Plutarch seems to have forgotten it. The suggestion of Rasmus (*de libro qui de communibus notitiis inscribitur commentatio* p. 24) that 48–50 should be inserted between 44 and 45 (between 43 and 44 would be a better place as 44 would be linked to 50 by the subjects of οὐσία and ποιότης) only mitigates the difficulty.

THE FOX AND THE HEDGEHOG

AMONG the remains of Archilochus is an iambic trimeter which is as mysterious as it is charming. Zenobius, who quotes it (v. 68), says that it was written by Homer and used by Archilochus in his *Epodes*. If he is telling the truth, it must, as Bergk saw, come from the *Margites*. But its origin and original purpose need not now concern us. The important fact is that Archilochus used it, and we ought to be able to discover how he used it. What was his precise intention when he quoted or composed the line

$$\pi \acute{o} \lambda \lambda' \ o \mathring{\iota} \delta' \ \mathring{a} \lambda \acute{\omega} \pi \eta \xi \ \mathring{a} \lambda \lambda' \ \mathring{\epsilon} \chi \mathring{\iota} \nu o s \ \mathring{\epsilon} \nu \ \mu \acute{\epsilon} \gamma a,$$

what was the contrast he drew between the Fox and the Hedgehog, and how did he make use of it? Zenobius gives two aids, but neither is so easy as it looks at first sight. First, he says that the proverb was used ἐπὶ τῶν πανουργοτάτων, and secondly he quotes as relevant some lines from the *Phoenix* of Ion of Chios (fr. 38 Nauck, 81 von Blumenthal) about the hedgehog:

> ἀλλ' ἔν τε χέρσῳ τὰς λέοντος ἤνεσα
> ἢ τὰς ἐχίνου μᾶλλον οἰζυρὰς τέχνας·
> ὃς εὖτ' ἂν ἄλλων κρεισσόνων ὁρμὴν μάθῃ,
> στρόβιλος ἀμφ' ἄκανθαν εἱλίξας δέμας
> κεῖται δακεῖν τε καὶ θιγεῖν ἀμήχανος.

Let us see what can be made of this.

The natural meaning of ἐπὶ τῶν πανουργοτάτων is that the Fox and the Hedgehog are both types of οἱ πανουργότατοι. This is easy enough for the Fox, to whom the adjective πανοῦργος is solemnly applied by Aristotle (*H.A.* 488^{b}20) and whose ancient character for making mischief deserves the adjective in its worst sense. But the Hedgehog seems a harmless enough creature both to us and to Aristotle, who admired it for its prescience as a weather-prophet (*H.A.* 612^{b}2) and says nothing against its character, while the Elder Pliny appreciated its gift for making provision for the winter by carrying food on its spines (*N.H.* viii. 133, cf. Tzetz. ad Lyc. *Al.* 1093). But this was not the only view of it. For Tzetzes says explicitly ὁ ἐχῖνος ζῷόν ἐστι πανοῦργον, and Aelian (*Nat. An.* vi. 64) goes further and couples it with the Fox when he says ἡ ἀλώπηξ πονηρὸν ζῷόν ἐστιν . . . πονηρὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ χερσαῖος ἐχῖνος. We need not treat Aelian's adjectives too seriously, nor need we take πανοῦργος in its worst sense when it is applied to the Fox and the Hedgehog. The word could be used with a note of admiration to mean something like the English 'rogue', as when in Menander's *Epitrepontes*, 318, the slave Onesimus greets Habrotonon's plan for outwitting her master with the words:

> πανούργως καὶ κακοήθως, Ἀβρότονον.

It seems clear, and reasonable, that πανοῦργος could be used as a term of praise by those who admired a subtle or unscrupulous display of wits. That it could be applied to the Fox is easy to understand; for the Fox's other name was Κερδώ (Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 78, Aristoph. *Equ.* 1068; Ael. *Nat. An.* vii. 47) and it was a familiar example for craftiness. But the application of πανοῦργος to the Hedgehog needs some discussion.

There is not much ancient lore about the Hedgehog. The Greeks were naturally impressed by its covering of spines (Empedocles, fr. 83; Aristoph. *Pax*, 1086; Opp. *Cyn.* ii. 599–600; Aristot. *H.A.* 490^{b}29). They were also, like Ion, impressed by its gift of rolling into a ball in self-protection. Of this the Elder Pliny gives an excellent description: 'ubi vero sensere venantem, contracto et ore pedibusque ac parte omni inferiore, qua raram et innocuam habent lanuginem, convolvuntur in formam pilae,

ne quid comprehendi possit praeter aculeos' (*N.H.* viii. 133). That this trick of the Hedgehog was admired is beyond doubt, and perhaps it was enough to qualify the Hedgehog for πανουργία, though we might feel that it is not really comparable to the multifarious craftiness of the Fox. But the Hedgehog, so it was said, was able to turn his defensive armament with great success to offensive purposes. Oppian (*Hal.* ii. 359–86) tells in detail how the Hedgehog, who is the enemy of the Snake, rolls up when he sees him; the Snake encircles the Hedgehog, but the spines stick into him, and eventually he dies of them. Sometimes the Hedgehog dies, too, but often he escapes:

πολλάκι δ' ἐξήλυξε καὶ ἔκφυγε δεινὸς ἐχῖνος,
ἐκδὺς ἑρπυστῆρος ἀλυκτοπέδης τε κελαινῆς,
εἰσέτι τεθνηῶτος ἔχων περὶ σάρκας ἀκάνθαις.   (384–6)

The same activity is recorded by Tzetzes on Lyc. *Al.* 1093, who also draws attention to the Hedgehog's occasional survival over his enemy, ὁ δὲ γνοὺς ἑλίσσεται δίκην σφαίρας, καὶ ταῖς ἀκάνθαις ἐμπλακέντα τὸν ὄφιν ἀνελὼν σῴζεται and uses this, like other details about his habits, to prove that the Hedgehog is πανοῦργος. Since this gift seems to have been the Hedgehog's greatest, and indeed only, method of defence against his enemies, it might well be called ἓν μέγα and be what was in Archilochus' mind.

So in their different ways both Fox and Hedgehog might be regarded as examples of πανουργότατοι and classed together. But are they classed as allies or as enemies? Zenobius says nothing on this question and we must look elsewhere for an answer. At first sight we might expect them to be friends, since, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* ii. 20), Aesop told a fable about them in which the Hedgehog in a friendly spirit offers to remove the ticks which are sucking the Fox's blood. But against this we must set more weighty evidence on the other side. Plutarch (*De Soll. Anim.* 16) quotes both our line from Archilochus and two lines from Ion, and he does so with one important clue: τῶν δὲ χερσαίων ἐχίνων ἡ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄμυνα καὶ φυλακὴ παροιμίαν πεποίηκε

πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα·

προσιούσης γὰρ αὐτῆς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἴων,

στρόβιλος ἀμφ' ἄκανθαν εἱλίξας δέμας
κεῖται δακεῖν τε καὶ θιγεῖν ἀμήχανος.

The vital word here is αὐτῆς. It can only refer to the Fox, and it indicates that the Fox attacks the Hedgehog, which rolls itself up in self-defence against it. There seems, then, to have been traditional enmity between the two, and how this appeared in popular zoology may be seen from two passages in Aelian. At *Nat. An.* vi. 24 he says: δολερὸν χρῆμα ἡ ἀλώπηξ. ἐπιβουλεύει γοῦν τοῖς χερσαίοις ἐχίνοις τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. ὀρθοὺς αὐτοὺς καταγωνίσασθαι ἀδύνατός ἐστι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, αἱ ἄκανθαι ἀνείργουσιν αὐτήν. ἡ δὲ ἡσύχως καὶ πεφεισμένως ἔχουσα τοῦ ἑαυτῆς στόματος ἀνατρέπει αὐτοὺς καὶ κλίνει ὑπτίους, ἀνασχίσασά τε ἐσθίει ῥᾳδίως τοὺς τέως φοβερούς, and at vi. 64 he gives an even more poignant account of the struggle: καὶ ὃ μὲν ἑαυτὸν συνειλήσας κεῖται, θεασάμενος ἤκουσαν τὴν ἀλώπεκα, ἡ δὲ χανεῖν τε καὶ ἐνδακεῖν οὐ δυναμένη, κᾆτα οὔρησεν αὐτοῦ ἐς τὸ στόμα· ὁ δὲ ἀποπνίγεται, τοῦ πνεύματος ἔνδον ἐκ τῆς συνειλήσεως κατεσχημένου καὶ ἐπιρρέοντός οἱ τοῦ προειρημένου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κακὸν κακῇ περιελθοῦσα τὸν ἐχῖνον ἡ ἀλώπηξ ᾔρηκεν αὐτόν. We may surely conclude from these two passages that the enmity between the Fox and the Hedgehog was traditional, and that Plutarch, who knew the poems of Archilochus, understood his line to refer to it.

The question then arises whether Archilochus identified himself with either the Fox or the Hedgehog or used them to give point to one of his feuds. The line comes from his *Epodes*, and we know that in these he dealt frankly with his own affairs and

quarrels and used fables about animals to intensify what he had to say. In fr. 88 he addresses his enemy Lycambes by name in what is undoubtedly an Epode, and Lucian (*Pseudolog.* 19) says that in a poem about a Man and a Cicada, of which a line survives (fr. 88A), Archilochus compared himself to the Cicada. It is therefore probable that in other Epodes he represented himself or his cause in imagery drawn from fables. For us the most relevant case is his Fable of the Fox and the Eagle, whose plot is known from fragments (frs. 85–95) and from an abstract given by 'Aesop' (*Fab.* 5 Halm, 3 Chambry). In this, contrary to expectation, the Eagle is the villain and the Fox the innocent victim, who eventually triumphs over his treacherous ally and displays the moral that those who violate friendship are punished by the gods. If this referred, as it probably did, to Archilochus, his symbol would be not the Eagle but the Fox. Again, if in his Epode on the Fox and the Monkey (frs. 81–3) either character represents Archilochus, it is more likely to be the crafty Fox than the absurd Monkey. So if in one of his Epodes he spoke of the Fox and the Hedgehog, we might on general principles expect him to be the Fox.

To this view there are two possible objections, neither fatal but both worthy of consideration. First, the order of the words and the emphasis given to the single, big thing known by the Hedgehog suggest that this is better than all the knowledge of the Fox. This cannot be proved beyond dispute, but it gets some support from Semonides, fr. 29

$$\text{ἐν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χῖος ἔειπεν ἀνήρ,}$$

where ἐν certainly draws attention and gives something like praise to the quotation that follows, and from Sophocles, fr. 165 Pearson

$$\text{οὐκ οἶδα τὴν σὴν πεῖραν· ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι,}$$
$$\text{τοῦ παιδὸς ὄντος τοῦδ' ἐγὼ διόλλυμαι,}$$

where ἐν gives emphasis to what is most important in the speaker's words. So in Archilochus' line the knowledge of the Hedgehog is certainly emphasized as important, and might be singled out for praise. On the other hand, we do not know who spoke the words, and since in an Epode there were different characters and speakers, we have no reason to believe that the speaker was justified in the end. He may, for instance, have been boasting and later have been punished for it. Secondly, Diehl draws an attractive parallel between our line and another fragment of Archilochus:

$$\text{ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα,}$$
$$\text{τὸν κακῶς με δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς}\quad\text{(fr. 66).}$$

What could be more natural than that the ἐν μέγα of the Hedgehog should be a remarkable gift for doing an evil turn to its enemies? Could it not, for instance, treat the Fox in the same crafty way as it treats the Snake? It is at least conceivable that in this Epode Archilochus dramatized himself as the Hedgehog which deals firmly and decisively with another enemy, the Fox. Yet here, too, we are on uncertain ground. We cannot be certain that in fr. 66 Archilochus is speaking of himself, though it is probable that he is, or that if he used ἐν μέγα in one sense at one place he necessarily used it in the same sense at another. Both points carry some weight, but neither is conclusive. We must set against them more cogent arguments from the other side.

Here there are two arguments that count. First, since in his other Fables Archilochus appears as the Fox, and in one of them as the Fox against a creature ordinarily so admired as the Eagle, the chances are that here, too, he is the Fox. Its craftiness seems to have appealed to him. Indeed his liking for it may account for Plato's words τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου 'Αρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην (*Rep.* ii. 365c), which, whether they assume or not that Archilochus pictured himself as a Fox, certainly show his admiration for the Fox's cunning. Secondly, since the

two stories in Aelian show that when the Hedgehog fights the Fox it gets the worst of it, we should hardly expect Archilochus to dramatize himself as an animal which fable made the loser. He would surely be the victorious Fox who by means sufficiently unscrupulous overcomes his opponent. In that case the point of the line is that though the Hedgehog has a single great gift, which merits our admiration, even this is no good against the versatile cunning of the Fox. In the conflict between craft and obstinate defence Archilochus prefers to be on the side of craft. A similar contrast is made, oddly enough, by Pindar, and with the opposite purpose. In *Pyth.* ii. 77–8 he compares his enemies to Foxes because of their craftiness:

$$\text{ὀργαῖς ἀτενὲς ἀλωπέκων ἴκελοι·}$$
$$\text{κερδοῖ δὲ τί μάλα τοῦτο κερδαλέον τελέθει;}$$

but goes on to compare himself to the cork that rides the surge—a type of untouched opponent that is in its ways as complete as the Hedgehog who rolls up into a ball. But we should not expect Pindar to agree with Archilochus, and earlier in the same poem at 53–6 he has emphatically disclaimed any desire to be like him.

Archilochus, it seems, compared himself to the Fox and his opponent to the Hedgehog. No doubt he went on to threaten the Hedgehog's destruction. If this was his attitude, it explains why Zenobius quotes Ion of Chios in the same context as Archilochus. The character in Ion's play, whoever he may be, prefers the open offensive of the Lion to the crafty defensive of the Hedgehog, just as he seems to deplore the view preached by Theognis to Cyrnus (213–18) that a man should imitate the polyp and take his colour from his surroundings (fr. 36 Nauck, 82 von Blumenthal). Archilochus was not such an advocate of open methods as this, but he agreed at least in preferring an active policy to passive resistance. That he should identify himself with the despised and derided Fox would be characteristic of him; for, as Dio Chrysostom says of him (*Or.* xxxiii. 12), πρῶτον αὐτὸν ψέγει. But actually he seems to have imparted some of his own dignity to the Fox, for, as Dio again says (*Or.* lv. 10), τὴν Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα τοῖς λέουσι καὶ ταῖς παρδάλεσι παραβάλλομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἢ μὴ πολὺ ἀποδεῖν φαμεν. Archilochus is a poet who must be judged by his own standards.

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THE AUGUSTAN RULES FOR DACTYLIC VERSE

THE elements which every schoolboy learns on beginning Latin Verse Composition include a number of rules which seem arbitrarily designed to make the game harder. In hexameters, he is told, he must have a masculine caesura either in the third foot or in the second and fourth, and end normally with a disyllable or a trisyllable; in pentameters he must end with a disyllable; and in neither line may a single mono-syllable stand at the end. Rarely, in my experience, is any reason given him by way of redress, and he will search for one in vain in most of the school text-books, in introductions like Postgate's to Tibullus and Propertius, and in histories of Latin literature like Wight Duff's and Mackail's. This reticence may be due to the dissensions of experts on this subject and on the subject of Latin accentuation in general, but the theory that predominates in England, among those who hold a theory at all, explains so many of the phenomena that it deserves to be more widely and precisely known. The most detailed exposition of it is by E. H. Sturtevant, who summed up his analyses in a pair of articles in the *Transactions* of the American Philological Association in 1923-4.[1] While his careful work is invaluable as marshalling the statistics and evidence, it errs on the side of excessive minuteness,[2] and leaves room not merely for some additions, but for a different kind of treatment concerned less with bare statistics and more with poetic principles and historical development. Since Latin Verse Composition plays such an important part in English higher classical education, it seems desirable that a less technical and more accessible account should be available for English readers. Such an account I attempt to give here, keeping separate as far as possible the exposition and the consideration of the criticisms and rival theories that have been advanced.

According to this orthodox theory the rules are due to the Latin accent. The laws of accentuation for the Classical period are mostly known for certain.[3] In spite of their simplicity they are seldom taught in English schools because there are few cases in which the accent does not fall where an Englishman would naturally put it.[4]

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[1] Vol. liv, pp. 51-73; vol. lv, pp. 73-85. The main principle has been fairly often indicated; e.g. by W. M. Lindsay, *The Captivi of Plautus* (1900), pp. 359-60; S. E. Winbolt, *The Latin Hexameter* (1903), pp. 75, 127 n., 143, 238; W. R. Hardie, *Res Metrica* (1920), pp. 209-10; G. Murray, *The Classical Tradition in Poetry* (1927), p. 113 n.; W. F. J. Knight, *Accentual Symmetry in Virgil* (1939), pp. 8-9. See also F. Vollmer, *Römische Metrik*, pp. 11-12, in Gercke-Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* (1923). Many German, and almost all French, authorities dissent.

I am indebted for references and suggestions to Messrs. E. Harrison, W. F. J. Knight, A. P. Sinker, and J. B. Poynton.

[2] His statistics for clash and harmony in *each* of the first four feet seem unnecessary and encourage the attribution of excessive self-consciousness to the various poets.

[3] Cic., *Or.* xviii. 58; Quint. i. 5. 30-1. See W. M. Lindsay, *The Latin Language* (1894), pp. 160 ff.; F. W. Westaway, *Quantity and Accent in Latin* (1930), pp. 59-81. The best recent con-

spectus, which shows how clearly scholars are divided on the lines of their native language into a French and an Anglo-German School, is by M. Leumann, in Stolz-Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*[5] (1926), pp. 180-9. The chief rule is that the accent falls on the penultimate syllable if it is long, on the preceding syllable if the penultimate is short. A few details are disputed. In what follows I accept the view that enclitics like -*que* did not, in the Classical period, draw the accent onto a final short syllable (*magnáque*, not *magnáque*), though they did onto a long; and that pentasyllables of the type $- \cup \cup - \cup$ had a secondary stress on the first syllable, not the second (*cònticuére*, not *contícuére*). This last is a case in which English accentuation differs from Latin.

(The sign ʼ is used for a secondary accent.)

[4] The French, having no stress accent of their own, generally refuse to allow that the Romans had one. They do not represent quantity in reading, as we and the Germans do, by putting a stress on the syllable that bears the ictus. Consequently Virgil, as read by a Frenchman,

As to its nature, the most reasonable opinion is that it was, in the Classical period at any rate, a combined pitch and stress accent, and the only question is, which predominated.[1] This question does not affect our inquiry. Two preliminary remarks must be made. There is no reason why a theory designed to explain phenomena in late first-century dactylic poetry should square with the phenomena of early second-century dramatic verse. For one thing, verse spoken on the stage is likely to keep nearer to common speech; for another, the Latin language was constantly changing, as well as the Roman ear for rhythm, and we know that its accentuation altered during the last two centuries before Christ. Neither is there any reason why all the peculiarly Latin phenomena in dactylic verse should be due to a single cause, or why two causes should not have operated at the same time.

Hexameters.

The history of the subject begins with a passage in Bentley's 'Schediasma' prefixed to his *Terence*, p. xvii:

'Árma uirúmque cáno Troíae qui prímus ab óris
Italiam fáto profúgus Lauínaque uénit
Lítora; multum ílle et térris iactátus et álto
Vi súperum, saéuae mémorem Iunónis ob íram.'

Qui perite et modulate hos uersus leget, sic eos, ut his accentibus notantur, pronuntiabit; non, ut pueri in Scholis, ad singulorum pedum initia, *Italiám fató profugús Lauínaque uénit*, sed ad rhythmum totius uersus.' Bentley is over-emphasizing the accent to correct a common fault; but no doubt in Latin, as in English, the speech accent was given by the reader, and the metre was heard underneath it because it was familiar to the hearer and expected by him; as we should read the first line of *Paradise Lost* rather thus,

Of man's fírst disobédience and the frúit,

than thus,

Of mán's first disobédience ánd the frúit.[2]

It was Ritschl, apparently, who, developing some remarks of Hermann,[3] first formulated the theory that the mature Latin hexameter was so constructed that in the first four feet metrical ictus and speech accent should tend to conflict, while in the last two feet they should coincide. Opponents of this view drew upon themselves his scorn in a well-known passage: 'What care they for a Bentley? What for a Hermann? for the men who first opened our eyes to the secrets of the *Harmonious Disharmony* of verse- and word-accent, on which the charm of ancient, and peculiarly of Roman, versification so essentially depends? . . . The dactylic Hexameter passes from clash of verse- and word-accent in the first part into the resolution of the conflict in the second.'[4] So essential do we find some sort of clash between accent and ictus that we create it artificially when reading Greek verse by importing our English stress-accent. But we must take care not to lose the sound of the underlying metre. Lucian Müller put the case well, and may be quoted as an impartial witness because he was an opponent of the ictus-accent theory: '. . . seruandus est modus,

usually sounds like French prose to an Englishman or German.

[1] Leumann (p. 185) inclines to think that it was pitch combined with a moderate stress, Westaway (p. 65) the reverse. Of course 'accent' is only a convenient term for main accent,

emphasis varying considerably over all syllables.

[2] See Murray, op. cit., p. 82; C. Day Lewis, *A Hope for Poetry*, p. 10.

[3] *Elementa Doctrinae Metricae* (1816), p. 344 (217 in 1817 ed.).

[4] *Opuscula*, vol. ii, Introd., p. xii.

quoniam, nisi certa statuetur norma, inuerti possunt funditus et perturbari numeri principales, minime iam ut constet carmini propria natura et origo. Quod incommodum ut uitetur, ultimum certe pedem cum paenultimo proprium retinere numerum par est, quo nitantur uelut fundamento cetera, nec minus ideo quod recentissima quaeque maxime inhaerent mentibus.'[1] That is why the fifth foot of a hexameter is nearly always a dactyl, and the second half of a pentameter always dactylic;[2] and why blurring elisions in the last two feet are avoided.

Ennius, who introduced the hexameter to Latin, imitated Homer, not the metrically refined Alexandrians. But he diverged from the Greek in one important respect: he gave no less than 80 per cent. of his lines a masculine caesura in the third foot, eschewing the common Greek caesura κατὰ τρίτον τροχαῖον, and over 80 per cent. of the remainder have masculine caesuras in both the second and fourth feet; as

> Musae quae pedibus ‖ magnum pulsatis Olympum.
> Postilla, ‖ germana soror, ‖ errare uidebar.

Pioneer as he was, he must have had good reason for so confining himself. The comparative scarcity in Latin of trochaic endings such as the Ionic dialect supplied (-oιo, etc.) might account for a tendency towards masculine caesuras; but there is reason to believe that Ennius had a definite object, and this may well have been to ensure, as the masculine caesuras do, that in the first four feet conflict between ictus and accent should predominate.[3] In introducing quantitative metre into Latin Ennius may well have felt it to be a virtue to distinguish his metre clearly from the accentual rhythm of common speech.[4] He does have lines in which ictus and accent coincide throughout, such as

> Spársis hástis campus longus splendet et horret.
> Póste recúmbite uéstraque péctora péllite tónsis.

But these are exceptions, intended perhaps to imitate the sense.

In the last two feet, on the other hand, there is reason to think that even Ennius preferred to end with words of two or three syllables, beyond the natural average in proportion to the number of such words, with the result that in these feet ictus and accent distinctly tend to coincide.[5] Thus the origin of the pursuit

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[1] *De Re Metrica*[2] (1894), p. 198.

[2] Only some uncouth inscriptions have spondees here.

[3] T. Birt, *Ad Historiam Hexametri Latini Symbola* (1876), p. 7; Vollmer, loc. cit. E. H. Sturtevant (*Cl. Phil.* xiv, 1919, p. 383) shows by statistical comparison with prose writers that Ennius, and his successors still more, must have gone out of their way to use words that ensured this conflict. F. Crusius (*Römische Metrik*, 1929, pp. 45–6) puts the cart before the horse. Ennius, he says, had a difficulty; he had to get in many iambic, anapaestic, and choriambic words which could not be elided (as *sédens, pédibus, praetéritos*). The accent on these was bound to conflict with the ictus, so 'he put them before a caesura, or a place where according to circumstances a caesura was permissible (2nd, 3rd, and 4th arsis)'; in this position the accent would upset the tempo less badly. This presumes that Ennius wanted to avoid conflict. But where else could he have put such words? The great preponderance of

masculine caesuras in Ennius compared with Homer indicates that he did not 'have to get in' such words, but purposely introduced them, as Sturtevant's statistics suggest. If not, it is due to the fact that such words are commoner in Latin than in Greek; they are indeed appreciably commoner, and Greek had the help of the Ionic forms, but these facts are not sufficient to account for the difference.

[4] See Müller, op. cit., p. 234.

[5] M. P. Humphreys (*Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.*, 1878, p. 41) tried to show that the percentage of conflicts in the fifth foot in Ennius is about the same as in Homer and Hesiod read with a Latin accent, if allowance is made for the fact that words in ∪∪ and ∪∪–∪ are more numerous in Greek than in Latin; and that Ennius therefore simply copied Homer. But Sturtevant's statistics (loc. cit., p. 379) suggest that Ennius definitely preferred to end with words of two or three syllables.

of Ritschl's 'harmonious disharmony' in both its elements may be traced to him, though we need not suppose that he was guided by theory rather than ear. In course of time, with stress accent becoming stronger perhaps in everyday speech, the Romans became ever more sensitive to this rhythmical refinement. I do not believe that their pleasure was due merely to association, that they came to like a chance effect simply because it was common and therefore expected;[1] for it reflects an aesthetic principle observable in other kinds of poetry and in music, where a struggle ending in harmony or victory is purposely contrived.[2]

Lucilius has fewer conflicts in the sixth foot than Ennius and far fewer in the fifth; he also has fewer spondees in the fifth foot and pentasyllabic end-words.[3] In Cicero's hexameters we find the rules well established, and only the minuter refinements remained for Virgil to make. Lucretius was notoriously less careful, but Catullus' ear was as sensitive as Cicero's.[4] (Horace's hexameters, intended to be *sermoni propiora*, tended to disregard the rules—naturally to a greater extent in the Satires than in the more artistic Epistles.[5])

Virgil was at pains to make ictus and accent conflict in the fourth foot where there was a choice; thus he wrote *Tro|iae qui | primus* for *qui | Troiae | primus*, *col|lo dare | bracchia* for *dare | collo | bracchia*;[6] and he cut down the number of words in − − − or ∪ ∪ − − following a masculine caesura in the third foot, which similarly create coincidence in the fourth. Catullus had favoured coincidence here; Virgil tended to keep it for special effect, to give strength, for instance, as in

Dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum . . . ,

or to smooth out the rhythm at the end of a period and make the underlying metre emerge, as in

Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem.[7]

Let us now consider the application of the ictus-accent theory to the various types of line. I use the sign ∕ for coincidence, × for conflict, ∕∕ for secondary accent, × for secondary accent with conflict. (It should be noted that elision does not alter accentuation.)

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[1] As R. S. Radford maintained: *A.J.P.* xxv (1904), pp. 424–6.

[2] See especially Gilbert Murray, op. cit., p. 114: 'The last verse of an Alcaic is extraordinarily delightful in rhythm; but it would be nothing in particular if it were not reached by a struggle —and just the right kind of struggle'; cf. p. 112. Mr. P. F. Radcliffe tells me that conflict ending in harmony is a feature of Elizabethan madrigal.

[3] Humphreys, loc. cit., p. 44.

[4] Virgil admitted more exceptions than Cicero and Catullus, in order to produce various effects. Winbolt, op. cit., p. 127, gives the percentages of abnormal endings as: Ennius, 14; Lucretius i, 8½; Cicero (*Aratea*), 2½; Catullus, 2 (excluding *Hymenaeus*); Virgil, 3.

[5] In his first two Satires Horace has 40 conflicts in the last two feet. 'The result thereby produced is certainly striking, and, as he meant it to be, unpoetical.' H. A. J. Munro, *Trans. Camb. Philos. Soc.*, 1864, p. 394.

[6] This was first observed by G. Cortius, who edited Lucan in 1726. It is familiar especially from Munro's Introduction to his *Lucretius*

(1864), vol. ii, p. 105. It was 'discovered' in Germany in 1922 by F. Marx (*Abh. d. Sachs. Ges.* pp. 197–232), and is now known there as *Lex Marxii*. Crusius (op. cit., pp. 50–1) thinks the object was to prevent a diaeresis in the middle of the line, though he recognizes conflict of ictus and accent as a secondary motive.

[7] Figures are given by W. F. J. Knight, op. cit., pp. 38–9: Catullus lxiv, 61 per cent.; Lucretius, 51 per cent.; Virgil, *Ecl.*, 37 per cent., *Geor.*, 33 per cent., *Aen.*, 36 per cent. Cf. W. R. Hardie, *J.Ph.*, 1907, pp. 266–79. In Horace's 'neoteric' *Epode* xvi, of the 14 hexameters in the description of the Isles of the Blest (37–66) 12 have coincidence in the fourth foot. Mr. Knight, in his chapters V and VI, makes an interesting study of Virgil's use of such lines for special effect and his combination of them with 'heterodyne' types. His conclusions seem to me legitimate, allowing for differences of sensibility in given cases, and provided that too much *conscious* theory is not attributed to Virgil and that the method is not pressed too far.

Caesuras.

We have seen that in the fourth foot conflict and coincidence are more or less equally likely, but that Virgil took care to make conflict the normal. And although Catullus rather favoured coincidence in the fourth foot, of the first 100 lines of LXIV that have the penthemimeral caesura, 60 have coincidence, and only 7 have conflict, predominating in the first three feet. Taking the first four feet together, of the first 31 lines of the *Aeneid* conflict predominates in 23, coincidence in only 3, 5 being neutral.[1] But remove the masculine caesura from the hexameter, remove even one of the two in the $2\frac{1}{2}+4\frac{1}{2}$ type of line, and coincidence will predominate; as in

> Mersatur missusque secundo defluit amni.
>
> Lilia uerbenasque premens uescumque papauer.
>
> Nox tenebraeque ruebant; sidera nulla uidebam.
>
> Dignum mente domoque legentis honesta Neronis.

The rule against monosyllables before the caesura is another factor in promoting conflict, since openings like *optat ephippia bos*, *fert tibi gaudia nox* are thereby excluded. But they are allowed if preceded by another monosyllable, or by a pyrrhic, which will bear a conflicting stress.

Endings.

These may be classed as 'regular', 'occasional', and 'rare', as by Postgate, *Prosodia Latina*, p. 79.

A Regular endings.

> sidera tollit
>
> arma requirunt
>
> nocte per umbras

Proclitics (e.g. prepositions) and enclitics, having no accent, do not disturb the coincidence. As for other short monosyllables, the type of ending *euasisse tot urbes*, involving a conflict, occurs only six times in Virgil, twice in Tibullus, never in Propertius or Ovid; and of the equivalent, elided Pyrrhics, Virgil only has *sine, ubi, ibi* (Ovid adds *nisi*) before the last foot; of these, *sine, nisi*, and *ubi* (relative) are proclitics, and *ibi* only occurs twice. Moreover, the type with a longer word elided at the end of the fifth foot, e.g. *intremer(e) omnem*, involving a conflict, occurs only once in Virgil (*A*. iii. 581),[2] never in Tibullus, Propertius, or Ovid; whereas the type *numin(a) aquarum*, involving no conflict, is not avoided.[3] These facts are highly significant. It is not enough to say, with regard to the first two types, that the words responsible are rare, for they are not proportionately rare (*uir, hic, fit, dat, it, quid?, quod?, tot, bis, ter, bene, male, data, bona, modo*, etc.); the facts can be explained by a desire to

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[1] Crusius, op. cit., p. 48, arguing against the ictus-accent theory, quotes the first 31 lines of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and shows that here coincidence predominates almost as often as conflict. But (1) he admits that, if you read on, the case is different; (2) he allows no accent on any pyrrhic, whether or not it is immediately preceded by an accented syllable; (3) Ovid liked his lines to be fluent, not complex, so he avoided coincidence less. Knight (p. 39) gives the percentage of coincidences in the fourth foot in *Metamorphoses* i as 49. This represents a notable

reversal of Virgil's tendency.

[2] *-que* occurs in this position a few times; but there is some reason for supposing that, when it was elided, it did not alter the accentuation of the word to which it was attached; see Lindsay, *A.J.P.* xiv (1893), p. 313. But it is rarely added to dactylic word-ends even in Cicero (26 cases in the speeches): F. W. Shipley, *Cl. Phil.* viii (1913), pp. 33–5.

[3] 114 instances in Virgil. Full figures given by G. Eskuche, *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. liv (1890), pp. 385 ff.

avoid conflict of ictus and accent at the end of the line, and not, I believe, by any of the other theories that have been advanced.[1]

Occasional endings.

> hos regit artus
> increpat, et uox
> haec quoque, si quis

A pyrrhic in the fifth foot or a final monosyllable must be preceded by a monosyllable. Here we have to take account of sentence-accent. Stress accents cannot stand on successive syllables without affecting one another. It seems probable that the accent on a pyrrhic or a monosyllable could be very much weakened by an accented syllable immediately preceding (which could only be a monosyllable, unless it were one of the rare exceptions to the Penultima Law, *illíc, addúc,* etc.). The pyrrhics in question are often actually enclitics, *quoque* being particularly common, and the preceding monosyllable is usually an emphatic word.[2] In the case of final monosyllables there are several tendencies which can perhaps be accounted for by a similar desire to assist coincidence by throwing the accent as much as possible on to the preceding monosyllable.[3] (1) The final monosyllable is often an enclitic.[4] (2) There is often a pause at least as strong as a comma before the sixth foot, no pause occurring at the end of the line, as in *sub moenibus! o gens* . . .; this tends to strengthen the accent on the prior monosyllable, since the first syllable of a sentence or clause is bound to be slightly emphasized. (3) The final monosyllable is often closely connected with the succeeding line, thereby losing much of its emphasis, since the voice hurries on, as in *uidet oscula, quae non* . . .; and the break before the last foot seems to be facilitated when that foot involves a correlative or epanaphora,[5] perhaps because it is then doubly clear that the voice must run on, as in *cum messis inhorruit, et cum* . . .

So far, then, the ictus-accent covers all cases. The remainder, the rarities, may be divided into two categories, those in which there is conflict, which are too rare to upset any theory, and can mostly be accounted for satisfactorily, and those in which there seems to be coincidence and whose rarity therefore embarrasses the theory.

Rare endings.

(1) { lucet uia longo
{ medium secat amnem

Here there is a conflict. Out of 131 lines in Virgil ending in two disyllables 114 are saved by a monosyllable preceding the pyrrhic, while in some of the remainder the pyrrhic is enclitic, which diminishes the conflict, as in *sanctum mihi nomen,* and in others the rhythm clearly represents the sense, as in the description of the writhing snake (*G.* ii. 153).

> nec rapit immensos orbes *per humum neque tanto*
> squameus in spiram tractu se colligit anguis.

In Ovid's *Metamorphoses* there are 35 examples, *all* preceded by a monosyllable.[6]

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[1] H. D. Edmiston, *C.R.* vii (1903), pp. 458–60.
[2] A. G. Harkness, *Cl. Phil.* iii (1908), pp. 41–58; R. S. Radford, *A.J.P.* xxv (1904), pp. 157, 160, 420; H. D. Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm* (1922), p. 55 f. Harkness sums up: 'Pyrrhic and iambic and monosyllabic words are not used in such a way that they could be accented as part of a word-group in cases where the word-group accent would be contrary to the verse rhythm. On the other hand we find these words employed in such a way that they naturally form word-groups where the word-group accent is in harmony with the verse-rhythm.'

[3] Winbolt gives the facts (op. cit., pp. 137–43) and notes (with regard to Pyrrhics) that 'in effect these conditions secure coincidence of verse-and word-stress' (p. 137 n.).
[4] Of the 155 cases in Ovid almost all are enclitics: Harkness, loc. cit., p. 54. See also E. Norden, *Aeneis VI*[3] (1934), p. 448. Norden's Appendix IX, on irregularly formed verse-endings, is a most valuable collection of material and statistics.
[5] F. H. Sandbach, *C.R.* xlvii (1933), p. 217.
[6] Norden, op. cit., pp. 447–8.

(2)
- prócumbit humi bos
- saep(e) exiguus mus
- restituis rem
- ruit Oceano nox
- et magnis dis

All such instances in Virgil, where a final monosyllable not preceded by another causes conflict, can be explained either as onomatopoeia or as imitation of Greek or Latin predecessors.[1]

(3)
- gemitu lacrimisque
- nitens elephánto
- grauidus autúmno

Such endings in a Molossus or Ionicus a minore can be accounted for on similar grounds.[1]

We now come to endings which are avoided although they do not seem to cause much conflict.

(1)
- di genuerunt
- mentem animumque
- mos maiorum

Such endings in a monosyllable and an Ionicus a minore or Molossus are very rare and where they occur they usually have the same excuse as the other rarities. This is the crux which has caused many to reject outright the ictus-accent theory. Why should such endings have been so studiously avoided? It is probable that there was a secondary accent on the first syllable of words like *ánimúmque*, *gráuitátes*, and this may have caused sufficient conflict to offend the ear.[2] But it is odd, in that case, if it was less weakened by the preceding monosyllable's accent than the full accent of Pyrrhics.[3] It looks as though some additional deterrent was at work here. Rönström and Winbolt thought that the reason was that the tetrasyllabic end-words in ∪∪−− 'suggested something soft, supine, or effeminate, unsuited to Roman taste'. They pointed out that Virgil's endings *femineo ululatu* and *semiuiro comitatu* seem designed to produce such an effect.[4] It may be that the early syllables of the long word were too much gabbled to bring out the rhythm. Virgil has such a word at the end 53 times in all; usually it is of Greek origin.

(2)
- quádrupedántum
- abscondántur

The fact that these words have at most a secondary stress on the first syllable means that they do not bring out the coincidence very well.[5] But Lucretius ended

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[1] Norden, op. cit., pp. 438–46. Virgil has 85 abnormal endings due to the presence of Greek words. Sometimes, as in *Atlantides abscondantur*, the Greek word is not itself included in the last two feet, but has suggested a Greek rhythm. See also in general R. Maxa, 'Lautmalerei und Rhythmus in Vergils Aeneis', *Wiener Studien*, xix, 1897, p. 78 f.

[2] Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, pp. 159, 161; Westaway, op. cit., p. 72.

[3] 'Accent greatly weakened a following short

syllable or two following short syllables'; Radford, loc. cit., p. 420.

[4] Winbolt, op. cit., p. 128. Cf. Norden, op. cit., p. 441, on the effect of the ending *lacrimisque* (*Aen*. x. 505). It is by no means true that Latin has so few eligible words of four or five syllables as to account for their rarity at the end of hexameters.

[5] Harkness, loc. cit., p. 43; Vollmer, *Sitz. bayer. Akad.*, 1924, p. 17.

his lines so often with a word in $-\cup\cup-\smile$ and the *Neoteroi* with a word in $---\smile$, and Virgil avoided both types so markedly, that here too we may suspect the working of an additional cause (besides reaction against the excessive use of *spondeiazontes* by the *Neoteroi*). A remark made by Quintilian, first adduced by Wilhelm Meyer, is pertinent.[1] Quintilian objects (ix. 4. 64) to Cicero's ending sentences with *balneatori* and *archipiratae*: 'Est in eo quoque nonnihil, quod hic singulis uerbis bini pedes continentur, *quod etiam in carminibus est praemolle*, nec solum ubi quinae, ut in his, syllabae nectuntur, *fortissima Tyndaridarum*, sed etiam quaternae, cum uersus cluditur *Apennino* et *armamentis* et *Oreione*.' Later (97) he repeats that it makes all the difference even in prose if the clausula is divided between words: thus *criminis causa* is 'forte', *archipiratae* is 'molle', and, he adds, *facilitatis* is 'mollius'. The reason is that long words were gabbled or slurred and failed to bring out the rhythm.[2] Endings in four long syllables, however distributed between words, were also avoided because they obscure the metre at the critical point, the fifth foot.

I do not see why the uncertainty—it is no more—about these last two types alone should be held to invalidate the whole ictus-accent theory, which not only explains practically all the other phenomena, but is also applicable to the pentameter, and which is justifiable by recognized aesthetic principles.

Pentameters.

It is well known that the mature pentameter ended regularly with a disyllable. There is a prima-facie probability that it did so for reasons analogous to those that caused hexameter endings to be restricted.[3] Now ictus and accent could only coincide completely in the latter part of a pentameter if it ended in a monosyllable, and this was ruled out for reasons not connected with stress.[4] So the pentameter remained in rustic freedom for at least fifty years longer than the hexameter. But so sensitive did the Roman ear become to the conflict of ictus and accent at the end of lines that it finally demanded even the *pis aller* offered by the disyllabic ending, which secured that in the second half of the pentameter there were two coincidences to one conflict; as in

$$\text{iugera multa soli}$$
$$\text{corpus inane rogo}$$
$$\text{non sinis ire iugum,}$$

or at least a predominance of coincidence, as in

$$\text{mors adoperta caput}$$
$$\text{concinuisse lyra.}$$

[1] *Abh. bayer. Akad.* (1886), p. 9. Cf. F. Leo, *De Stati Siluis* (*Proem. Gott.*, 1892–3), pp. 7–8. The Asiatic Dichoreus, Choriambus, and Ionicus a minore do not seem to have come under the ban, being conceived of as single feet.

[2] Cf. Diomedes, p. 469 (quoted by Leo): 'Quamuis enim idem pedes eademque sint tempora, tamen, ubi duae sunt partes orationis, nescio quo modo in utriusque confinio retentus spiritus et restrictus adfert quandam compositioni firmitatem; at in una parte orationis *properare uerba et continua spiritus celeritate labi uidentur*.' Müller, op. cit., pp. 242–3, suggests further aesthetic objections to such words as endings.

[3] The main principle is indicated by Lindsay,

The Captivi, p. 359; Butler and Barber, *Propertius*, p. xvi. Hermann was again the forerunner (op. cit., p. 227).

[4] The Greeks too avoided it. In the rare exceptions in Greek (e.g. *Theognis* 456 and 520), and also in Latin (e.g. Catullus, lxxvi. 8; Martial xii. 68. 6; Ovid, *Pont.* i. 6. 26), the monosyllable goes closely with the preceding word. Even in prose a non-enclitic monosyllable was a *uitiosa clausula*; H. Bornecque, *La prose métrique dans la correspondance de Cicéron* (1898), p. 20. It was probably felt to cause too much of a bump; for Virgil certainly used it when he wanted to produce such an effect, as in *praeruptus aquae mons, procumbit humi bos.*

So far as we know, it was Tibullus who, writing the elegies of his First Book between 32 and 26 B.C., made the disyllabic ending, which had been only a tendency, into what was practically a rule. The figures for percentages of such endings tell a clear story:[1]

		%	Date
Catullus	.	39	(d. 54)
Propertius I	.	61	c. 29–8
Tibullus I	.	93	c. 26
Propertius II	.	86	c. 25
Propertius III	.	95	c. 22
Tibullus II	.	92	(d. 19)
Propertius IV	.	98	? 16
Ovid, Her. 1–15	.	100	?

It is evident that Propertius himself abandoned the polysyllabic ending as soon as the effect of the regular disyllabic had been brought home to him by Tibullus;[2] and from that time onward it was only admitted as an exception, by Ovid here and there in his later works to give colour or variety, and by Martial sometimes to sharpen the point of an epigram.[3]

As in the case of hexameters, the way in which short monosyllables which are neither proclitic nor enclitic are used (cf. p. 34) supports, if anything, the ictus-accent theory. In the type of ending *hic uir et ille puer* coincidence would predominate, no doubt, the accent on *hic* weakening that on *uir* (cf. p. 35); but even so, only 5 examples occur in Ovid, all in earlier works.[4] In the type *dura uir arma ferat* coincidence would still probably predominate, the accent on *uir* being doubtless slighter than on *dura*; but again, of the 17 examples in Ovid, only 3 occur in his later works.[5] These types were clearly tolerable, though rare; what was not tolerable was the type *praesidium dat equis*; this produces conflict all through, and there is no such line in Augustan elegy, even with a proclitic monosyllable.[6]

There remains a type which is hardly found outside Catullus, and seldom in him except with enclitics and proclitics: *florida uer ageret*. Here the long monosyllable causes two coincidences to one conflict, as in the regular types. There must be some other reason for its avoidance. Certainly the juxtaposition of two accented syllables clogs the flowing rhythm where it should run most smoothly; the monosyllable is thrown too much into relief; and the resultant rhythm sounds anapaestic ('rising') whereas the rhythm of the pentameter is dactylic ('falling').

As in hexameters, polysyllabic endings were allowed where a Greek word or name was involved. This had no doubt the simple object of giving a Greek flavour to the verse; but it is also possible that such words were felt to conflict less with the metre, supposing that the Greek accent had not yet become so strong in stress as the Latin.[7]

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[1] Figures from Postgate, *Tibullus*, p. lii, and Butler and Barber, op. cit., p. xvi.

[2] *Not* by Ovid, as has so often been said (e.g. by F. Plessis, *Le Pentamètre Dactylique*, p. 64).

[3] Postgate, *Prosodia Latina*, p. 85.

[4] H. 9. 24; 36. Am. iii. 7. 60. A.A. i. 736; iii. 150.

[5] H. 3. 12; 5. 98; 6. 140; 9. 106; 11. 96; 13. 40; 15. 86, 206. Am. i. 10. 60; ii. 10. 14; iii. 11. 18. Rem. 30, 406. Med. 10. In later works, F. i. 28. 564. Tr. v. 10. 2.

[6] Ovid, Rem. 306, has a monosyllable in this position: *inst…tor, heu, noctes quas mihi non dat habet*. But here the preceding monosyllable *non* enables coincidence to predominate slightly. Elision in the fourth foot producing conflict, as *desiner(e) esse mea*, occurs only five times in Ovid and never in Propertius or Tibullus. Whereas elision in this foot producing coincidence, as in *poner(e) in aede morer*, is allowed more often.

[7] The hexameters of Nonnus and Musaeus are usually accented on the penultimate syllable. It has been held that they were imitating the Latin practice, the Greek accent having by then (4th cent. A.D.) become one of stress. This

There was one other way in which the difficulty of the conflicting stress on the final disyllable could be circumvented. A certain number of words in Latin were sentence-enclitics and bore no accent, notably parts of the verb 'to be', and the personal and possessive pronouns when unemphatic (*erat, fuit, meus, tibi*, etc.).[1] It has been noticed that Augustan pentameters often end with such a word;[2] but it has not, I think, been noticed that this tendency grew in a remarkable way. Since it is a subjective matter to decide whether or no a word is emphatic, statistics cannot be exact; but the following are rough figures:[3]

	Pentameters ending in disyllable	Pentameters ending in sentence-enclitic	Percentage	
Tibullus I . .	378	12		3·4
II . .	197	3	2·5	1·5
Propertius I . .	220	29		13
II . .	623	105		17
III . .	503	54	14·75	11
IV . .	470	86		18
Ovid, *Her.* 1–15 . .	1,202	327		27
Fasti . .	2,486	508	25	20
Tristia . .	1,750	489		28

The astonishing difference here revealed between Tibullus' and Ovid's usage may be due to some extent to Ovid's passion for symmetry, *meus*, etc., being conveniently put at the end to balance an agreeing noun placed before the caesura. He might even be accused of making things easy for himself, *erat, erit*, etc., being so manageable because of the initial vowel. But Ovid, though prolific, was not unfastidious, and in face of the figures it is hard to resist the conclusion that he felt that pentameters ending with a sentence-enclitic ran more smoothly to their close.

Postgate[4] recalled with approval a remark of Paley[5] about the description of the spring in Propertius' Hylas-poem (i. 20. 29–42), in which the poet intentionally, it seems, ends seven successive pentameters with a word of more than two syllables: 'Those who object to such verses as inharmonious must have a very limited or a very erroneous conception of the capabilities of descriptive elegiac verse.' Why 'descriptive'? Because it is the description, rather than the polysyllables, that has charmed Paley. And the fact remains, that, whatever the modern ear may approve in its ignorance of how Latin verse sounded to a Roman, as soon as Tibullus demonstrated the effect of the regular disyllabic ending, Propertius, and after him Ovid, were converted to it.[6] Mr. Mackail, in his *Latin Literature* (p. 125), wrote thus of Propertius' adoption of the disyllabic ending: 'By what course of reasoning he was led in his

would be a strong argument for the ictus-accent theory for Latin verse, were it not that, as Otto Crusius pointed out, the phenomenon can be better explained by the growing desire to make the last syllable definitely long. (There is no lack of perispomenon endings.) See W. G. Rutherford, *Babrius* (1883), p. xviii n.

[1] Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, p. 167.

[2] Lindsay, *The Captivi*, p. 360; Harkness, loc. cit., p. 43.

[3] Catullus has 15 instances, Lygdamus 10. I have taken the pronouns to be emphatic when predicative, when contrasted, and in various other cases. Hardie (op. cit., pp. 54–5) says:

'It is a principle of symmetry and emphasis that a line should not end with an unimportant or otiose word, and this is even more clearly true of the ending of a couplet.' That is so. But in the same paragraph he notes *meus, tuus, suus* as exceptions to the rule of not ending with an adjective. It looks as though Ovid thought the avoidance of conflict more important.

[4] *Select Elegies of Propertius*, p. cxxviii.

[5] *Propertius*, p. viii.

[6] W. Meyer (*Sitz. bayer. Akad.*, 1884, p. 1024 f.) says: 'Wer möchte behaupten dass diese Regel nicht thöricht war?'!

later work to suppress this large and elastic treatment, and approximate more and more closely to the fine but somewhat limited and metallic rhythm which has been perpetuated by the usage of Ovid, we cannot guess.' Surely the ictus-accent explanation deserves at least to hold the field until a better is found.

To the indirect influence of the disyllable rule may be attributed, in part at least, another development in Latin elegy. Catullus wrote elegiacs like the Greeks, in which the sense often ran on from couplet to couplet. Here is an instance covering six couplets (lxviii. 105–16):

> Quo tibi tum casu, pulcherrima Laodameia,
>   ereptumst uita dulcius atque anima
> coniugium? Tanto te absorbens uertice amoris
>   aestus in abruptum detulerat barathrum
> quale ferunt Graii Pheneum prope Cylleneum
>   siccare emulsa pingue palude solum,
> quod quondam caesis montis fodisse medullis
>   audit falsiparens Amphitryoniades,
> tempore quo certa Stymphalia monstra sagitta
>   perculit imperio deterioris eri,
> pluribus ut caeli tereretur ianua diuis
>   Hebe nec longa uirginitate foret.

As far as treatment goes, that might just as well have been written in heroic hexameters. But turn to Tibullus and we find that almost all his couplets are self-contained; a complete change has come over Latin Elegy. Here is a specimen (ii. 1, ll. 37–46):

> Rura cano rurisque deos. His uita magistris
>   desueuit querna pellere glande famem;
> illi compositis primum docuere tigillis
>   exiguam uiridi fronde operire domum;
> illi etiam tauros primi docuisse feruntur
>   seruitium, et plaustro supposuisse rotam.
> Tum uictus abiere feri, tum consita pomus,
>   tum bibit irriguas fertilis hortus aquas;
> aurea tum pressos pedibus dedit uua liquores,
>   mixtaque securost sobria lympha mero.

What had happened may be explained and illustrated by a comparison with the English heroic couplet. The new rule which ensured that the metre should be supported by the stress in the second half of the pentameter marked off the couplets rhythmically from one another and gave the verse a more regular flow and ebb. The parallel development in English poetry is well described by Lytton Strachey in his Leslie Stephen Lecture on Pope (1925):[1] 'It was not until the collapse of blank verse, about 1630, that the essential characteristics which lay concealed in the couplet began to be exploited. It was Waller who first fully apprehended the implications of regularity; and it is to this fact that his immense reputation during the succeeding hundred years was due. Waller disengaged the heroic couplet from the beautiful vagueness of Elizabethanism. He perceived what logically followed from a rhyme. He saw that regularity implied balance, and that balance implied antithesis; he saw that balance also implied simplicity, that simplicity implied clarity, and that clarity implied exactitude. The result was a poetic medium contrary in every particular to blank verse—a form which, instead of being varied, unsymmetrical, fluid, complex, profound and indefinite, was regular, balanced, antithetical, simple, clear, and exact.'

[1] *Characters and Commentaries*, pp. 288–9.

How well these last words describe the elegy of Tibullus as contrasted with Virgil's hexameters! The regularization of the second half of the pentameter had the same effect as rhyme: the couplet became an artistic unit. Catullus had used no tricks of style, not even anaphora. Tibullus was the Waller of Latin Elegy; he paved the way for Ovid, its Pope. Pentameter restates hexameter; the roughness of elision is almost gone;[1] assonance, alliteration, and even rhyme between the halves of the verse tune the couplet internally. Listen to the play of sounds in this:

> Ne tibi neglecti mittant mala somnia Manes
> maestaque sopitae stet soror ante torum.

The couplet has become a plaything, fascinating in itself, liable to become an end in itself; *loci communes* tend to supply the place of thought and feeling. It has been well said[2] that Tibullus was a musical composer rather than a poet.

Criticisms and Rival Theories.

The ictus-accent theory of Hermann and Ritschl, as applied to dactylic verse, has been constantly criticized, sometimes *en passant* by scholars whose main object was to prove with reference to early Latin dramatic verse that accent did not influence 'educated' Roman poetry before St. Augustine. Space forbids more than an indication of the arguments and of possible answers.

In 1855 Weil and Benloew, on the ground that the types *di genuerunt* and *frugiferentes* were disqualified though they produced coincidence, suggested that the objection was to the masculine caesura in the fifth foot, which 'rend la chute des vers moins coulante'.[3] Munro[4] and Corssen[5] agreed: the accentual effect was a chance by-product. Munro added other objections: why were certain types, involving exceptions to the Penultima Law, allowed, although they produced conflict? Thus the ancient grammarians say that *-que* drew the accent on to short final syllables (as well as long), yet Virgil allows endings like *Lauinaque uenit*. But these grammarians, none of them earlier than Diomedes, were quite probably wrong, at any rate as regards the Augustan period.[6] And even if they were not, the cases are so few that they can practically be written off as rarities; in the first six books of the *Aeneid* there are only 28, and Ovid is still more sparing in the *Metamorphoses*.[7] Another exception cited, *éxinde* (*éxinde per amplum, Aen.* vi. 743), is simply an odd case. Munro suggested that the coincidences arose accidentally from 'judicious imitation of Greek models'. 'Rhythm, not accent,' he added, 'determined Virgil's practice. . . . All the great masters have with fine tact, the reasons for which we can feel if we cannot explain, given to the end this free open fall in opposition to the involution of rhythm which the caesura occasions in the middle of the verse.' Answers are provided by Langen. In *Odyssey* i (444 lines), read with a Latin stress accent, there are 63 conflicts in the fifth foot: in the whole of Virgil there are only 57. Virgil cannot

[1] The figures are: Catullus 39 per cent., Propertius 23 per cent., Tibullus 10 per cent., Ovid 9 per cent. A long syllable was now rarely elided before a short, except in a few stock phrases like *uidi ego*.

[2] M. Schuster, *Tibull-Studien* (1930), p. 58.

[3] *Accentuation latine*, p. 75.

[4] *Trans. Camb. Philos. Soc.*, 1864, p. 388 ff., a detailed criticism.

[5] *Aussprache, Vocalismus und Betonung* (1870), vol. ii, pp. 980–8.

[6] Müller, op. cit., p. 468; P. Langen, *Philologus*, xxxi (1872), p. 108; F. W. Shipley, loc. cit., pp. 31–2.

[7] No doubt their rarity is due to the fact that in Virgil only words in *-a* are concerned; *-que* in the verse-position immediately preceding (as in *diuisque uidebit*) is extremely common (83 instances in *Aen.* vi alone). But it is a notable fact that *-que* is only attached to a trochaic word-end 34 times in all the speeches of Cicero (0·5 per cent. of its total occurrence), and that in 21 of these cases it is elided and has therefore probably no effect on accentuation; Shipley, loc. cit., p. 29.

simply have imitated Homer. Again if, as Corssen held, it was the masculine caesura in the fifth and sixth feet that was objectionable and accent had nothing to do with it, how did it happen that of 206 exceptions in Virgil (in the fifth foot) 147 are preceded by a monosyllable? And as for the aesthetic effect of these breaks in the 'rollender Fall' or 'free open fall', why were the Greeks, and in particular the fastidious Alexandrians, not disturbed by it?[1]

To this last criticism W. Meyer found an ingenious reply. The Alexandrians, he said, did not allow a masculine caesura in the fifth foot following a masculine in the third, and rarely allowed it following a masculine in the fourth. Since the Latin hexameter had fixed such caesuras either in the third or in the second and fourth feet, it followed that when the Romans began to study Alexandrian models they avoided a masculine caesura regularly in the fifth. But why did the Romans adopt these earlier masculine caesuras, if they had no regard for accent? And why, as Norden objects, did they break this 'Greek' rule precisely when Greek words were concerned?[2] Leo then propounded an entirely different theory.[3] We know that the orators objected to endings in monosyllables and in words of four and five syllables like *armamentis* and *Tyndaridarum* (see pp. 36–7). There only remain words in two or three syllables, and that is the reason for the rule, introduced from oratory no doubt by Cicero. Norden inclines to this view,[4] though he recognizes that it leaves much unexplained. But it must be through an oversight that he includes tetrasyllables in $\cup\cup-\underline{\cup}$ as being ruled out in imitation of oratory (*esse uideatur* was surely a legitimate clausula): and Leo's solution, as Professor Fraenkel has said, 'befriedigt in der Tat sehr wenig'.[5]

The pentameter has been less discussed in this respect. Some have held that, since it is by origin a hexameter with a rest instead of the second half of the third and sixth feet, its rules are simply derived from those for hexameters: cut off one syllable from the two legitimate hexameter endings and you are left with a disyllable and a monosyllable; monosyllabic endings being ruled out for other reasons, there only remains the disyllable.[6] But it is hard to believe that the Roman poets, even if they were conscious of the origin of the pentameter, would restrict themselves for so mechanical a reason, which appeals more to the fingers than to the ear; or that it should have taken them so many years to draw such a simple conclusion, if there was any point in drawing it, from the rules for hexameters which Cicero knew as a young man; and the hexameter rules themselves have then to be explained. Another explanation is given by Wilamowitz in his *Griechische Verskunst* (p. 53); he says that Maas has pointed out to him that the disyllabic ending is copied from contemporary Greek Epigram. He gives no references, and I cannot find on what evidence he bases this view; such endings are the rule neither in Philodemus, the chief epigrammatist of the late Republican period, nor in Crinagoras, Antipater of Thessalonica, or Marcus Argentarius, the representatives of the Augustan age. Also the exceptions tend to occur precisely when the word is Greek. K. F. Smith finds an explanation in Zieliński's theory that the accentuation of Classical poetry and oratory was archaic, and distinct from that of contemporary speech. Words like *ferent* would thus have their old accent on the last syllable, and coincidence is established. This will suffice for those who hold, with Zieliński, that ictus and accent are identical.[7] Vollmer supposes that the object was to ensure a *contrast* at the end, one coincidence and one

[1] Loc. cit., pp. 106–7.
[2] *Aeneis* vi, p. 437.
[3] *De Stati Siluis*, p. 8.
[4] Ibid.
[5] *Iktus und Akzent*, p. 349 n.
[6] Meyer, *Sitz. bayer. Akad.*, 1884, p. 1042;

Müller, op. cit., p. 247; Postgate, op. cit., p. 86.
[7] Zieliński, 'Das Klauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden' (*Philologus*, Suppbd. ix, 1904), pp. 827 (242) ff. Smith, *A.J.P.* xxv (1904), p. 461; *Tibullus* (1913), p. 99.

conflict occurring regularly in the last four syllables. This explains the phenomenon, but has it any aesthetic justification? He admits that the opposite effect is sought in the hexameter.[1] Christ's explanation was that the trochaic division of the dactyl allowed the line to flow more easily to its close.[2] That is nearer the mark; but here again, as in the case of hexameters, it is hard to believe that, if the rule was really desirable on these grounds, the fastidious Alexandrians would not have discovered and introduced it. We are drawn back at every point to seek an explanation in the one main factor in the Latin language which might cause Latin versification to diverge from its Greek models—the presence of a stress accent.

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[1] Gercke-Norden, loc. cit., p. 14.   [2] *Metrik* (1879), p. 209.

PHALAECUS AND TIMOLEON

To his narrative of the Sacred War Diodorus appends an excursus on the fate of the Phocian leaders, describing at some length the adventures of Phalaecus and his mercenaries after their departure from Thermopylae (xvi. 61–3). The object of this excursus, whose substance probably derives from Demophilus,[1] is to illustrate the terrible consequences of temple-robbery, but to modern scholars the story is interesting chiefly for its portrayal of the difficulties and hardships experienced by mercenary commanders.[2] It does not appear to have been noticed that at the same time Diodorus unconsciously throws some light upon the mission of Timoleon to Sicily.

The details of this excursus seem to be accurate enough, being distorted little by its moral purpose, but the chronology is uncertain. Although it is clear from the words of Diodorus (61. 3) that the series of adventures extended over several years,[3] the date and duration of each episode is unspecified. One date only is beyond doubt: the capitulation of Phalaecus to Philip took place in mid-July 346, as is known from a precise statement by Demosthenes.[4] The final episode, in which Elean exiles enlisted the remnant of the mercenaries in a disastrous attempt to overthrow the newly established oligarchy, very probably belongs to 342.[5] Into the intervening four years must be fitted: (1) a period of unemployment spent in the Peloponnese; (2) a voyage towards Italy, which proved a fiasco, since the mercenaries mutinied and returned to Greece; (3) a further period of unemployment, apparently short, at Cape Malea; (4) campaigns in Crete, which terminated with the death of Phalaecus at Cydonia. The last of these periods is a long one. Many months must have elapsed between the dispatch of the Lyctian appeal to Sparta and the defeat of Phalaecus' troops by Archidamus, while the siege of Cydonia seems to have commenced only after the withdrawal of the Spartan relief-force. If, as is likely, the death of Phalaecus took place in 342 and his followers returned to the Peloponnese immediately,[6] they can scarcely have been transported to Crete later than the autumn of 344. The link between their adventures and the career of Archidamus is not very helpful: he sailed to aid the Tarentines soon after his victory in Crete, but his arrival in Italy cannot be dated with certainty, though it may belong to the end of 342.[7] A considerable part of the interval between the surrender of Phalaecus at Thermopylae and his departure for Crete may be assigned to his first period of unemployment in the Peloponnese, which was by no means short (Diod. 61. 4, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διέτριβεν περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον). He supported his mercenaries from the remnant of the Delphic treasure and must have tried to secure employment for them. But the Peace of Philocrates had severely restricted the demand for professional soldiery in Greece, and he was eventually compelled to ship his men from Corinth, pretending that his services had been commissioned by agents from Italy and Sicily. The adoption of this subterfuge suggests that he was desperate and had tried every other expedient, the behaviour of his troops that long unemployment had destroyed their faith in him. This episode,

[1] Hammond, *C.Q.* xxxi (1938), pp. 82–5.

[2] Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, pp. 140–2.

[3] Pickard-Cambridge, *C.A.H.* vi, p. 240, does not explain his unusual view that Phalaecus was killed towards the end of 346, i.e. a few months after the surrender at Thermopylae.

[4] xix. 59. The date corresponds to 18th July (Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, iii, p. 295).

[5] Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii. 1, p. 541; Glotz, op. cit., p. 323. Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., pp.

240 and 248, assigns this event to 343, associating the destruction of the mercenaries with the successful coup of the Elean oligarchs; but it is more likely that they perished in a subsequent attack by democratic exiles.

[6] Beloch, op. cit., p. 510; Lenschau, *R.E.* xix, col. 1613.

[7] Beloch, op. cit., p. 595, n. 1; Hackforth, *C.A.H.* vi, p. 300. Glotz, op. cit., p. 417, assigns it to 343.

therefore, seems either to belong to the summer of 345, the period of inactivity at Malea occupying the following winter, or to have occurred as late as the spring of 344. In either case this large body of mercenaries—in whatever part of the Peloponnese it may have been encamped—was available, and indeed most eager, for enlistment at the time when the expedition of Timoleon to Sicily was being organized.

The appeal by Syracusan exiles for Corinthian aid is assigned by most scholars to the summer of 345,[1] the departure of Timoleon for Sicily to the spring of 344. His armament, excluding supplements received in the course of the voyage, amounted to 700 men and seven ships (Diod. 66. 2; Plut. *Timol.* 8. 4), and these were assembled only after considerable delay (Plut. 7. 6). Among the 700 were many who had served the Phocians,[2] but a very large majority of Phalaecus' formidable army was left unengaged. Though a reliable commander was the most pressing need of the Sicilians, the Corinthian government can hardly have believed that a larger armament would be superfluous; for Dionysius was supported by a powerful body of mercenaries at Syracuse, while Hicetas, whose untrustworthiness was patent, had already invited Carthaginian intervention (Plut. 7. 3–7). Despite the insistence of Plutarch on the enthusiasm of the Corinthians (2. 2, 3. 1, 7. 7), they cannot at the outset have viewed this hazardous venture with any favour. To ignore an appeal from the greatest of their colonies would be dishonourable, but they were reluctant to be involved in a heavy financial outlay.[3] Two factors confirm this conclusion. The strange choice of Timoleon to be the leader of the expedition—an elderly man who had lived in retirement from political life for the past twenty years and seems never to have held an important military command—suggests that they refused to sacrifice any of their most valuable leaders to a mission from which they were unlikely to derive much profit. Secondly, when Timoleon had achieved striking success and the undertaking began to promise substantial returns, they sent a considerably stronger armament to Sicily, consisting of 2,000 hoplites, 200 cavalry, ten ships, and a supply of money.[4] This change of attitude was certainly not due to any improvement in the situation at home: the Macedonian danger was becoming increasingly pressing, and it was in 343, the year in which the reinforcement to Timoleon was sent, that Philip threatened the Corinthian dependencies of Ambracia and Leucas (Dem. ix. 34).

The interrelation of Timoleon's mission and the uncompleted voyage of Phalaecus to Italy and Sicily is relatively unimportant and is rendered obscure by chronological uncertainties. The latter may have sailed before the appeal of the Syracusan exiles was received at Corinth, but this is rather improbable. The war between Tarentum and the Lucanians offered him some prospect of employment, but he could scarcely have believed that Sicily would afford him secondary opportunities or have tried to convince his men that they had already been engaged (Diod. 61. 4), unless hostilities had broken out there or were known to be imminent. No fighting occurred in eastern Sicily in 345, and the operations of Hicetas against Dionysius at Syracuse, which were designed to forestall the arrival of Timoleon, belong to the spring of 344 (Diod. 68. 1–3; Plut. 9. 3). It is more likely that Phalaecus' voyage was undertaken either

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[1] Envoys perhaps left Leontini in the spring (Hackforth, op. cit., p. 285).

[2] Diod. 78. 3–4, 82. 2: Plut. 30. 7–8. Plutarch, who exaggerates the piety of Timoleon, is forced to excuse the enlistment of men guilty of sacrilege by the plea that no others were available. But there can scarcely have been a shortage of mercenaries in a brief period of widespread peace, and in the following year, when Phalaecus was already in Crete with most of his company, a much larger force was collected, apparently

without difficulty. The Corinthians had been nominally allies of Phocis in the Sacred War and can have been little influenced by religious scruples.

[3] Hicetas in his letter to the Corinthians stressed the cost of the expedition (Plut. 7. 5).

[4] Diod. 69. 4; Plut. 16. 3. The ten ships seem to have been all triremes, whereas the seven of Timoleon had included three smaller vessels (Diod. 66. 2).

in the autumn of 345 before the end of the navigating season, while the Corinthians
were organizing their expedition, or in the following spring, whether before or after the
departure of Timoleon. Both sailed from Corinth, where Phalaecus may well have
offered the services of himself and his men to the Corinthians and received a rebuff,
only a few hundreds of his company being accepted. In desperation he probably
decided first to try his luck at Tarentum and, if he failed there, to cross to Sicily,
where recent developments were encouraging to a commander of unemployed mer-
cenaries. If these hopes proved fruitless, he could turn to free-lance brigandage and
seize some defenceless city (Diod. 61. 4). But the justifiable lack of confidence in him
felt by his followers wrecked all his schemes.

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THE SEVENTH IDYLL OF THEOCRITUS

In a paper designed to prove that the technopaegnium entitled Σῦριγξ could not be by Theocritus, I said in 1914[1] that that question had a bearing of some importance upon the interpretation of the Idylls since the 'Mascarade bucolique' depended ultimately on the assumption that Simichidas in *Id.* 7 was Theocritus himself. If T. referred to himself elsewhere by that name (and the *Syrinx* so refers to him), the assumption would be justified; if someone else did so, he would, in company with the scholia and with the author of the barbarous verses beginning Σιμιχίδα Θεόκριτε which are prefixed to the Idylls in certain manuscripts, be merely drawing an obvious and possibly mistaken inference.

Belief in the 'Mascarade bucolique' has taken various forms, but its fundamental postulate is that some or all of the figures in the bucolic Idylls are not rustics but literary men, and the game is to identify them. Thus Lykidas in *Id.* 7, with whom most players begin and many stop, has at one time or another been pronounced to be Aratus, Astakides (of Call. *ep.* 24), Callimachus, Dosiadas, Leonidas, Rhianus, and maybe others besides. The game has been less popular of late, or less publicly played, and it is partly for that reason that a threat made twenty-five years ago to return to the subject has never been carried out. There are, however, two other reasons. One is that the equation Simichidas = Theocritus is of much less importance than I then thought it; the other that the problems of that enigmatic masterpiece the seventh Idyll remain unsolved. For problems there are; and if I now return to them, it is not so much to attack the postulates of the 'Mascarade bucolique' as in the hope that a review of the difficulties from a somewhat different angle may encourage someone to solve them. It will be well to begin with Simichidas, who describes in the first person an experience which evidently reflects, in part at least, an experience of Theocritus himself.

First, then, by way of precaution let us note that 'I' in literature may stand for the author himself, as for instance in *Id.* 28, or for a character he has created, as in *Id.* 3, and that between these extremes an author may identify himself not wholly but only in part with a character who uses the first person. Hence, though the speaker in *Id.* 7 is plainly in part the poet, the two are not necessarily identical. Still, it is most natural in this poem to assume the identity, and with this caveat I shall assume it and suppose Σιμιχίδας to be neither more nor less than an alias for Θεόκριτος.

If that is so, the name remains unexplained, and I shall waste no time upon the obscure guesses of the scholia on 7. 21 except to say that though the Simichidas, son of Perikles, of Orchomenos, there mentioned as resident in Cos, must be supposed to have existed, he does not illuminate the matter. It is, however, important to observe that if T. passed under an alias, he was not the only Alexandrian poet to do so. Callimachus certainly called himself Battiades once (*A.P.* 7. 415) and, to judge from the popularity of the name with later writers, may be supposed to have done so more than once; and in this very poem (40) the poet whom we know as Asklepiades is called Sikelidas. Herein the Alexandrians perhaps took a hint from an earlier age, for Simonides, who is called by Ovid and may perhaps have called himself Leoprepides (Ov. *Ib.* 512, cf. Sim. *frr.* 146, 147), is said by Suidas to have been called also Melikertes, and Solon (*fr.* 20) addresses Mimnermus as Ligyastades.

[1] *J. Phil.* xxxiii. 129.

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From this batch of names—Battiades, Leoprepides, Ligyastades, Melikertes, Sikelides, Simichidas—two points seem to emerge. First, with the exception of Melikertes, all are patronymic in form, and Leoprepides is so in content (for Simonides was son of Leoprepes), but none of the others can be proved to be so, and two, Ligyastades and Simichidas, are not formed from the father's name.[1] Secondly, though these names are aliases, there is not the slightest reason to think that any of them are disguises, and there is plain evidence that some of them are not.[2] And it ought to have been plain in *Id.* 7 that the name Simichidas is not a disguise; if the uninitiated were not to recognise Simichidas, they would not have been allowed to think for twenty lines that the speaker was Theocritus.

Nor does Simichidas make any serious pretence of being a rustic. He is going from the town of Cos to attend harvest festivities on the estate of one of the most aristocratic families of the island, and he wears the laced boots of the traveller, which presently catch the quizzical eye of Lykidas,[3] no doubt barefoot himself (cf. 4. 56). Knowing, though seemingly only by repute, Lykidas's skill in rustic song (27), he invites him to βουκολιασμός (36) and so far conforms to that genre himself as to pretend that his inspiration reached him ἀν' ὤρεα βουκολέοντα (92) and to embellish his prelude with a rustic image (97); but where Lykidas's rivals are herdsmen and harvesters (28) Simichidas's are Asklepiades and Philetas (40), his poetry is known in exalted circles (93), and his song concerns the love-affairs of Theocritus's friend Aratos, an urban and mundane theme devoid of any further touch of rusticity unless the appeal to Pan is such—and Pan, as Σ remark, is on other grounds appropriate here, and he is made the occasion for the most elaborate display of Alexandrian erudition to be found in the Idylls.

Simichidas, then, an urban poet, sets out in company with Eukritos and Amyntas on their walk,[4] and less than half way to their destination they fall in with Lykidas. This encounter is described by Cholmeley (who was strong on the 'Mascarade bucolique') with the words (p. 12) 'they meet one "Lycidas" *masquerading as a goatherd*

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[1] Ligyastades, according to Suid. s.v. *Μίμνερμος*, is formed διὰ τὸ ἐμμελὲς καὶ λιγύ, in which case it is descriptive and resembles Melikertes, formed διὰ τὸ ἡδύ (Suid. s.v. *Σιμωνίδης*); the name Ligyrtiades, which Suidas gives as that of Mimnermus's father, is no doubt begotten by it. T.'s father was named not Simichos but Praxagoras. Battiades may be a real patronymic but is not certainly such (see *RE.* Suppl. 5. 386); so may Sikelidas, but the name of Asklepiades's father is unknown, for Σ T. 7. 40, who assert that it was Sikelos, assert also, among other explanations, that T.'s father was named Simichos, and they cannot be trusted.

[2] The plainest case is Sikelidas, for in T. the name is on exactly the same footing as Philetas in the same line, and it is used both by Hedylus (Ath. 11. 473A) and by Meleager in his preface (*A.P.* 4. 1. 46). The poet is elsewhere called, and calls himself, Asklepiades (*A.P.* 12. 50), but it is hardly clear which of the two names is genuine and which alias, nor for our purpose is it material. Ligyastades, from its context, must have been recognizable as referring to Mimnermus, and presumably the same was true of Melikertes and Battiades.

[3] 26 πᾶσα λίθος πταίοισα ποτ' ἀρβυλίδεσσιν

ἀείδει. Eustathius (746. 3, cf. 1236. 4) observes that the singing stones βουκολικὴν ἔχουσιν ἀφέλειαν, and I cannot forbear to quote from Pepys's Diary of 14 July 1667, at Epsom: *We took notice of his woollen knit stockings of two colours mixed, and of his shoes shod with iron shoes, both at the toe and heels, and with great nails in the soles of his feet, which was mighty pretty; and, taking notice of them, 'Why,' says the poor man, 'the downes, you see, are full of stones, and we are faine to shoe ourselves thus; and these', says he, 'will make the stones fly till they sing before me.'*

[4] Simichidas leads the trio, for Lykidas addresses him, in the singular, throughout, though his opening questions refer to the whole party. The phrasing (2, 131 f.) may suggest that Simichidas and Eukritos are closer friends to each other than to Amyntas, whose Macedonian-sounding name may be significant. A third-century inscription from Cos (B.M. 343, Paton and Hicks, 10 C 91) contains the name ΕΥΚ - - - - - ΟΚΡΙΤΟΥ: but let no one add ΡΙΤΟΣΘΕ, for the letters will not fill the space, and T.'s name would probably have been spelt Θεύκριτος in Cos. This is sad.

(αἰπόλῳ ἔξοχ᾽ ἐῴκει)'.[1] The italics are Cholmeley's, but what Simichidas says about Lykidas is categorically that he *was* a goatherd and no one could have mistaken him for anything else (13 ἦς δ᾽ αἰπόλος οὐδέ κέ τίς νιν | ἠγνοίησεν ἰδών). He sadly underestimated the capacity of his commentators, and I suggest that those who wish to play the *mascarade* game should begin by disposing of the two words ἦς αἰπόλος, for a theory based on the assumption that T. means the reverse of what he says starts at some initial disadvantage. There is, however, this excuse for Cholmeley, that Lykidas's costume is described with what may seem needless particularity (15):

> ἐκ μὲν γὰρ λασίοιο δασύτριχος εἶχε τράγοιο
> κνακὸν δέρμ᾽ ὤμοισι[2] νέας ταμίσοιο ποτόσδον,
> ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ στήθεσσι γέρων ἐσφίγγετο πέπλος
> ζωστῆρι πλακερῷ, ῥοικὰν δ᾽ ἔχεν ἀγριελαίῳ
> δεξιτερᾷ κορύναν.

The costume, in short, is almost too good to be true: but it does not thereby follow that it came from the costumier, and Simichidas gives a further indication that it did not; for if Lykidas's goatskin smells of τάμισος[3] it is, as Σ observe, because he has been cheese-making and has wiped his hands on it: and to lengths such as these the most conscientious masquerader would hardly go. If, therefore, these lines need explanation, I would rather suppose that Simichidas, though he is not addressing Lykidas, is amused by his clothes and strikes in advance the playful and faintly derisive tone of Lykidas's opening speech.

The name Lykidas stands on exactly the same footing as the name Simichidas, and both interlocutors use it (13, 27, 55, 91), as both use Simichidas (21, 96). Therefore if it is an alias it is not a disguise. Like most of the aliases mentioned above it is patronymic in form, but that is not in itself suspicious, for among T.'s characters are others with names so formed, as there are also others connected with λύκος,[4] and Λυκίδας is also fairly common outside Bucolic.[5] Nor can we attach importance to the fact that he is called Κυδωνικὸν ἄνδρα (12). Stephanus Byzantinus records a Kydonia in Crete, in Sicily, and in Libya, and there was an island so named near Lesbos (Plin. *N.H.* 5. 140); the first is the most important, but the adjective might belong to any. Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xxxiv. 616)[6], from 71 f., would enrich the known topography of Cos with an Acharna and a Lykopeia, and Paton and Hicks (p. 213) with a Ptelea from 65. The geographical adjectives in this Idyll, as I have said elsewhere (*C.Q.* xxiv. 153), are perhaps on a different footing from those in the other poems, and if these suggestions are correct, we may have to add a Coan Kydonia to the other four. And, finally, though it may be surprising that a goatherd in Cos should express opinions on an Alexandrian literary squabble (47 ff.),[7] the example of Korydon at 4. 31 should discourage hasty inferences.

In short it may be thought that Lykidas is not a wholly realistic portrait of a goatherd. He is not: but then, with the possible exception of Milon in *Id.* 10, there is no wholly realistic portrait of a rustic anywhere in T.; and if T., using not indeed the

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[1] So, more recently, Legrand, *Buc. gr.* i. 2, 'un quidam que T. s'amuse à dépeindre comme un chevrier'; Bignone, *Teocrito* 34, 'un pastore non è benchè gli rassomigli a puntino'; cf. Edmonds, *Gk Buc. Poets*, xiii.

[2] I do not accept Graefe's λαιοῖο and Kaibel's ὤμοιο, for the juxtaposition of practically synonymous adjectives is not rare in Greek poetry (see Lobeck on Soph. *Aj.* 710), and the additions of another genitive and another -οιο are no ornaments to the sentence.

[3] Τάμισος is not, as L. and S. say, *rennet*, a substance extracted from the inner lining of the stomach of sucking calves and other animals, but curdled milk from the stomach, in which the coagulant enzyme is still active. It is the Doric for πυετία, which L. and S. define correctly.

[4] Diokleidas, Philondas, Theumaridas: Lykon, Lykopas, Lykos.

[5] e.g. Herod. 9. 5, Dem. 20. 131.

[6] See also *Hell. Dicht.* ii. 138.

[7] Cf. *C.Q.* xxxii. 12.

name his parents gave him but a recognisable equivalent for it, depicts himself taking a walk in his proper character as a town-dweller and literary man, and asserts that on that walk he met a goatherd, then it seems to me that, however unusual the behaviour of that goatherd may appear, we have no title to disbelieve T. and ought to regard Lykidas, whether that was his real name or no, as a genuine rustic,[1] and to discard the 'Mascarade bucolique', of which not a word is heard in antiquity.[2] My difficulty, however, is this. There is a contrast, plainly if unobtrusively drawn, between the rival of Asklepiades and Philetas, and the country-clad Lykidas whose instrument is the σῦριγξ and whose rivals are to be found in the harvest field and the pastures (28), and I should have expected, if the two are to indulge in a friendly singing-match, that the contrast would be emphasised in their songs. Now Lykidas's song is certainly considerably more bucolic than Simichidas's: it is much concerned with two bucolic heroes, and it ends (86 ff.) on a purely bucolic note, but it is a very odd composition and I do not understand it.

It begins with a statement that if Ageanax will grant his favours to Lykidas, he will have a prosperous voyage to Mitylene even in the stormy season (52–60). Changing from statement to prayer, apparently as an indication that the favours have in fact been received, Lykidas prays that Ageanax may reach his destination, and announces his intention of holding rustic festival to celebrate ἆμαρ τῆνο—seemingly the day of Ageanax's safe arrival. His στιβάς will be topped with fragrant herbs[3] and he will lie there, drinking and thinking of Ageanax, while two shepherds pipe to him and Tityros sings. The subject of the songs will be how Daphnis wasted with love for Xenea and how Komatas, shut up in a coffer by a cruel master, was fed by bees because the Muses had touched his lips with nectar. At this point the résumé of Tityros's songs apparently closes and Lykidas ends his own song with the following apostrophe to Komatas (83):

> ὦ μακάριστε Κομᾶτα, τύ θην τάδε τερπνὰ πεπόνθεις,
> καὶ τὺ κατεκλάσθης ἐς λάρνακα, καὶ τὺ μελισσᾶν
> κηρία φερβόμενος ἔτος ὥριον ἐξεπόνασας.
> αἴθ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ζωοῖς ἐναρίθμιος ὤφελες ἦμεν,
> ὥς τοι ἐγὼν ἐνόμευον ἀν᾽ ὤρεα τὰς καλὰς αἶγας
> φωνᾶς εἰσαΐων, τὺ δ᾽ ὑπὸ δρυσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ πεύκαις
> ἁδὺ μελισδόμενος κατεκέκλισο, θεῖε Κομᾶτα.

Now Lykidas's festival is to celebrate nominally Ageanax's arrival in Mitylene but also, no doubt, the happy outcome of his own love-affair, and one would expect him to select for Tityros subjects appropriate to the occasion; and the love-pangs of Daphnis, by way of contrast, may serve that purpose. But the story of Komatas as here outlined has no such relevance, nor is it easy to see why Lykidas should show so

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[1] I agree with those who infer from the characterisation in 15 ff., 128 f. that T. is drawing in part at least from the life, and I will not conjecture that he is confronting himself, à la Pirandello, with a character from his own Idylls.

[2] Bion is no doubt treated as a rustic in the ᾿Επιτάφιος and Virgil introduced his friends into the Eclogues, but the silence of T.'s scholia ought not to be undervalued, for, as the note on 21 shows, some of their information comes from Coan sources (cf. Wendel, T.-Scholien, 128).

[3] 67 χἀ στιβὰς ἐσσεῖται πεπυκασμένα ἔστ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶχυν | κνύζᾳ τ᾽ ἀσφοδέλῳ τε πολυγνάμπτῳ τε σελίνῳ.

I take him to mean not that his στιβάς will be made of these herbs, which would involve an unusual sense for the participle, but that the hay of which it is composed will have a top-dressing cubit-deep of them: cf. Plat. Rep. 372 B κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μιλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις εὐωχήσονται. I do not know celery in such a context, but fleabane δύναται . . . ὑποστρωννύμενος . . . θηρία διώκειν καὶ κώνωπας ἀπελαύνειν. κτείνει δὲ καὶ ψύλλους (Diosc. 3. 121), and it is mentioned together with asphodel for useful properties of this kind at Geop. 18. 2. 4; cf. ibid. 13. 11. 3.

much enthusiasm for this hero. True, a rustic singer might in general venerate a rustic so signally favoured by the Muses, but, if that is all, the end of Lykidas's song is feeble and inconsequent, and the disappointment is the greater since it has begun with a passage not surpassed in beauty anywhere in T.

Further: ll. 83 ff. are rendered by Legrand 'c'est toi qui as subi cette aimable aventure, toi qui fus enfermé dans le coffre; toi qui passas' etc., and I agree that the anaphora of the emphatic pronoun cannot be disregarded as it is in the other versions at which I have looked. Τύ θην . . . καὶ τύ . . . καὶ τύ seem to me to mean *thou truly . . . thou too . . . thou too*, and to be capable of no other meaning. But did any one besides Komatas have these experiences? and if he did, what does it matter here?

Some light on this puzzle might seem to proceed from Σ 78 φασὶν ὅτι Θεόκριτος τὰ τοῦ Δάφνιδος εἰς τὸν Κομάταν ⟨μετήνεγκεν⟩. τοῦτον γὰρ ἡ μήτηρ ἐξέθηκε τὸν πατέρα Ἄνακτα εὐλαβουμένη, εἰδυῖα ὅτι οὐ πείσει ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρύσου διακορηθῆναι λέγουσα, but I fear it is a will-o'-the-wisp due to someone who asked himself the first of my two questions and assumed the answer to be Daphnis because Daphnis was the last person mentioned. For in the first place the exposure of Daphnis as an infant is part of the Daphnis legend, but does not tally with what is here said of Komatas, and what is here said of Komatas is not elsewhere recorded of Daphnis; and in the second place, the scholia on this same passage seem to show that T. did not after all invent this story of Komatas. One note states, on the authority of Λύκιος, that an unnamed shepherd, who sacrificed his master's sheep to the Muses, was shut into a chest and was found two months later[1] alive, the chest being full of honey-comb; another, giving no authority, names the shepherd Komatas—ταὐτὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν Μενάλκας.[2] The scene is said to be τῆς Θουρίας ὅρος, which the first note calls Θάλαμος and the second locates not at Thurii but in Sicily.

Λύκιος is a Greek name, but no writer is known to have borne it and Toup plausibly wrote Λύκος. This will be Lykos of Rhegium, strangely called ὁ Βουθήρας, and said to be the father, real or adopted, of the tragedian Lycophron; and among his fragments the passage will be found (F.H.G. 2. 372). Λύκιος, Λύκος, Λυκόφρων, and Λυκίδας? Well, the arm of coincidence is long, the relation of Lykos and Lycophron is obscure,[3] and though Lykidas for a son of Lykos would resemble the alternative names mentioned above in being an alias which is no disguise, I am not inviting any-one to add Lycophron to the list of poets with whom Lykidas has been identified. If anyone should wish to do so, let him first show that Lycophron left his native Chalkis to live the very simple life, preferably at a place in Cos called Kydonia, and he will command attention, though we shall still want to know what all this fuss about Komatas means.

To be brief, I am no believer in the 'Mascarade bucolique' in any sense in which the theory has so far been propounded, but I recognise a real difficulty in this part of the poem, and while that difficulty remains I must admit the possibility of some such explanation of it.

On ll. 25, 60, 70 of this Idyll I have written elsewhere.[4] I add here some further notes on points of detail.

1. T. hat durch das Anfangswort ἧς χρόνος ἀνίκα, 'es war einmal' das Erlebnis, von

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[1] The discrepancy in the duration of the punishment can be evaded by supposing that 85 ἔτος ὥριον means *the spring* as *pomifer annus* at Hor. C. 3. 23. 8 means *autumn*, but I know no Greek example of this idiom.

[2] Σ 1 praef. offer Menalkas or Komatas as names for the unnamed goatherd. It will not help us to suppose that it was not Daphnis but Menalkas who shared Komatas's fate.

[3] See RE. xiii. 2317, 2406.

[4] C.Q. xxiv. 148; C.R. xli. 166.

dem er erzählt, in eine unbestimmte Ferne gerückt, als ob es ein Märchen wäre. So Wila-
mowitz (*Hell. Dicht.* ii. 142), citing for the colour of the Greek phrase Critias *fr.* 1,
Plat. *Prot.* 390 c, *Cypria fr.* 1 (ἦν ὅτε), Moschion *fr.* 6. 3 (ἦν ποτ' αἰὼν κεῖνος ἡνίκα),[1] in
all of which the reference is to a remote age. He adds, however, that T. is not likely
to have recovered so much freshness of vision after a long interval, and that Aratos's
love-affair is an ephemeral topic which would soon lose interest.

With these conclusions I agree, but I do not think the opening words have neces-
sarily any colour of antiquity or fairy-tale. They seem to be used elsewhere of epochs
which are indeed closed but are not necessarily remote. Thus ἦν χρόνος ἡνίκα . . .
begins epitaphs referring to the life of men now dead (*A. Plan.* 270; Kaibel, *Ep. Gr.*
254), and similarly Plat. *Alc.* 1. 106 E ἆ ἄρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε
οὐχ ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι; Diog. Laert. 6. 56 ἦν ποτε χρόνος ἐκεῖνος ὅτε ἤμην ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος ὁποῖος
σὺ νῦν.[2] If therefore any inference is to be drawn from the phrase (and I think it
may be), it is not that T. chooses to represent the events as having taken place long
ago, but that the situation has changed materially since they occurred—for instance,
that T. or some others concerned have left Cos, or that not all are still alive.

23.   ἐπιτυμβίδιοι κορυδαλλίδες.
ἢ ὅτι τοῖς τάφοις ἐνδιατρίβουσιν ἢ ὅτι τὸν τύμβον ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς φέρουσι (Σ). The
first explanation, which probably inspired [Babr.] 72. 21 κορύδαλλος οὖν τάφοις παίζων,
is favoured by Wilamowitz (*Red. u. Vortr.* 1. 281), who pictures the party walking on
a tomb-lined road like the Via Appia. But they are already well on their way (10)
on their walk of five or six miles,[3] and it is difficult to imagine that the town of Cos,
which had been of no importance until the μετοικισμός in 366 B.C. and was small in
Strabo's day (Diod. 15. 76, Strab. 14. 657), had a row of tombs stretching far into the
country; the second explanation, which fits Lykidas's whimsical tone, seems therefore
more probable.

The bird will be the crested lark, for the skylark is in Greece a winter migrant
(Thompson, *Gloss. Gk Birds*[2], 166). Whatever the origin of the story, told also of the
hoopoe, that the lark buried his father in his head (see ibid. 167), I suspect that
Greeks saw a resemblance between the lark's crest seen frontally and the *anthemion*
which tops so many grave-stelae.

46. Oromedon, not otherwise known, is no doubt rightly said by Σ to be a mountain
in Cos, and may further be supposed to be in view at the moment, for the party is
walking westwards in the comparatively fertile northern plain and on their left hand
rises the barren ridge of mountains which line the south coast of the island. The
name Prion preserved by Pliny (*N.H.* 5. 134) presumably denotes the whole ridge,
which has a Sierra-like outline. Paton and Hicks's map suggested Mt. Dikeo in this
range as a probable Oromedon, and Miss Alice Lindsell, who was in Cos in 1937, very
kindly looked into the question on the spot.

From the information and the excellent photographs supplied by her and by
Miss J. B. Mitchell, it appears that Mt. Dikeo is a group of summits of over 800 m.,
not isolated, but standing out as the most conspicuous portion of the chain, and in
full view of travellers in the northern plain. I think we may guess Oromedon to have
been its ancient name.

Miss Lindsell tells me that in normal years in Cos the barley-harvest on the lower
ground is over by the end of April, and that the vintage goes on through August and
September according to the kind of grape. This information supplements what I

[1] Add (from Headlam's note on Herodas 4. 50)
Diog. L. *praef.* 4, Call. *fr.* 87.
[2] ἦν ὅτε is used with exactly the same colour,

e.g. *A.P.* 8. 178, 9. 344, 12. 44, 14. 52; Kaibel 565.
[3] For the position of Haleis and Pyxa see
Paton and Hicks, *Inscr. of Cos*, p. 212.

said at *C.Q.* xxiv. 148, and the barley-harvest ought to fix the time of year with some precision (33 f.). I fear, however, that there is something wrong, for the scene in 131 ff. suggests a later date than April, and even in shady vineyards the leaves would not be stripped from the vines (134) so long before the vintage (see *Geop.* 5. 28, Pallad. 9. 3, 10. 18, Colum. 5. 5. 14, 11. 2. 61). Whether owing to a change of climate, or to a difference in the varieties of barley and vines cultivated, or to both causes, the modern dates do not fit T.'s setting.

53.[1]   χὥταν ἐφ' ἑσπερίοις ἐρίφοις νότος ὑγρὰ διώκῃ
         κύματα, χωρίων ὅτ' ἐπ' ὠκεανῷ πόδας ἴσχει.

The matutinal (or cosmical) setting of Orion, associated elsewhere with gales (e.g. *A.P.* 7. 273, Hor. *C.* 1. 28. 21, *Epod.* 10. 10), occupies a month in the autumn, and the time meant is that preceding the setting of his left foot (marked by the star Rigel), which crosses the horizon first, probably some time in October. The Kids are stars close to Capella in the constellation Auriga. They are often associated generally with storms (e.g. Arat. 158, Virg. *Aen.* 9. 668), and both their rising (Hor. *C.* 3. 1. 28), and their setting (Call. *ep.* 20, *A.P.* 7. 502, 640, Ov. *M.* 14. 711) are ominous. The time envisaged by Lykidas for Ageanax's voyage is autumnal or wintry (66), but the matutinal setting of the Kids is in December and later than that of Orion;[2] and even if ἑσπέριος could refer to their setting Lykidas would not mention the more dangerous period before the less. They are, it is true, in the west when Orion sets, but the fact that they are there is of no significance. I think, therefore, that we must rather understand the reference to be to their vespertinal (or acronychal) rising. It will follow that ἑσπέριος means not, as L. and S. say, *western*, but *vespertinal*;[3] and the word has that sense at Arat. 1065 ἑσπερίων προπάροιθεν | Πληιάδων, where it is rightly explained by *Σ* as τῶν ἀφ' ἑσπέρας ἀνατελλουσῶν.

Ancient dates for the vespertinal rising of the Kids range from September 26 to October 7,[4] dates some weeks earlier than the setting of Orion, and it may be doubted whether, as καί . . . καί suggest, Lykidas is fixing two dates about the beginning and end of October respectively, or whether both phenomena refer to one date. Ancient poets frequently use astronomical data loosely, forgetting that they change with the precession of the equinoxes and vary considerably from latitude to latitude;[5] and since καί . . . καί often in T. form quite a light copula (e.g. 2. 49, 7.3, 29.37), I think the second explanation cannot be excluded. If it is correct, Lykidas is giving somewhat vaguely the evening and the morning signs which mark the stormy period associated by us no less vaguely with the equinox.

99 ff. Wilamowitz (*Gött. Nachr.* 1894, 185) pointed out that 100 f. must mean that Aristis is a citharist accomplished enough to compete without discredit at Delphi in the premier musical festival of Greece. We shall never know what part Aristis played in Aratos's love-affair, but it is reasonable to suppose that this compliment is not *à propos de bottes*, and its simplest explanation would be that Aristis, like Simichidas, had composed a poem on the theme. If *Id.* 6, as Wilamowitz plausibly suggests (ibid. 188), also relates to it, Aratos's affairs of the heart would seem in any case to have achieved remarkable publicity.

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[1] Professor D. S. Robertson has kindly read, and improved the astronomy of, this note.

[2] Their vespertinal (or heliacal) setting is in the spring, and therefore inappropriate here though said to be stormy at *Σ* Arat. 679.

[3] *Se montrent au couchant* Legrand. Among the older commentators Wuestemann and Kiessling, though they do not explain the adjective,

seem to have understood the reference to be to the rising, and this view was suggested to me also by Professor Housman.

[4] Colum. 11. 2. 66, 73, Lydus *de ost.* Wachsmuth, pp. 147, 149, 184, 291, 297.

[5] Cf. Smith, *Dict. Ant.* i. 224; Housman, Manil. 5, p. xxxix.

III.   εἴης δ' Ἠδώνων μὲν ἐν ὥρεσι χείματι μέσσῳ
                       Ἕβρον πὰρ ποταμὸν τετραμμένος ἐγγύθεν ἄρκτῳ.

These words are translated by Wilamowitz (*Gött. Nachr.* 1894, 195) *neben dem Hebrus, gerichtet nach dem nahen Bären*, and εἴης παρ' Ἕβρον presents no difficulty, for παρά *c. acc.* with no idea of motion is common enough (see Wyse on Is. 8. 16).[1] Τετραμμένος ἐγγύθεν ἄρκτῳ, however, has caused great trouble, and Bücheler's citation (*Rhein. M.* 39. 276) of Arat. 575 ἐξόπιθεν τετραμμένος (of the posture in which Engonasin rises), though it contented Wilamowitz, seems to me quite irrelevant. I believe, however, that the difficulty is a mere illusion, that ἐγγύθεν ἄρκτῳ goes with εἴης (as e.g. Arat. 181 ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἐγγύθεν ἦσαν, 480, *Il.* 11. 723), and Ἕβρον πὰρ ποταμόν with τετραμμένος. The common preposition with this verb is πρός, but ἀνά, ἀντί, ἐπί, ἐς all occur, and παρά, though I know no other example, seems natural enough. Πρός (for ποτί) occurs in the bucolic Idylls (5. 93), but I do not recommend its substitution.

Wilamowitz (ibid. 194) observed that Pan is thought of as the shepherd-god changing his pastures with the seasons like a mortal shepherd. The curse is that winter shall find him in the coldest, summer in the hottest part of his range. In winter, then, he will not only be on Rhodope near the pole, but will face north, towards the Hebrus, which is on that side of the mountain. And I think there is a similar point in 114 πέτρᾳ ὑπὸ Βλεμύων ὅθεν οὐκέτι Νεῖλος ὁρατός. In summer Pan is to be in Ethiopia but, facing south, will see no river at his feet because he has reached or passed its source. I will not discuss the geographical conceptions involved, except to note that Dion. Per. 220 speaks of Βλεμύων . . . κολῶναι | ἔνθεν πιστάτοιο κατέρχεται ὕδατα Νείλου. Possibly there is some confusion between the source of the Nile and one of the higher cataracts, to which, according to Eustathius, Dionysius refers.

115 ff. Wilamowitz (*Gött. Nachr.* 1894, 187) is of course right in supposing that the purpose for which the Loves are summoned is to inspire Philinos not with love for Aratos but with an unrequited passion which will punish him for his present behaviour;[2] and the seats from which they are summoned are probably not as irrelevant to this point as he fancies (ibid. 193, *Hell. Dicht.* ii. 140). Hyetis is not mentioned elsewhere, but Byblis is called after the daughter of Miletos who met her death, in circumstances variously related, in consequence of an incestuous passion entertained for or by her brother (Parthen. 11, Ant. Lib. 30, Ov. *Met.* 9. 664); and the temple at Oikous was founded by their father (Parthen. loc. cit., Σ Dion. Per. 825). If T. had had a prosperous love-affair in mind, this choice of shrines would have been unfortunate, and there was, nearer at hand and far more famous, the Cnidian temple, which had no such sinister associations.

But I do not think Wilamowitz right in supposing 120 f. to mean 'and yet Philinos is not worth your pains'. Mr. Denniston is silent as to καὶ δὴ μάν, and I do not know the particles conjoined elsewhere; but when καὶ δή and καὶ μήν both have progressive sense, it is improbable that καὶ δὴ μάν will have the adversative force peculiar to καὶ μήν.[3] Moreover, *and indeed* is better sense than *and yet*. The thought will be: 'Inspire Philinos with the unhappy passion he deserves; and indeed he is fully of an age for one'—and the further reflection that he is therefore no longer worth Aratos's pains follows by implication in 122.
                                                                              A. S. F. Gow.

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[1] *P. Ox.* 1618, which usually omits iota adscript, has "Ἕβρω παρ ποταμῶ—no doubt wrongly.
[2] Cf. *A.P.* 12. 12, 16, 109, 193.

[3] Mr. Denniston cites ἦ δὴ μάν from *Il.* 17. 538, and εἰ δὴ μάν, a conjecture at Alc. *fr.* 89 Diehl. Neither lends any support to an adversative use.

THE 'ASKEW COLLATIONS' OF AESCHYLUS

NEARLY every edition of Aeschylus published between 1782 (Schütz, first ed.) and 1852 (Hermann, posthumous ed.) contained readings from what were called 'Askew's collations' or the 'Askew MSS.'—usually referred to as Ask. A, Ask. B, Ask. C, Ask. D, Ask. a, Colb. 1, and Colb. 2. These MSS., which were very briefly described, were stated in these editions to be Paris MSS. (with the exception of Ask. a, said to be in Askew's own library) which had been collated by Askew. Blomfield,[1] however, discovered that Askew had transcribed all the collations from a note-book that had belonged to Needham, and Pierron[2] accused Askew of deliberate plagiarism and unscrupulous dishonesty. The late Prof. H. W. Smyth in a recent note on the subject[3] attempted to identify the 'Askew MSS.', and maintained the charge of plagiarism; but his conclusions were based on inadequate evidence,[4] and were consequently partly incorrect. A full study of all the available evidence, a summary of which I give below, not only clears Askew's name of any plagiarism, but also establishes the identity of the MSS.

Four volumes of manuscript notes in Cambridge University Library (MS. Nn II 32 and Adv. a 64.1, once owned by Needham, and MS. Nn IV 6 and Adv. a 51.1, written by Askew)[5] provide the key to the problem. Peter Needham (1680–1731), a fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, from 1698 until 1716, was a competent classical scholar who had published editions of Bassius' *Geoponica*, Hierocles' *Commentary on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras*, and Theophrastus' *Characters*.[6] After 1712 (and perhaps before that date) he began collecting materials for an edition of Aeschylus[7]. With this purpose he may have made independent collations (none have survived), but he mainly relied on the good services of continental scholars (especially Father Bernard de Montfaucon) and of English friends travelling on the Continent to obtain not only the readings of manuscripts but also collections of emendations and other subsidia for an edition of Aeschylus. The autograph copies of these collations, etc., exactly as they were received by Needham, are now bound up in MS. Nn II 32, and are the ultimate origin of the 'Askew collations'. The volume contains (1) eight pages of scholia and emendations, dated 1549, the work of Robortello and L. Castelvetro of Modena; (2) a collation of the Medicean MS. made for Needham in October 1715 by Salvini, professor of Greek at Florence; (3) collations of six Paris MSS. made by three Benedictine monks of St. Maur and by Abbot Lama of Naples, and sent to Needham by Montfaucon; (4) collations of one Paris MS., three Leyden MSS., and a list of Scaliger's conjectures found among Voss's papers at Leyden, sent to Needham (probably in 1720) by John Walker, fellow of Trinity College, who was travelling on

[1] Blomfield, *Prometheus Vinctus* (1810), introd.

[2] Alexis Pierron, 'Notice critique sur le Parisinus L d'Eschyle' (*Annuaire de l'Association pour l'Encouragement des Études Grecques en France*, iii, 1869), p. 6.

[3] *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. xliv, 1933, 'Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Aeschylus', pp. 57–8.

[4] He was unable to consult personally the papers of Needham and Askew, and had to use the brief description of them in *A Catalogue of Adversaria and Printed Books containing MS. notes, in the Library of the University of Cambridge*, 1864.

[5] In the old library numbered in the Adver-saria class Nn II 32, Nn I 16, Nn IV 6, and Nn I 17 respectively.

[6] Bassus (Cassianus), *Geoponicorum, sive de re rustica libri XX*. Cantab. 1704. Hierocles Alexandrinus, *Commentarius in aurea carmina, de Providentia et Fato quae supersunt, et reliqua fragmenta*. Cantab. 1709. Theophrastus Eresius, *Characteres Ethici*. Cantab. 1712. Cf. Monk, *Life of Bentley*, pp. 177–8.

[7] John Walker, in a letter (bound in MS. Nn II 32) to Needham from Paris, dated 12 Dec. 1719, wrote 'I have not forgot to make enquiry here after any thing that may be of service to your Aeschylus'.

the Continent in 1719-20 on behalf of Bentley.[1] For easier reference, Needham used the margins of a copy of Stanley's edition (now Adv. a 64. 1), into which he transcribed the readings of the Medicean and the six Paris MSS.—presumably at the time he had not received the other collations and did not trouble to enter them when he did subsequently receive them. At some time after 1720, Needham seems to have abandoned his intention of editing Aeschylus: his reasons for this change of mind are not known, but one may suppose that the duties of rector of Stanwick, Northamptonshire, where he lived from 1717 to his death in 1731, and the distance from Cambridge and libraries prevented the completion of his task.

Needham's papers came into the possession of Askew, to whom they may have been given by Dr. Mead, a close friend of both Needham and Askew. Anthony Askew (1722-74) was a very interesting figure: he was all his life a great lover of the Classics, in spite of the fact that he was by profession a practising doctor. At an early age he conceived an enthusiasm for Aeschylus: in August 1740 he collated the Wolfenbüttel MS. of Aeschylus, and in September 1743 the two Leipzig MSS.[2] It was apparently in 1744 that he obtained Needham's papers: in 1745 he collated the two MSS. of Aeschylus in Dr. Mead's library (now in Cambridge University Library), and in the same year took the degree of M.B. at Emmanuel College, where he was in residence. In 1746 he went to Leyden for a year's study in medicine, and made use of the opportunity to collate some of the MSS. of Aeschylus there.[3] At Leyden he published a 12-page quarto pamphlet entitled *Novae Editionis Tragoediarum Aeschyli Specimen, curante Antonio Askew*, 1746, which contained only *Eum.* 566-94—a passage chosen probably on account of his conjecture οὐρανοῦ in l. 567. From this it is clear that he was at the time planning a complete edition. He then visited Hungary, Athens, Constantinople, Italy, and other parts of Europe before returning to Cambridge, where he took his M.D. in 1750 and commenced a practice not long afterwards. His intention of editing Aeschylus was later dropped, but for the rest of his life he retained his Classical interests and built up a fine library of editions of Greek and Latin authors. When Askew received Needham's two note-books, he copied out their contents for his private use. The collations bound up in MS. Nn II 32 he copied into a note-book of his own (MS. Nn IV 6), and entered the readings in the margin of Needham's Stanley into his own Stanley (Adv. a 51.1), on the title-page of which is written, 'Antonius Askew M.B. 1744'. Comparison between the four volumes shows that whereas he copied out the readings in Needham's Stanley fully and word for word, he afterwards entered in his note-book only selections from Nn II 32. There are admittedly some errors in his copies arising from carelessness,[4] but his transcriptions of the collations certainly cannot be called plagiarism as they were made for his private reference only: and Needham's name occurs several times in his copies.

Before tracing the later history of the 'Askew collations' it is necessary to reproduce the titles and descriptions of the MSS. concerned as given in the four volumes mentioned above. In the original collations bound in MS. Nn II 32 they are given as follows:[5]

Aeschylus collatus cum codice Mediceo.

Aeschylus collatus cum codice Colbertino 4016, bombycino. Colb. 1.

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[1] Monk, *Life of Bentley*, pp. 430-3.

[2] The collations, entered in the margins of a copy of Canter's ed., are preserved in Camb. Univ. Library, Adv. e 51.1 (previously Adv. Nn IV 38).

[3] Alexander Carlyle, *Autobiography*, p. 172: 'Dr Askew . . . as a learned man of twenty-eight, had come over to Leyden to collate manuscripts for a new edition' (Askew was actually only twenty-four in 1746). Askew's note-book (Nn IV 6) contains collations of two Leyden MSS. probably made at this time.

[4] Blomfield, *Septem*, Introd., p. x.

[5] I have rearranged the order for convenience: in Nn II 32 the collations are given in the following order: Med., B, C, D, Colb. 2, Colb. 1, A.

Aeschylus collatus cum codice Colbertino 6443. Bombycinus. Scriptus fuit anno
    mundi 6807, id est Christi 1299. Colb. 2.

Codex Regius 3320.2 bombycinus, seculi decimi quarti. A.

Codex Regius 3320 chartaceus sat bonae notae. B.

Codex Regius 3330 chartaceus sat vetus. C.

Codex Regius 3521 chart. recenti sed eleganti manu scriptus. MS. D.

The signs Colb. 1, Colb. 2, A, B, C, and D were added by Needham, probably at the
time when he transferred the readings to the margin of his Stanley. Askew copied
the above descriptions into his own note-book,[1] with only the most trivial changes.
When Needham copied the variants into his Stanley, he added no new details con-
cerning the MSS. except the names of the collators[2] and the fact that A and B were
bound in one volume. In his note on B (given after that on A), 'Codex MS. chartaceus,
sat bonae notae, eiusdem voluminis et Bibliothecae Regis Galliae pars', he omitted
to give its reference number (Reg. 3320), probably thinking that to describe B as part
of the same volume as A (Reg. 3320.2) would make its number sufficiently clear.
Subsequent editors, however, who had no access to the original collations, were baffled
about its identity. These descriptions, too, Askew copied word for word into his own
Stanley, together with his collations of Dr. Mead's two MSS., which he designated
M1 and M2.

As a result of Askew's decision not to produce a complete edition of Aeschylus,
none of these collations was in any way published until 1758, when Burton produced
his Πενταλογία, in which Aeschylus was represented by the Seven against Thebes
alone. In this work Burton thanks Askew for supplying him with some MSS. col-
lations: 'ad Aeschyli Septem Codd. MSS. collationes a clarissimo viro Antonio
Askew M.D. benigne communicatas accepimus' (p. 6): the collations are described
on p. 48:

Codd. MSS. επτα επι Θηβας quorum var. lectt. CL. Askew M.D. communicavit.

Med.   MS. Membran. in bibl. Laur. Medicaea in pluteo XXXII No. 9, vetustus:
        quo P. Victorius usus est.

Colb. 1. Bombycin. in bibl. Colbertina Lut. Par. No. 4016. Saec. circiter 15.

Colb. 2. Bombycin. in bibl. Colb. script. anno 1299 ut patet ex notula calci subjecta.

A.   Bomb. in bibl. reg. Gall. No. 3320 saec. XIV.

B.   Chartaceus in eadem bibl. bonae notae.

C.   Chart. in bibl. R. Gall. No. 333 vetustus.

D.   MS. in charta eleganter exaratus olim manu Jani Lascharis in bibl. R.
        Gall. No. 3521.

a.   MS. chartac. in bibl. CL. Askew, notatus[3] M1 annos habens circiter 500.

A second edition of the Πενταλογία was published, with slight revisions by Thomas
Burgess, in 1779, but with no change made in these two passages; and the error of
333 for 3330 (in the number of C) and the spelling of Lascaris were not corrected. The
descriptions make it certain that the MSS. collations obtained by Burton were
identical with those given above. It must be noted that Burton did not state that
the collations were made by Askew, but merely that they were communicated to
him by Askew.

Three years after the second edition of the Πενταλογία and eight years after

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[1] I have followed the same order: in Nn IV 6
the collations are given in the following order:
Med., Colb. 2, Colb. 1, A, C, D, B.

[2] A was collated by Abbot Lama of Naples,
BCD by Charles de la Rue and Malinguehen,
and Colb. 1 and 2 by Rouerdy and Malinguehen.

[3] Burton did not give any readings from M2
since Askew had collated only the Prometheus
in this manuscript.

Askew's death, Schütz published his edition of Aeschylus (1782), in which we find (vol. i, p. xviii):

Codices ab Askewio collati.

Hi tantum in Commentario ad Septem adversus Thebas memorantur: eorum enim V.L., quantum ad istam tragoediam pertinent, CL. Askew cum Joh. Burtono πενταλογίας sive tragoediarum graecarum delectus editore communicaverat, cujus ex editione ii a Thoma Burgess Oxonii 1779 curata enotavimus. Sunt autem qui sequuntur:

The descriptions of the MSS. given by Burton are then repeated word for word, except that for the signs A, B, C, D, a, Schütz wrote Ask. A, Ask. B, Ask. C, Ask. D, and Ask. a. It will be seen that Schütz drew from Burton's statement that Askew had communicated the collations to him the entirely unjustifiable and incorrect deduction that the collations had been actually made by Askew himself. Thus Schütz was the originator of the heresy about the 'Askew collations' and the 'Askew MSS.', which, once started, persisted in nearly every edition for seventy years.

Pierron (op. cit., p. 6), referring to the variants of the Seven against Thebes in Burton's Πενταλογία, wrote, 'Elles lui avaient été communiquées par Anthony Askew, et Anthony Askew avait oublié de lui dire qu'elles venaient de Peter Needham. Burton, qui croyait que les collations de Needham étaient l'œuvre d'Askew lui-même, ne manqua pas de faire honneur à son ami, en le présentant comme un des hommes qui avaient le mieux mérité d'Eschyle. Askew ne réclama point. Il laissa toute sa vie les philologues répéter ces expressions que nous avons si souvent rencontrées dans les livres: collationes Askewianae, codices ab Askewio collati.' This paragraph contains two gross mis-statements: in the first place, there is no reason whatever for believing that Burton thought that Askew had himself made the collations, since, had he thought this, he would surely have mentioned it. Comparison between the descriptions of the MSS., given above, and other minute but important details very strongly indicate that Burton took his readings direct from Askew's Stanley, which Askew probably lent him for this purpose: and from the fly-leaf of this volume Burton must have learnt the true origin of the collations. Thus, although it is possible that Burton may not have learnt that the collations were originally sent to Needham—it is more probable that Askew informed him of this fact—he certainly knew that they were not made by Askew. Pierron's second statement is even more incorrect. Askew died in 1774: the first edition of the Πενταλογία was the only book containing the collations which was published during his lifetime, and, as has been already stressed, Burton clearly stated merely that Askew communicated the collations to him. The expressions 'collationes Askewianae, codices ab Askewio collati' were never used before Schütz's edition, several years after Askew's death.

Schütz's erroneous attribution of the collations to Askew was maintained in all his numerous editions, and was followed by Butler, the first volume of whose edition appeared in 1809. Butler was the first to make use of the collations (mentioned above) of the Wolfenbüttel MS. and the two Leipzig MSS. which were genuinely by Askew: but he rejected Askew's collection of variants from the two Cambridge MSS. of Aeschylus in favour of more complete collations by himself. His preface, in which he gives a list of the 'Codices ab Askevio collati' shows that at the time he apparently knew of neither of Needham's note-books, and was acquainted with only Askew's Stanley: from this he obtained the 'Askew collations' of all the plays, whereas Schütz, who copied from the Πενταλογία, had given the readings of the Seven against Thebes alone. The second volume of Butler's edition did not appear until 1811. In the meantime, Blomfield published his *Prometheus* (first ed. 1810) in which he disclosed his discovery that Askew's Stanley was a copy of Needham's Stanley: 'Septem codi-

cum collationes, hinc illinc a Petro Needhamo conquisitas, adscripserat ille margini
exemplaris editionis Stanleianae, quod nunc in bibliotheca Academiae Cantabrigiensis
servatur. Has omnes Askevius, qua erat fide, usque ad ipsa Needhami verba et
symbolum, in suum Aeschyli exemplar transtulit: quod Butlero fraudi fuisse videtur:
namque hos codices ab Askevio collatos esse ait.' Blomfield's insinuation against
Askew (*qua erat fide*) was hardly justifiable, since Askew made the copies for his
own reference, and never attempted to claim them for himself, but his charge that
Butler had believed that the collations were made by Askew was undoubtedly correct.
When Butler in his second volume ignored this, Blomfield repeated his statement with
more detail in his edition of the Seven against Thebes[1] (first ed. 1812). Butler reserved
his reply for the introduction of his fourth and last volume (published in 1816),
where he wrote:

> Ejus [i.e. Needham's] collationes, tum Codicis Medicei, tum quatuor Regiorum
> Parisiensium, in manus Askevii venerunt, qui eas ad oram editionis Stanleianae
> ab exemplari Needhami descripsit, unde brevitatis gratiâ Ask. A.B.C.D a nobis
> compendio notati sunt. Cum enim nullos codices Needhamus ipse contulisset,
> nullam etiam editionem Aeschyli protulisset, Askevius autem non tantum specimen
> edidisset, sed et hanc supellectilem et alia quoque subsidia satis multa, praeter
> Needhami collationes, aliunde comparasset, dignior hic mihi demum visus est
> cujus nomen adhiberetur in compendio. Quod meum consilium, si quis, ut mos
> est aliquorum omnia carpentium, forte reprehenderit, meminerit is velim, iisdem
> compendiis et Burtonum et Schutzium ante me usos esse.

From this passage we learn that Butler was, in 1816, acquainted with Needham's
Stanley, and from another sentence later in his introduction[2] that he knew of the
autograph collations bound up in MS. Nn II 32. But it is almost certain that he was
quite ignorant of both these volumes when he published the first parts of his edition
in 1809: it was only after Blomfield had, in 1810, publicly announced his error in
believing the collations were made by Askew, that he became aware of the existence
of Needham's two note-books. It was then too late to alter the introduction to his
first volume and especially the signs Ask. A, B, C, D: and although in his last volume
he might frankly have confessed his mistake, instead he preferred to malign Blom-
field ('ut mos est aliquorum omnia carpentium') and to defend his error at all costs,
implying, at the same time, that he had known of Needham's two volumes all along.
Butler's apologia is, of course, eminently unsatisfactory. His first argument, that
his compendia Ask. A, B, C, D, were justified because Needham had published no
edition whereas Askew had done so, is not convincing, and entirely fails to explain
or condone his own phrase 'Codices ab Askevio collati' in vol. i: the second excuse,
that Burton and Schütz had used Ask. A, etc., is partly incorrect (Burton used only
plain A, B, C, D) and partly futile—as if the mistakes of a previous editor could
exonerate oneself from repeating them.

Such, however, was the carelessness of nineteenth-century editors, that in spite
of all Blomfield's work, the references to 'Askew's collations', the 'Askew MSS.',
remained for many years. Thus Wellauer's edition (1823) contains the following
descriptions (p. ix):

> Reg. L. chartaceus, manu Jani Lascaris exaratus, in Bibl. Reg. Parisiensi No. 3521,
> ab Askewio collatus, unde Ask. D a Buttlero Schützioque vocatur.

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[1] Blomfield, *Septem*, Introd., p. x: cf. the
whole paragraph and especially the sentence,
'Quem errorem, haud sane gravem, a me obiter
notari, aequo animo feret vir, laboris sui laude
minime fraudandus'.

[2] 'Quin ipsae collationes non a margine exem-
plaris Needhami, sed ab ipsis autographis ex-
scriptae, penes me sunt, quae collatorum dili-
gentiam abunde testantur.'

Regg. GHK. codices Regii Parisienses, ita ut Reg. L ab Askewio collati, unde Buttlero et Schützio Ask. A.B.C. audiunt.

Colb. 1, 2. codices olim in Bibliotheca Colbertina, ab Askewio collati.

Although Hermann's posthumous edition (1852) is otherwise free from the error, a last remnant of it occurs in vol. ii, p. 3: 'Parisinus a Wellauero littera L notatus, quem et Antonius Askewius et Godofredus Faehsius contulerunt'.

The identification of Colb. 1, 2, Ask. A, B, C, and D presents little difficulty, since the descriptions (given above) in the original collations themselves (bound in Nn II 32) in each case contain the number of the MS.:

Sign	No. in Nn II 32	Modern no. in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
Colb. 1	Colb. 4016	2785
Colb. 2	Colb. 6443	2884
Ask. A	Reg. 3320.2	2786
Ask. B	Reg. 3320	2787
Ask. C	Reg. 3330	2788
Ask. D	Reg. 3521	2886

Smyth (op. cit., p. 57) came to the same conclusions concerning the identity of the MSS., except that he wrongly gave Ask. A as 2787 and Ask. B as 2786. This error was due partly to the fact that he used, not the original descriptions in Nn II 32, but those in Needham's Stanley, in which the number of MS. B is omitted, partly to a slip in the Catalogue[1] (on which he was forced to rely), in which the number of MS. A (Reg. 3320.2) is given as Reg. 3320.

Apart from their work on the MSS. of Aeschylus, both Needham and Askew proposed several textual emendations of worth: Needham's emendations are entered in his Stanley, those of Askew are to be found in a copy of Pauw's edition,[2] and in his own Stanley, together with a mass of MSS. readings and other variants. These conjectures are little known, as they have never been published in full: Butler took some readings from the margins of Askew's Stanley and Pauw (occasionally, too, from Needham's Stanley), but since he did not trouble to trace their authors he referred to them all as from 'margo Askevii', under which title were included conjectures actually by Needham, John Pearson (Bishop of Chester), Grotius, etc., besides those of Askew himself. The authorship of the emendations, however, can be determined with certainty, and a list of the most important is here given. Needham proposed: *Suppl.* 939 εὖ ἴσθι γ᾽: *Pers.* 152 προσπιτνῶμεν: *Sept.* 229 κρημνάμενον νέφος, 270 πολεμίων, 293 δυσευνήτορα, 402 ἡ 'ννοία: *Pr.* 182 δέδιά γ᾽, 246 ἐλεινὸς: *Ag.* 103 θυμοβόρου φρένα λύπης, 511 ἦσθ᾽, 1341 θνητῶν (for βροτῶν), 1383 περιστολίζω: *Cho.* 224 τόνδ᾽ ἐγὼ: *Eum.* 481 δυσμήνιτ᾽ (cf. schol.), 1007 ἀτηρὸν (apparently independent of Bentley). Askew proposed: *Suppl.* 29 νεύματι, 71 παρηΐδ᾽, 361 γέρων περ ὢν, 461 ὑποσχήσῃ, 535 ἔφαπτορ, 698 τ᾽ ἀρτεμεῖς, 750 δολιόφρονες δὲ καὶ δολιομήτιδες, 782 ἀλώμαν, 924 οὔτις, 1040 πράκτορι πειθοῖ, 1048 παρβατός: *Pers.* 245 τοκεῦσι, 725 μέλας, 736 γαῖν: *Sept.* 103 δέδοικα: *Pr.* 438 προυσελούμενον (subsequently found in two MSS.), 924 νέμων (for νόσον): *Ag.* 52 ἐρειδόμενοι, 101 ἀγανὰ 'πιφανεῖσ᾽, 345 δ᾽ ἐναμπλάκητος, 346 ἐγρήγορος, 499 ἀποτρέπω, 988 πείθομαι: *Cho.* 930 κανοῦσ᾽ ὄν: *Eum.* 185 δόμοις σε, 225 λίπω, 567 οὐρανοῦ διάκτορος, 569 φαῖνε τῷ, 711 γεραίαν. It will be especially noted that Needham's conjectures at *Pr.* 246, *Ag.* 511, and *Eum.* 1007, and Askew's at *Suppl.* 535, 1048, *Pers.* 736, *Ag.* 346, and *Eum.* 225 are adopted in most modern texts, although the credit for them is usually assigned to later scholars.[3]

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TISIAS AND CORAX AND THE INVENTION OF RHETORIC

A LASTING tradition among the ancients marked Sicily as the birthplace and Tisias and Corax as inventors of the art of rhetoric: and in this tradition, legendary though it became, there is a stricter truth than in most of the stories related about the foundation of invented arts. We, with more elaborate historical views, shall still say of rhetoric that it was created at a certain epoch; and can still point to the Sicilians Tisias and Corax as its authors. Oratory, to be sure, has existed almost as long as speech. Its beginnings are prehistoric, and must in any case be imperceptible; and if by rhetorician we meant no more than one who uses speech with more than common effect, we might set the origin of rhetoric as far back as we chose, and could hardly bring it lower than the beginning of recorded literature. Indeed we are told that under the Antonine Emperors the eminent scholar Telephus of Pergamum wrote a book on *Rhetoric in Homer*, in which he illustrated from the Poet the whole contemporary system of the art down to the thirteen constitutions of Minucian;[1] and in the same spirit the Venerable Bede, resenting the claim of the Greeks to have invented tropes and figures of speech, wrote a short work to show that they could all be found in Holy Scripture.[2] But such inquiries, even when conducted less foolishly than by Telephus and less incompetently than by Bede, are irrelevant to the proper history of rhetoric. Let the practice of oratory have begun when it may, the first attempts known to us in Classical Antiquity to formulate a series of principles for the art of speech were made in the fifth century before Christ. These earliest systems were naturally very imperfect: they could not immediately be either comprehensive or well organized. But they were something that had not existed at all before: methodical principles for speaking. At the moment when these were first set out the art of rhetoric began.

The only traditional rival to Tisias and Corax as first author of the art is Empedocles, whom Aristotle in his early dialogue *Sophista* is said to have called the inventor of rhetoric as Zeno was of dialectic.[3] But the claims of Empedocles are very doubtful. He can hardly have been much older than Corax: and there is certainly no reputable evidence that Corax learnt anything from him. There may be some truth in the vaguer version given by Sextus Empiricus (*adv. Dogm.* i. 6), with which Quintilian (iii. 1. 8) agrees: Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γάρ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι—*primus post eos, quos poetae tradiderunt, mouisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur*. Empedocles, as the sage, worthy, healer and prophet of Acragas, held a position in many ways anticipating that of the sophists, among whom Gorgias is reputed to have been his pupil. At all events he was not ignorant of the arts of publicity; and public discourse must have been familiar to him. It is therefore natural that he should afterwards have had the reputation of having been a rhetorician, and it would not be surprising if Aristotle declared him to have made tentative approaches to the subject. But nowhere is it stated that he wrote upon or taught rhetoric; nor do any authors ever refer to his views on the art. Even Quintilian classes him next the legendary orators of the heroic age, and reserves for Tisias and Corax the position of *artium scriptores antiquissimi* which really entitles any one to be called the founder of rhetoric. What is more, Aristotle himself in another work, apparently the *Synagoga*, set Tisias and Corax in that place as the first rhetorical theorists.[4] From them therefore we may begin.

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[1] *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (ed. Rabe), p. 189 = *Rhet. Graec.* vii. 5 (Walz): see also Wendel in *R.E.*

[2] *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Halm), p. 607.

[3] Diog. Laert. viii. 57.

[4] Fr. 137 Rose *apud* Cic. *Brut.* 46.

Corax, as Tisias' master, would appear to be properly the inventor: but whether he wrote a book himself, or bore a part in one written by Tisias, or allowed Tisias to write down his own verbal teaching, we cannot certainly know. No faith, obviously, can be placed in such expressions of the minor rhetoricians as συνέθηκε τέχνην or Κόραξ ὁ τεχνόγραφος:[1] and most of them in any case are not explicit. Aristotle was apparently able to distinguish the two authors' contributions to the art when he wrote in *Soph. El.* 183[b] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον. In *Rhet.* 1402[a] also he speaks of ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη as made up entirely of argument from probability. But in neither case need he have known Corax otherwise than through Tisias; and Plato, when in the *Phaedrus* (272 D) he deals with this same method of argument from probability, throughout takes Tisias as its exponent, though implying that he was not altogether responsible for it. 'A very mysterious art it seems to be,' says Socrates, 'this invention of Tisias or what's his name, whoever it was.' Considering Plato's language together with the facts that nowhere is there an express mention of two separate books, that Aristotle in the *Synagoga* couples the two men as authors of one, and that Cicero in *de Inventione* ii. 6, on information derived in the first instance from an Hellenistic source, names Tisias alone as the inventor of the art and as the first author represented in Aristotle's *Synagoga* itself, we must allow it to be probable that Corax's work did not survive outside Tisias' book: and at that rate it is much more conformable to our evidence to suppose that the book contained Corax's verbal teaching than that it was the product of joint authorship.[2]

There are two traditions of the origin of Corax's rhetoric. One is that to be collected from the Minor Greek Rhetoricians in Walz's collection or Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, who agree in the following account. After the death of Hiero, when a republic was established in Syracuse, Corax by his rhetorical art was able to sway the new assembly and direct the democratic state. This art he formulated in rules, and undertook to teach for a fee; and among his pupils was Tisias. Tisias, having learnt the art, refused to pay the fee; and so the famous lawsuit came on. The story is given in substantially the same form by a number of authors, most of whom say that Corax had been powerful at the court of Hiero, and devised his art as a means of maintaining that power in a republic.[3] All these, therefore, make rhetoric begin with political oratory, or what would later be called the γένος συμβουλευτικόν: and they go on to draw the line of descent from Tisias to Gorgias, who carried the art to Athens on his embassy of 427. The other tradition is that of Aristotle as quoted by Cicero (*Brutus* 46). This also places the activity of Tisias and Corax presumably in the republic established at Syracuse after the death of Hiero and the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466; but it makes them theorists not in the political but in the forensic field, *cum sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis res priuatae longo interuallo iudiciis repeterentur*. This account is to be preferred; for it is notorious that the earliest systems of rhetoric were occupied entirely with the business of judicial oratory. This is stated in the *Phaedrus* (261 B), and is equally a matter of complaint for both Isocrates (*adv. soph.* 19) and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1354[b]), who in well-known passages express themselves very positively. The shortcoming of which they complain is one of theory. We need not necessarily disbelieve the minor rhetoricians if they tell us that Corax was active

[1] *Prol. Syll.* 189 = vii. 5 (W.); cf. Syrian, iv. 575 (Walz) = ii. 127 (Rabe).

[2] See P. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ῥητορική* (*Rhetorische Studien* 2), Paderborn, 1914, pp. 9 ff.; and Stegeman in *R.E.* v a, 142.

[3] Fullest account in iv. 11- W.=269- R. and Doxapater vi. 12- =25 R. Cf. Troilus vi. 48=52 R.; Max. Plan. v. 215=67 R.; *Prol.* vii. 5=189 R.

politically. But it is as a theorist, not as a practitioner, that he is important to us; and in determining the scope of his theory we cannot refuse the combined evidence of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Whatever allowance is made for their polemical attitude and for their eagerness to point out a failing to which they consider themselves superior, we must conclude that that failing was real, and that the system of Tisias and Corax was indeed adapted only to the oratory of the courts. No one who is familiar with the later tendencies of ancient rhetorical theory will find this surprising.

The principal part of that system is the celebrated doctrine of $\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}s$ or argument from probabilities. The stock example of this type of argument is well known: a puny man, accused of assaulting a big man, defends himself on the ground not of evidence but of the improbability of his having made such an assault. We have to consider what principle underlies such arguments, and what Corax may be said to have invented or discovered. Most of the arguments that an orator uses are in a sense only probable. It is seldom that he can demonstrate by rigorous logic from necessary premisses. But we must distinguish between arguments in which the form of reasoning is strict, and only the doubtful truth of the premisses makes the conclusion uncertain; and arguments in which the form of reasoning itself is no more than probable, even if the premisses are true. It is the importance to the orator of arguments of the latter class that Corax recognized, though the Aristotelian terms by which it is convenient for us to distinguish them were of course far from his mind. Thus set out, the matter seems so obvious that no one could well have discovered it, and so general that there could be no profit in the discovery. But we are to consider the characters of the two types of argument. The first type argues normally from particular evidence, on the truth of which it entirely depends. This is the simplest and directest, one might almost say the most natural type. Corax's probable reasonings, on the other hand, proceed altogether from a computation of general experience. What will happen or has happened in a particular case is inferred from what usually happens. This standard, though not absolutely to be relied on in any particular case, must nevertheless be in general correct: and so in general arguments from it command assent. Corax's notion seems to have been that such probable arguments, logically inconclusive though they must be, are nevertheless often more effective than stricter arguments from particular evidence, because they are based on general observations which every one will admit to be true: while the stricter reasoning which we might expect to carry more weight carries less, because its force depends entirely on the truth of particular premisses which the hearer may be not at all disposed to believe; and far more people are impressed by admitted truth in the premisses than by logical cogency in the reasoning.   The orator who can adduce general probability but no particular evidence on his side appeals to a real sentiment in his audience when he urges them, however fallaciously, to prefer probability to testimony because it is incorruptible, saying $\acute{o}\tau\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$ $\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\tau\omega\nu$ $\delta\epsilon\hat{\iota}$ $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\tauο\hat{\upsilon}\tau$' $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\grave{\iota}$ $\tau\grave{o}$ $\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\mu\eta$ $\tau\hat{\eta}$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta$, $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\acute{o}\tau\iota$ $o\acute{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\pi\alpha\tau\hat{\eta}\sigma\alpha\iota$ $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\tau\alpha$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\grave{\iota}$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega$, $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\acute{o}\tau\iota$ $o\acute{\upsilon}\chi$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\tau\alpha$ $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\iota\hat{\omega}\nu$ (Arist. *Rhet.* 1376^a). These probable arguments, by their reference to universal and undoubted experience, do seem to have an authority and validity not belonging to those drawn merely from the alleged circumstances of a particular case.

But probability, even while possessing the authority of a working approximation to truth, has in the eyes of the sophistic rhetorician a still greater advantage, that one can argue from it independently of truth. Though one probability makes for a case, yet another can almost certainly be found that makes against it. The nature of this manipulation is well explained by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1402^a). 'In eristics', he says, 'an apparent syllogism may be made by confounding the absolute and the conditional, as in the dialectical arguments that the non-existent is, because the non-existent is

non-existent; and that the unknowable may be known, because it may be known to be unknowable. Similarly in rhetoric an apparent enthymeme may be made from a probability not absolute but conditional. This probability is not generally valid; as Agathon illustrates in the lines

> Well might one say just this is probable,
> that much not probable should come to pass.

Things happen against probability; so that things against probability are probable. At that rate the improbable will be probable; only the probability is not absolute. As in eristics the deception lies in not adding the conditions, application, or manner in which our statement is valid, so in rhetoric it lies in the probability's being not absolute but conditional. On this topic Corax's system is constructed. If a man is not open to the charge, as when a puny man is accused of assault, then it is not probable that he is guilty. If he is open to it, as a strong man would be, then again it is not probable that he is guilty, just because it would have been sure to seem probable. The same applies in all his cases. The accused must either be open to the charge or not, and in each case a probability appears; but one is absolute, the other of the particular kind described.'

Aristotle's account excellently describes the sophistic method of argument from probability. Two things are noticeable: first, that the whole of Corax's method is spoken of as being directed to judicial cases, and in these does not go outside criminal charges; secondly, that even in these it is employed only to argue the facts of the case, or perhaps the results of one or another verdict, never its merits. So much we must infer from Aristotle's statement that the whole of Corax's method of argument is of this type, and that in all his cases the defendant is bound 'either to be open to the charge or not'.

Honestly used, argument from probability is an approximation to truth necessary for the practice of oratory as elsewhere: but when it is irresponsibly exploited in this way it no longer serves truth but seeks to supplant it. It was as a supplanter that Plato saw it and condemned it in the *Phaedrus*. His argument, indeed, is directed against something much wider than this particular sophism of Corax, against the whole notion of an art that claims to decide cases without knowledge of the truth. The first condition that Socrates lays down for good writing or oratory is that the author should 'know in his mind the truth about whatever he is to discuss' (259 E). Those, he says, who believe that an orator needs to know only what passes with his audience for truth will leave both orator and audience floundering in ridiculous error. Even if our purpose is to mislead, we cannot be sure of attaining it unless we ourselves command the truths both of ethics and of psychology; and past these there is no short cut such as the sophists imagine. As characteristic of these imagined short cuts Plato takes the doctrine of probability, upon which he then makes a special attack: but that attack, besides being concerned to put Corax's method in the worst possible light, also makes it stand for a type of the whole of sophistic rhetoric; and we shall not rightly understand it unless we see that Plato is combating something more than the particular method of argument that Aristotle exposes. The sophists, he says, maintain that there is no need to know the truths of ethics or of psychology to be an adequate rhetorician. In the law courts no one pays any attention to these things, but only to what is plausible, that is, to probability. The man who intends to possess the art of speaking will apply himself to this. Sometimes he must not even tell the very facts of the case, if they are improbable, and must substitute probable ones, either in attack or in defence. It is probability at all costs that he is required to pursue in speaking, and truth must go by the board. This principle consistently observed makes him master of the whole art. The illustration that Socrates then cites from

Tisias is similar to Aristotle's, but embroidered: for as the simplest example best suited Aristotle's purpose, so the most extravagant best suits Plato's. A puny but fierce man is on trial, having robbed with violence a burly man who is actually a coward. Here neither side admits the truth. The big man, considering the improbability of the true charge, pretends that the little man was one of several who attacked him. The other, denying this, uses the direct argument from probability: 'how could a little man like myself have attacked a big man like him?' The big man will not confess his own cowardice, and tries to put up other false stories; and so the defendant, as likely as not, catches him out. And in all cases, says Socrates, the rules of the art are much the same. This example is of course concocted by Plato to be as fantastic as possible; and, as Thompson observes in his note, 'the impotent conclusion is maliciously added by Socrates'. The attack is one of ridicule, not of analysis: and the case as here given does not even illustrate the sophistic exploitation of absolute and conditional probability on which Corax largely relies, and which Aristotle exposes. The only argument from probability involved is of the simplest form: but that is pushed to extreme lengths, when the accuser falsifies his whole case in the interests of plausibility. The defendant meets the accuser's probability with evidence, and builds his own probability on his own version of the facts. The Platonic version, therefore, though apparently more circumstantial than Aristotle's, is less useful in indicating the characteristics of Corax's argument. Nevertheless it confirms our previous observation that Corax's arguments are concerned only with the facts of the case, and only with criminal cases. Socrates leads off as though some short cut past ethics and psychology were to be propounded that would serve the whole of rhetoric. The more marked, therefore, are the successive limitations which restrict the doctrine of probability, as it is set out in 272 D–E, first to the courts and then to accusation and defence.[1] At the same time Plato does point to a feature of argument from probability that Aristotle passes over: namely, its dependence on an empirical psychology. Aristotle wishes to display only the formal vices of the argument. Plato, to whom the notion of a formal art, indifferent to external truth, is repugnant, insists on the inadequacy of its premisses; and notices that Tisias' probable arguments are often based on rough and ready psychological grounds: they turn upon the motives and restraints which may be supposed to have governed the mind of the accused. Plato complains that the psychology, or rather the substitute for it, used by Tisias is crude and unscientific: but he expects too much in requiring rhetoric to be founded on exact psychology. In general it can be based only on that common and approximate knowledge of the workings of the mind which men possess in themselves and can appeal to in others.

The art of Tisias and Corax, so Plato and Aristotle agree, may be reduced to this type of argument; but neither they nor any one else tell us how Tisias and Corax actually presented it. We are left to guess not only what was their method of instruction, but also how well their own ideas were defined, and whether they had any clear abstract notion of probable argument, or in what sense they could be said to have reduced it to a system. Like all practical teachers they must have taught largely by examples: the like of which, one may suppose, is preserved in the first tetralogy of Antipho, a piece obviously written to demonstrate the use of the kind of argument that we have been discussing. The question is, did those examples serve to teach a method or only to produce an empirical faculty? An answer is suggested by Aristotle in the *Sophistici Elenchi* at 183[b] 17 ff. 'The beginnings of all inventions', he says, 'are small in bulk, though in importance they outweigh everything that follows. So in rhetoric the first inventors'—by which presumably he means simply Corax, with

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[1] Thomson at 272 E interprets καὶ πάντως to mean 'not only in the practice of the courts but also in that of the assembly'. I take it rather to mean 'at whatever cost'.

a vague allusion to any rival claimants—'the first inventors did not carry the art far; and it attained its present bulk by the subsequent labours first of Tisias, then of Thrasymachus, then of Theodorus and many others. In dialectics, on the other hand, nothing at all had been done before the present work. The professional eristics taught by the same method as Gorgias, giving their pupils set disputations as he gave them set declamations, to learn by heart, of a pattern that they conceived would meet most cases': a quick but unscientific method, as Aristotle explains. From this passage we may infer three things: first, that Aristotle believed Corax to have laid for rhetoric some foundation not wholly incomparable with that which it had been reserved for himself to lay for dialectics; secondly, that Tisias, coming after, made developments which Aristotle was able to distinguish from Corax's foundation; and thirdly, that the tradition of Corax and Tisias was continued by Thrasymachus and Theodorus, whereas Gorgias stood outside it; for on the one hand his name is omitted from among the successors of Corax, on the other the unscientific methods of the early eristic dialecticians, who had made no progress at all in the theory of their subject, are likened to his methods of teaching rhetoric. It is evidently implied, therefore, that Corax's rhetoric, unlike Gorgias', was something more than a collection of specimens, and that he had discovered some formal principle of the art; but that his discovery was only the germ of the developed system.

It would be surprising if Corax had gone far in the dialectical analysis of his arguments, in which the dialecticians themselves had made no progress; or if the methods of such a pioneer had been anything but largely empirical. But Aristotle does not say that he conceived more than the germ of systematic rhetoric, and we may think of the matter thus. Aristotle distinguished two kinds of proof used by rhetoricians, the ἔντεχνος and the ἄτεχνος, which we may call technical and natural. Natural proofs are all direct evidence, from testimony, documents, or whatever source. Technical proofs are those that depend on arguments devised by the orator. The natural proofs are of course unrhetorical, or if you will pre-rhetorical,[1] and do not depend on the art. Corax's argument from probability, on the other hand, is an extreme form of technical proof, being entirely the product of rhetorical art and more or less independent of external evidence. As the first exponent of this characteristically technical weapon, which stands in sharp opposition to the natural arguments of the uninstructed, Corax may fairly take place in Aristotle's view at the head of the systematic rhetoricians: for he had conceived a notion which could be systematically developed. It is possible, perhaps likely, that Corax did no more.

But Tisias at least, it is implied, began to reduce probable argument to a system, and while Gorgias merely held out finished specimens for imitation, he imparted some method to his presentation, some classification perhaps of topics. The method of rhetorical argument as it was later formulated comprised two parts, the formal and the material: or, as we may say, logic and topics. The development of logic was reserved for Aristotle: but it may be that Tisias made a beginning in the classification of topics.[2] If this is so, he was even more the founder of rhetoric than we usually reckon; for the classification of topics is the principal part of all the later systems of rhetorical invention.

There is another element of rhetorical theory which is by some attributed to Tisias and Corax: namely, a canon of the parts of the judicial speech. This canon comprises typically four parts, proem, narrative, demonstration, and epilogue; but admits of many variations. It seems to have supplied the plan of arrangement of standard rhetorical treatises before the time of Aristotle.[3] It would therefore be

[1] Cf. F. Solmsen, *Antiphonstudien* (*Neue philologische Untersuchungen*, viii), Berlin, 1931, pp. 5 ff.

[2] Cf. W. Süss, *Ethos*, pp. 2 ff.
[3] K. Barwick, *Hermes*, lvii (1922), 1–.

natural for us to accept the evidence of those authorities who attribute it to the first
founders of the art. But a simple argument from conditional probability shows that
such reasoning is insecure, because the same conjecture would have been a natural
one for our authorities themselves; and their evidence is in fact so vague and con-
tradictory that we must suspect it of being worthless. It is contained in a number of
passages of the minor Greek rhetoricians, all more or less connected. Corax, according
to them, devised his canon of parts of the speech when he first developed deliberative
rhetoric in the Syracusan assembly (cf. p. 62, *supra*). But the canon of parts attri-
buted to him is nearly always judicial, not deliberative. This in itself is suspicious.
It is still more suspicious that, though all our authors tell much the same story, they
vary widely in the actual list of parts.

The principal passages are the following:

A (*Prol. Syll.* 25 = W. vii. 11), the work of an anonymous Christian author whose
garrulous and fabulizing *Prolegomena Artis Rhetoricae*, first compiled perhaps in the
fourth or fifth century, were in constant use by writers of the Byzantine age. After
the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero, he says (a tyranny marked by every kind of savagery,
under which the citizens were forbidden to speak, and so being obliged to communicate
by pantomime invented the art of dancing), the Syracusans established a democracy.
Κόραξ δέ τις ὄνομα, Συρακούσσιος τὸ γένος, σκοπήσας ὡς ὁ δῆμος ἀστάθμητον καὶ ἄτακτον
πέφυκε πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἐννοήσας ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ᾧ ῥυθμίζεται ἀνθρώπου τρόπος, ἐσκόπησε διὰ
λόγου ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσφορα τὸν δῆμον καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν. εἰσελθὼν οὖν ἐν τῇ
ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ ὁ πᾶς συνηθροίσθη δῆμος, ἤρξατο λόγοις πρότερον θεραπευτικοῖς καὶ
κολακευτικοῖς τὴν ὄχλησιν καὶ τὸ θορυβῶδες καταπραῦναι τοῦ δήμου, ἅτινα καὶ προοίμια
ἐκάλεσε. μετὰ δὲ τὸ καταπραῦναι καὶ κατασιγάσαι τὸν δῆμον ἤρξατο περὶ ὧν ἔδει συμβου-
λεύειν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ λέγειν ὡς ἐν διηγήσει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀναμιμνή-
σκειν ἐν συντόμῳ περὶ τῶν φθασάντων καὶ εἰς σύνοπτον καὶ ὑπ' ὄψιν ἄγειν τὰ λεχθέντα
τῷ δήμῳ. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐκάλεσε προοίμια, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ἐκάλεσεν ἀγῶνας, τὰ δὲ τρίτα
ἐκάλεσεν ἐπιλόγους. This account is followed in the *Epitome Rhetorices* at iii. 160 W.

B (*Prol. Syll.* 52 = W. vi. 48), from the more philosophical *Prolegomena* of Troilus
Sophista, a Christian author of the fifth century: Ἱέρων καὶ Γέλων Σικελίας γεγόνασι
τύραννοι, ἔσχον δέ τινα Κόρακα τῷ ὀνόματι παραδυναστεύοντα, ὃς ἐποίει τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν
πολλῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς. μεταπεσούσης δὲ τῆς τυραννίδος εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ἑώρα γὰρ ὡς οὐ
δύναται πείθειν ἅπαντα τὸν δῆμον καθάπερ ἕνα τῶν τυράννων, ἐμηχανᾶτο τὰ προοίμια, ἵνα
δι' αὐτῶν ἐφελκύσηται τὸν ἀκροατὴν πρὸς εὔνοιαν, εἶτα τὴν προκατασκευήν, ἵνα ἀνέλῃ
αἰτίαν λυποῦσαν αὐτόν, εἶτα τὴν προκατάστασιν, εἰσβολὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ προοίμιον οὖσαν
ἐπὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, τὴν δὲ κατάστασιν ψιλὴν τῶν πραχθέντων ἔκθεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγῶνας
ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πίστιν τῶν ψιλῶς διηγηθέντων, εἶτα τὴν παρέκβασιν ἀπόδειξιν οὖσαν τοῦ
κρινομένου βίου· ἐσκόπει γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ ἑνὶ καὶ μόνῳ ἐγκλήματι τὸ †ὁ φεύγων ἀπολυθήσεται,
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν παρέκβασιν ἐπενόησε, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιλόγους ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν τῶν εἰρημένων
διὰ τὸ ὡς εἰκὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς πολλὰ ἀκούσαντας εἰς λήθην ἐλθεῖν.

C (*Prol. Syll.* 126 = W. ii. 119), a brief version of A included by John Doxapater
in his commentary on Aphthonius, written in the eleventh century.

D (*Prol. Syll.* 189 = W. vii. 6), from the anonymous prolegomena to Hermogenes,
giving a very summary version of B which is also found in the *Prolegomena* of Planudes
(*Prol. Syll.* 67 = W. v. 215).

E (*Prol. Syll.* 269 = W. iv. 11), from the prolegomena to Hermogenes attributed
conjecturally to Marcellinus, combining the versions of A and B.

Of these passages A and B, though their general similarity must be due ultimately
to a common source, have no immediate connexion with each other. The rest appear
to be dependent on them. The story given by A requires, it would seem, not the three
partes orationis mentioned, but four, προοίμιον, διήγησις, ἀγών, and ἐπίλογος: and these,
in fact, we find both in C and also in D, which in other respects follows B. E, which

in its story combines A and B, gives five, which fit no better than three. B's seven are avowedly judicial, not deliberative, and must therefore be drawn ultimately from some source different from that of the rest of the story.

It is evident that the personal authority of these writers is worth almost nothing; though if we must choose between them on such grounds, probably Troilus is to be preferred. The four canonical Isocratean *partes orationis* we suspect just because we should expect to find them referred back to the inventor of the art. Troilus' seven, on the other hand, are to a certain degree recommended by their singularity. Further, Syrian (ii. *127* Rabe = W. iv. 575) attributes the term κατάστασις to Corax, though in a different sense; and Antipho, who so well illustrates the method of argument from probability, also makes constant use of προκατασκευή.

These arguments, which incline us to accept, if anything, the evidence of Troilus, are suggested by Hamberger (op. cit., pp. 26 ff.); but he also attempts, at Drerup's suggestion, to obtain for Troilus' account the authority of Aristotle. Sopater, he argues, at the beginning of his commentary on Hermogenes offers an introduction on the same lines as Troilus' (W. v. 3 ff.). He also has some words about Corax's being the first founder of a system of rhetoric which, from their similarity to Cicero, *Brutus* 46, can be traced to Aristotle's *Synagoga*.[1] Hamberger therefore presumes upon the general similarity between Troilus and Sopater to declare a common sub-Aristotelian source, which he reconstructs by inserting into the text of Sopater the section of Troilus for which he wishes to obtain the credit of Aristotle's name. The charitable critic hesitates whether to call this ineptitude or impudence. Even if Troilus and Sopater were closely copying a common source it would not follow that Troilus' seven *partes orationis*, patently inconsistent with the rest of his story, were drawn from it. Our passage D, for instance, also combines Sopater's with one stage of Troilus' version; and it attributes to Corax the four Isocratean parts. But besides this it is perfectly plain that the sources of Troilus and Sopater, though related, are not the same. Their independence is particularly striking because, while they follow the same general plan, what they write is widely different.

Some further grounds for inference upon this question may be found in what we know about Thrasymachus and Theodorus, whom Aristotle in the passage quoted above puts third and fourth respectively of the pioneers of rhetorical theory. Thrasymachus is celebrated as a conjurer with ἔλεος and ὀργή. Τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων, says Plato in the same section of the *Phaedrus* (267 C), κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος: activities which later at least were particularly associated with the proem and peroration. Theodorus is actually characterized by Plato as the ingenious inventor of technical terms for the parts of the speech, προοί-μιον μὲν πρῶτον . . . δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ᾿ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ, τρίτον δὲ τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα . . . καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. Something similar, from a source which I cannot identify, is preserved in Martianus Capella v, § 552. Τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων, Plato adds finally, κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ᾿ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.

This form of classification, then, seemed to Plato characteristic at least of Tisias' and Corax's immediate successors: and here again Antipho exemplifies the theory. A single dark utterance of Aristotle's completes the evidence. In the second book of his *Rhetoric* Aristotle runs through a cryptic and tumultuary catalogue of twenty-eight topics of argument. The twenty-seventh of these (1400^b) is τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτη-θέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, with an instance from Carcinus' *Medea*. Medea's

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[1] Cf. Gercke, *Hermes*, xxxii. 344.

children are nowhere to be found. Some say she has made away with them. She retorts that Jason, not they, would have been her proper victim. To murder them without him would have been a blunder.[1] ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη. This startling statement appears a little less odd when we reflect that the topic is only a special form of εἰκός ; and that the standard example of the big man who argues that he would have been a fool to hit the little man first is a precisely similar reasoning ἐξ ἁμαρτηθέντων. But what is the meaning of ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη ? Does it mean Theodorus' early theory, as opposed to his later system of προοίμιον, διήγησις, and the rest? Or does it mean rhetorical theory before Theodorus, that is Tisias and Corax (though not presumably, this time, Thrasymachus) ; with the implication that Theodorus was himself the originator of the canon of parts of the speech, a thing unknown in pre-theodorean rhetoric? Kroll and Solmsen hold divergent views (*R.E. Suppl.* Rhetorik, 3 and V a, 1842 f.). If it could be certainly interpreted the passage might provide crucial evidence for this outstanding question. As it is, the matter remains open.

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[1] The sense of this passage is in all our texts obscured by the words ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων, which appear to be an interpolation.

THE CONSTRUCTION WITH *MH OY*

In line 1171 of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* the MSS. read μή. The remainder of the sentence, after μή, is much disputed, but I am not concerned with finding the true reading of it. The whole sentence runs, in the MSS., as follows: ἄκος δ' οὐδὲν ἐπήρκεσαν | τὸ μὴ πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει παθεῖν: which appears in Thomson's *Oresteia* as: . . . ἐπήρκεσεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἔχειν πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει. It is the note on this passage in Thomson[1] to which I wish to draw attention. It is from Headlam,[2] and says, in justification of reading μὴ οὐκ, that in such phrases the scribes, finding μὴ οὐ, constantly omitted οὐ as περιττόν. It adds that οὐ should always be restored, at any rate where there is any trace of it.

On the other hand, Goodwin[3] notes the absence of οὐ from the passage quoted and accepts it, comparing Soph. *O.T.* 1388 and *Ant.* 443, and remarking that οὐ is more often absent when τὸ precedes μὴ, as in all these passages, than when there is no τό; and Kühner-Gerth[4] reports that τὸ μή occurs instead of τὸ μὴ οὐ, and is often changed to τὸ μὴ οὐ by editors.

There is, then, a disagreement here between the editors and the grammarians. The latter state the apparent facts of the language, which, however, depend in this particular on the manuscript evidence; the former wish for consistency of speech, and so say that the manuscript tradition is faulty and proceed to 'restore' οὐ where the metre permits it.

My chief purpose in this paper is to see what rule can be stated on the use of the so-called redundant μὴ οὐ. I begin by examining the grammatical meaning of the phrase.

The μὴ οὐ that is in question is used chiefly before verb infinitives, or much less often before participles or even without a verbal form following. Goodwin's general description of its appearance with the infinitive (op. cit., par. 815. 2) is worth quoting. 'An infinitive which *for any reason* would take μὴ (either affecting the infinitive itself, as an ordinary negative, or strengthening a preceding negation, as in the case just mentioned [μὴ after verbs of denying, preventing, etc.]), generally takes the double negative μὴ οὐ, if the verb on which it depends is *itself negatived* or is interrogative with a negation implied.'

The governing clauses on which depends this μὴ οὐ with infinitive construction fall into two classes:

(1) The governing clause, which is negatived, expresses denial, doubt, prevention, etc. (v. K-G[5]., p. 210 for fuller list). ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ ἀδικεῖν 'I deny that I do wrong' is the positive form, and οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν 'I do not deny that I do wrong' is the negative form. In both sentences μή may be regarded as redundant, and in μὴ οὐκ neither negative particle requires translation in English.

(2) The governing clause differs from the other type in having a verb or verbal phrase of a positive nature, which is negatived by οὐ, α-, etc. The verbs express possibility, propriety, expectation, etc. (v. K-G., p. 212). οὐχ οἶός τ' εἰμὶ μὴ οὐ λέγειν 'I am not able not to say': οὐκ εἰκός ἐστι μὴ οὐ λέγειν 'It is not proper not to say'. Here, in the phrase μὴ οὐ, only οὐ is redundant, μή has indispensable meaning. Consequently, μή is always retained, but examples occur where οὐ does not appear in the MSS. (For

[1] *Oresteia*, G. Thomson, 1938.
[2] *Agamemnon*, W. Headlam, 1925.
[3] *M. and T.*, 1929, par. 812.
[4] *Ausführl. Gramm. d. griech. Sprache*, 1904, ii. 2, p. 218.
[5] Here and subsequently K-G. should be understood to mean Kühner-Gerth, op. cit. ii. 2.

passages without οὐ, v. K-G., p. 216, section *h* (β) for μή with inf., and p. 218, section *n* (β) for τὸ μή with inf.)

First, to consider μή after affirmative verbs of class (1). The phenomenon of the repetition of the negative idea conveyed by the verb of preventing, etc., by means of a following negative particle is found elsewhere, for example in French and Italian. K-G., p. 207 compares the Latin use of *ne*, *quominus*, and *quin* after similar expressions, as also showing redundant negatives. A comparison may be just, as I shall soon show; but most certainly not for the reason adduced in K-G., according to which both the Greek and the Latin have redundancy in the negative. Consider the following: *naves tenebantur quominus in portum redirent*, and, *nulla causa est quin me verberes. minus* in *quominus* is an alternative for *non* (derived from colloquial speech), and *quo* has final sense. The first sentence then means, translated closely, 'the ships were held back that they might not return to harbour'. *quin* is derived from **qui-ne*[1], 'how, why not?'; and the second sentence is explained[2] as developed from the paratactical 'why should you not strike me? There is no reason', to 'there is no reason why you should not strike me.' With *ne* the negative final sense is still more obvious: *ne facerem impedivit* 'it stopped me that I might not do, it stopped my doing'. In none of these Latin sentences can the negative in the subordinate clause be considered redundant. (Here it may be remarked that Latin differs from Greek in rejecting from the best prose, as a rule, unnecessarily repeated negatives: the piling up of mutually confirming negatives, as found in Greek,[3] occurs in early Latin and in the poets, but is uncommon in classical prose.)

It is possible that even μή after Greek affirmative verbs of preventing, etc., is not redundant. Brugmann[4] gives as the first of the meanings of the IE. infinitive the final-consecutive (regarding the distinction between aim and result as not to be insisted on here). This meaning is a natural development of the dative or locative case-form.[5] At *N*. 280 we find οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἧσθαι ἐρητύετ᾽ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός 'nor is his spirit held in check for, or, in respect of, sitting quietly, so as to sit quietly'; at *X*. 5 Ἕκτορα δ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι ὀλοιὴ μοῖρ᾽ ἐπέδησεν 'fettered Hector for, in respect of, remaining, so that he remained there'. The first is consecutive, the second either the same or final. κωλύω σε μὴ ἀδικεῖν can then mean 'I stop you so that you do not do wrong', where μή is not redundant: similarly ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ ἀδικεῖν 'I deny (what you say) so that I am not a wrongdoer'.

On the other hand, μὴ ἀδικεῖν may be in either of the two sentences regarded as the direct object of the governing verb, with the sense of a noun. 'I stop, I deny wrongdoing.' μή is then redundant. This would be a development of the meaning of the Homeric infinitive: but that can be allowed, as the construction is not an old one. None of the examples in K-G. (pp. 208, 209) is older than Aeschylus (verse), Herodotus (prose). There is, however, an inscription of as late as the fourth century B.C. which clearly shows the Homeric, final-consecutive use of the infinitive. Kaibel, *Epigr. Graec.* 87. 2; Meisterhans, *Gramm. att. Inschr.*[3] p. 258. αὐτὼ δ᾽οὐ παραδεῖξαι ἀφείλετο δαίμονος αἶσα '*sors liberos parentibus eripuit prohibuitque ne exemplo suo ad virtutem instituerent*'. The understood subject of παραδεῖξαι is the bereaved parents, not the sons meant by αὐτώ. οὐ is remarkably used for μή. This inscription seems to me to turn the balance in favour of the first explanation of μή with inf. given just above.

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[1] *Lat. Gramm.*, Leumann-Hofmann, p. 287.

[2] Ibid., p. 785.

[3] K-G., pp. 203 ff. The redundancy is not literary only, it appears on inscriptions, cf. *Sammlg. Inschr.* 5315. 34 (Euboea); 5464. 11 and 12 (Thasos). This repetition occurs in other languages, e.g. in Slavonic. Cf. Hirt, *Idg. Gramm.* vii, pp. 79 and 80.

[4] *K.V.G.*, p. 603; cf. Thompson, *Synt. of Att. Gk.* (1907), p. 247.

[5] The dative appears to be one origin of the inf. in IE. and also in Greek (v. Buck, *Comp. Gramm.*, p. 305), if we so explain the inf. in -σθαι. On the other hand, the Gk. inf. in -αι is a locative rather than a dative, as earlier held: cf. Hirt, *Idg. Gramm.* iv, p. 92. Also Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, pp. 808, 809.

μή in such a position, then, need not, and I think should not, be regarded as redundant. There can be no doubt of the redundancy of the negative in (1) ὅτι οὐ after verbs of denying (K-G., p. 209), or (2) τοῦ μή with inf. The ὅτι οὐ construction does not seem to be early: at any rate the oldest author quoted by K-G., p. 209 is Thucydides. τοῦ μή with inf., after a verb of preventing, has the negative idea of restraint expressed by the genitive τοῦ, so that μή is unnecessary: Hdt. 1. 86, βουλό-μενος εἰδέναι, εἴ τίς μιν δαιμόνων ῥύσεται τοῦ μὴ ζῶντα κατακαυθῆναι. Another early example is from Aeschylus (K-G., p. 218). Yet the more logically correct τοῦ with inf. is not represented by any one earlier than Xenophon (K-G., p. 215), who also uses τοῦ μή with inf., even after the same expression ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι. If we are to see here the working of the (originally colloquial) repetition of negative particles, the variety of construction is not surprising. This variety is further increased by examples with neither μὴ οὐ nor μή after negative verbs (K-G., p. 215), and without μή after positive verbs (ibid., p. 214).

Now to turn to the other type of sentence in class (1), where the governing verb of denial, etc., is in the negative: 'I do not deny that I am doing wrong', οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. Whether or not the μή of the previous form is redundant, the function of οὐκ in μὴ οὐκ is to cancel the μή. If the second half of the sentence is consecutive, the meaning is 'I do not deny (what you say) so that I *am* a wrongdoer'; if it is an object-clause in the accusative, 'I do not deny wrongdoing'; the οὐκ removes the influence of the redundant μή.

K-G., p. 216 h(a) collects examples where μή is read instead of μὴ οὐ. If we are to insist on uniformity, these texts must be emended!

Finally, there is the series of cases where the accusative neuter of the article is prefixed to the dependent clause: τό with inf. after affirmative verb (K-G., p. 216 k), τὸ μή after the same (ibid., p. 217 l), τὸ μὴ οὐ after negative verb (ibid., p. 217 m(a)), τὸ μή after the same (ibid., p. 218 n(a)).[1] The seekers for uniformity try to emend the last class, so as to leave τὸ μὴ οὐ in possession of the field as far as possible; the same principle should lead them to attack the first, in order to give precedence to τὸ μή (ibid., p. 217 l). Yet, from a grammatical standpoint, it is just this first class that explains the construction of the rest. Goodwin (*M. and T.*, par. 811) says that τὸ μή and τὸ μὴ οὐ with inf. are often less closely connected with the main verb than the simple infinitive is, and the meaning is sometimes simply one of result (compare with this Brugmann's 'final-consecutive' infinitive meaning, adduced above in explanation of the Homeric inf.). The construction, he adds, is that of an object in the accusative, as after expressions of denial; but oftener resembles the accusative of respect or limitation. So in Soph. *Phil.* ὅς σε κωλύσει τὸ δρᾶν 'who will stop you with regard to the doing'.[2] In τὸ δρᾶν, accusative of respect, nothing is stated concerning ful-filment or non-fulfilment. The types of sentence with μή or μὴ οὐ added include that extra statement. Thus Hdt. 5. 101, τὸ μὴ λεηλατῆσαι σφέας ἔσχε τόδε 'this re-strained them with regard to the non-plundering'. μή is not redundant, but makes clear the negative sense of the whole; if it were omitted, only ἔσχε would show that negative sense. Aesch. *P.V.* 786, οὐκ ἐναντιώσομαι τὸ μὴ οὐ γεγωνεῖν πᾶν 'I will not oppose myself with regard to not speaking all' (Greek manages it rather more neatly). τό again is an accusative of respect: μή serves the same purpose of clarifying as in the previous example: οὐ cancels out μή, as in the earlier case of μὴ οὐ without

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[1] And there is even τό with inf. after negative verb: Soph. *Phil.* 118, οὐκ ἂν ἀρνοίμην τὸ δρᾶν: though this has not escaped the attention of emenders.

[2] There is neither μή nor μὴ οὐ here: but I apply Goodwin's words to this original, simple τό with inf. class, where they are no less applic-able than where the negative particles are present.

τό, and removes any possible doubt as to the here positive meaning of the whole. Those examples that are under the editors' fire for their omission of οὐ do not trouble to remove this doubt. In short, neither μή nor οὐ in these constructions after τό is really redundant. Each helps in its place towards the clarification of its sentence. It seems fair to attribute the variety that the MSS. present to the ever-changing degree of the author's wish for clarity, which comes into conflict with the desire for simplicity and brevity.

The examples now to be considered are those of class (2), i.e. where the governing verb or verbal phrase is of a positive nature, negatived by οὐ, etc. (K-G., pp. 212, 215). The nature of the infinitive here is quite different from that following verbs of class (1): it is the familiar infinitive of extension after such verbs as δύναμαι, phrases like δίκαιόν ἐστιν, etc. (v. list in K-G., p. 212), the so-called prolative infinitive. When the governing verb is affirmative, the negatived dependent clause is introduced by μή, with its full and proper negative sense: δίκαιόν ἐστι μὴ λέγειν. The negative form of this sentence is: οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι μὴ οὐ λέγειν; or much less often, μὴ λέγειν (K-G., p. 216 h(β)). The explanation of οὐ in the form with μὴ οὐ is not easy. οὐ does not cancel out μή, as was the case after verbs of class (1). οὐ is undoubtedly redundant. K-G., p. 211. 5, after confessing that the usage is illogical, and the psychological basis for it not quite clear, produces a suggestion connected with its mistaken interpretation of the positive sentences of class (1). There it said that μή emphasized the negative trend of the whole sentence (p. 207); so here μὴ οὐ cancel one another out to emphasize the affirmative trend of the whole—'it is not right not to say' = 'it is right to say'. I prefer to suggest that μὴ οὐ here is simply an illogical copy of the use of μὴ οὐ after verbs of class (1), verbs of denying, preventing, etc. As in that other class μή with the dependent clause became μὴ οὐ when the governing verb was negative, so μὴ οὐ was adopted in this class in similar circumstances.

The idea that μή was changed to μὴ οὐ in the blind application of misdirected analogy is supported by a remarkable fragment of Anaxagoras[1]: τὸ γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι 'it is not possible for what is to be what is not' (sc. τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐόν); here apparently τὸ μή was judged untenable after the main verb οὐκ ἔστι, because of the generally observed rule after negative verbs just cited, although that rule concerns μή introducing an infinitive, and so it was changed to τὸ μὴ οὐκ. It is quite impossible to say that μὴ οὐκ cancel each other out, because that would ruin the meaning of the sentence.

I mentioned above the not very common occurrences of μή instead of μὴ οὐ (examples in K-G., p. 216 h(β)), e.g. Plato, *Theaet.* 153 A, τίς οὖν ἂν δύναιτο μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι; (a question with negative sense = no one would . . .). So far from being difficult to explain, this usage appears to be natural and simple Greek, and it is the μὴ οὐ quoted above that urgently needs to be explained away.

τὸ μὴ οὐ again appears as after class (1) verbs: examples in K-G., p. 217 m(β). The construction is varied, the τό-clause being equivalent to a noun-clause as subject, as object, or adverbially in the accusative of respect. τὸ μὴ οὐ has here negative force, so that οὐ is redundant. The same explanation for the presence of οὐ should be given here as for οὐ in μὴ οὐ after like verbs of class (2), just dealt with.

Finally, τὸ μή instead of τὸ μὴ οὐ is exemplified by K-G., p. 218 n(β). The passage of Aeschylus quoted at the start of this paper comes under this heading. The type is what one would expect to find, on logical grounds, and there is no redundancy in it.

Such, then, is the variety of construction permissible after the verbs of the two classes. I have purposely omitted the discussion of difficult passages, despite the

[1] Diels, *Frg. Vorsokr.*[5] ii, p. 33: Anax. 3.

syntactical interest of such an occupation; the question of the so-called virtual negative, which is found governing clauses with μὴ οὐ of class (2), and which I hope to deal with later in another paper; and, finally, the nature of the constructions of μὴ οὐ followed by a participle, or even no verbal form at all. None of these inquiries is germane to the present one. What I have done is to try to trace the logical origin and meaning of each of the forms mentioned, and the distinctions in meaning between the constructions following the two classes of verbs. The distinctions have been seen to be far-reaching, despite the outward parallelism of form. The general principle at work in creating the constructions has been a desire for clarity, but μὴ οὐ in the last examples has appeared to be due to analogy. Descriptive grammar has brought the investigation so far; now historical grammar is needed to complete it. From an examination of certain literary[1] passages where μὴ οὐ is found, new points come to light that are useful in helping to dispose of what is still my chief question, to emend or not to emend μή into μὴ οὐ.

The earliest example of μὴ οὐ is in Simonides of Ceos, 556–466 B.C., at 4. 8 (Diehl): ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. It is interesting that Schmid-Stählin observes (*Griech. Lit.* i. 1, p. 520) that S. in his syntax strove after clarity and ease of comprehension. This agrees with the view taken above, that the use of μὴ οὐ arose because of a desire for clarity; though the particular example of μὴ οὐ that we have from S. belongs to the type class (2), which I attributed to analogy. I regard it as accidental that the oldest surviving example of μὴ οὐ should be from that class. The fact cannot weaken the strong *a priori* probability that μὴ οὐ was first used in the class (1) type of sentence.

Aeschylus in verse, and Herodotus in prose, appear as the next employers of μὴ οὐ, and subsequently its use becomes general. Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes may be cited among the poets, and Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and the Attic Orators among prose-writers. I have not traced the complete history of the use of μὴ οὐ as extended to later writers, as it would not appear to repay the labour. It may be noted, however, that in New Testament Greek the use has died out. Though μή occurs following κωλύω, even that is not usual; and μὴ οὐ with inf. does not appear at all, simple μή being used instead.[2] So Acts iv. 20, οὐ δυνάμεθα ... μὴ λαλεῖν.

But though the use of μὴ οὐ thus became for a time general, it is possible, and I think true, that not even then was it consistent. The theoretical reasons designed to explain the absence of uniformity were given above in the earlier part of this paper. Turning to the evidence of the MSS., we find that in Herodotus μὴ οὐ with inf. (including τὸ μὴ οὐ) occurs 14 times after negative expressions,[3] while there are 2 cases of μή (incl. τὸ μή) in a similar position.[4] It is hard to believe that careless or ill-meaning scribes altered into μή only 2 examples of μὴ οὐ out of a possible 16, and left 14: it appears far more reasonable that there was ancient justification for the apparently anomalous μή in the two cases cited.

Poetry is more particularly helpful, because here the metre is of assistance. Aeschylus has μὴ οὐ with inf. (i.e. MSS. evidence is unanimous, or so strong that μὴ οὐ is commonly printed) in 5 passages: *P.V.* 627, 787, 918; *Eum.* 300, 914. There are 4 passages where μὴ οὐ is grammatically possible, but μή is the approved reading of the MSS.: *P.V.* 106, 1056; *Ag.* 1171; *Eum.* 59. It happens in these 4 passages that οὐ (οὐκ) is metrically possible; at *P.V.* 1056, *Ag.* 1171 οὐ has been restored by editors.

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[1] I have not found any inscriptional occurrences of μὴ οὐ of early or of classical date: but do not venture to deny their existence. It would be of very great assistance to discover some.

[2] Robertson, *Gramm. of Gk. New Test.*[3], p. 1171.

[3] 1. 187[2]; 1. 209[5] (οὐ Dobree); 2. 181[3]; 3. 51[1]; 3. 82[4]; 6. 11[2]; 6. 88; 7. 5[2]; 8. 57[2]; 8. 98[1]; 8. 100[2]; 8. 119; 8. 126[2]; 9. 12[2].

[4] These two are at 1. 112[2]; 7. 28[1] (both of class (2)).

But *Septem* 874 has μή, and there the nature of the text does not allow οὐ to be inserted: δόλος οὐδεὶς μὴ 'κ φρενὸς ὀρθῶς με λιγαίνειν.

It will be useful at this point to divide the passages coming under my notice in the tragedians into three types. The three represent respectively passages (*a*) where μὴ οὐ is the approved reading of MSS., (*b*) where μή is the MSS. reading, but μὴ οὐ is possible both grammatically and metrically, (*c*) where μή is the MSS. reading, and μὴ οὐ is grammatically possible, but not metrically so. The passages of Aeschylus quoted above can then be divided into (*a*) 5, (*b*) 4, (*c*) 1.

Sophocles has 9 examples of (*a*): *Aj.* 540, 728; *Ant.* 97, 936; *Trach.* 622; *El.* 107, 133; *O.T.* 1091, 1232. He has 6 examples of (*b*): *Aj.* 96; *Ant.* 443; *Phil.* 349; *Trach.* 90, 226, 742. μή alone is the MSS. reading here. Reference to the Oxford text will show that οὐ has been proposed by various editors in all the cases; that text, however, prefers to print simply μή, as does Jebb. Finally, there is one example of (*c*), where οὐ is metrically ruled out: *O.T.* 1388, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῆσαι τοὐμὸν ἄθλιον δέμας.

Euripides has 5 examples of (*a*): *Hippol.* 49, 658 (μή in LP); *Tro.* 797; *Phoen.* 1176 (μή in ALP); *Iph. Aul.* 42. He has 8 examples of (*b*): *Med.* 1243[1]; *Heracleid.* 568[2]; *Androm.* 410; *Hec.* 589; *Herc.* 326; *Or.* 1033 (μὴ οὐ Herwerden); *Rhes.* 489, 602 (μὴ οὐ Nauck). It is a matter for surprise that as many as 6 of the 8 examples have escaped the reforming zeal of editors, as far as one learns from the apparatus of the Oxford text. Finally there are 2 examples of (*c*): *Heracleid.* 882, οὐ σοφὸν τόδε, ἐχθροὺς λαβόντα μὴ ἀποτείσασθαι δίκην; *Or.* 478, τὸ μέλλον ὡς κακὸν τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι.

I have added Aristophanes to this survey, to include all the dramatists surviving in bulk. This author has 5 examples of (*a*): *Ach.* 320; *Aves* 37; *Lys.* 1197; *Ran.* 68, 695. He has 4 examples of (*b*): *Ran.* 42; *Eccl.* 610, 622; *Plut.* 478. There is one example of (*c*): *Aves* 29, οὐ δεινόν ἐστιν ἡμᾶς μὴ 'ξευρεῖν δύνασθαι τὴν ὁδόν; In this last instance μὴ οὐ would be grammatically possible, but not because of the first οὐ, since this is a question expecting a positive answer. 'Is it not outrageous that we cannot find the way?' is the same, for my purpose here, as 'It is outrageous . . .'. It is the expression δεινόν ἐστιν that could be followed here by μὴ οὐ; cf. Hdt. 1. 187[3], δεινὸν ἐδόκεε εἶναι μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν, an example of the 'virtual' negative.

I have tried to make my survey of these authors complete, though it is possible that there are further cases which have eluded my notice. But the evidence adduced is sufficient. If only one sure example of my category (*c*) were to be found, that would be enough to destroy the illusion that μὴ οὐ was consistently used. For that one example would show that, linguistically, μή instead of μὴ οὐ was possible for the author using it. As it is, each one of the four poets analysed has an example of (*c*). It is proved, then, that μή in place of μὴ οὐ is a legitimate construction. It follows that it is equally legitimate, in accordance with Greek speech-usage, in passages of my class (*b*), where the MSS. present μή and editors have been able to import οὐ without ruining the metre. In such passages (4 in Aesch., 6 in Soph., 8 in Eur., 4 in Aristoph.) that importation of οὐ has no linguistic basis; and since it flouts the MSS. I do not see that it has any other scientific basis either. Indeed, it would be quite as reasonable to proceed to 'emend' passages of class (*a*), and turn μὴ οὐ of the MSS. into μή until οὐκ remained only where it was metrically necessary.

My conclusion is that it is unsound to alter μή into μὴ οὐ simply because grammar and metre allow it. The μὴ οὐ construction depended on no fixed rule. In editing texts the MSS. evidence should be the only factor to consider in this particular, and μὴ οὐ or μή is to be printed according to that evidence. Headlam, on the passage (Aesch. *Ag.* 1171) quoted at the start, showed some of the required caution, when he

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[1] For μὴ οὐ after an interrogative μέλλω form, cf. Aesch. *P.V.* 627, τί δῆτα μέλλεις μὴ οὐ γεγωνίσκειν τὸ πᾶν; and Soph. *Ai.* 540, τί δῆτα μέλλει μὴ οὐ

οὐ παρουσίαν ἔχειν;

[2] For μὴ οὐ after αἰσχρόν, cf. Plat. *Prot.* 352 D αἰσχρόν ἐστι μὴ οὐχὶ φάναι: Xen. *Cy.* 2. 2. 20, etc.

said that οὐ is to be restored 'at any rate when there is any trace of it'. Unfortunately many texts show that even this caution has been disregarded. It is hardly to be expected that the MSS. will have preserved the original presence or absence of οὐ with perfect fidelity; but there is at the present day no point in trying to improve on their testimony on this subject.

In conclusion, I put forward for consideration a few reflections on the possible source of this μὴ οὐ construction. It has been seen that it was not part of the earliest literary language, and further that it does not appear in the New Testament dialect. Yet there appear to be grounds for regarding it as primarily a literary usage; I have not been able to trace it in early nor in classical inscriptions. If then the construction is a literary invention, is it possible to suggest from what source it came, to what literary dialect it belonged?

The oldest example is in Simonides 4. 8, as was observed above. The language of Simonides is a mixture of Epic, Ionic, and Attic,[1] with some Doric as well.[2] Herodotus is the oldest prose-user, and his language is a 'literary' brand of Ionic, with Homeric and Attic additions. It may seem quite accidental that the construction has such affinities with Ionic in particular; it may be argued that μὴ οὐ was in the late sixth and early fifth centuries beginning to find general acceptance in Greek literature, and that the intellectual pre-eminence of Ionians at that time accounts for the appearance of it in authors using that dialect. But a closer examination of the usage of the tragedians provides evidence which cannot be so dismissed.

The majority of the examples of μὴ οὐ with inf. quoted from the tragedians appear in the iambic sections, where the language is chiefly Attic; Aeschylus has Ionic additions, and Sophocles still more.[3] The exceptions are: Soph. *Ant.* 936; *El.* 107, 133; *O.T.* 1091: Eur. *Tro.* 797; *Iph. Aul.* 42. If we add those passages that have μή in the MSS., but where μὴ οὐ is proposed, there should be included Aesch. *P.V.* 1056.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the disputed problem of the dialectal sources of Greek tragedy, but I can very briefly recall some points in the problem. Words which have the common Greek ᾱ instead of the Attic-Ionic η appear chiefly in lyric sections of tragedy. This has been, and is, generally accepted as a linguistic sign of the Doric origin of those sections, and this view is supported by the presence of some distinctively Doric words and forms in lyric and (by infiltration[4]) in iambic sections. On the other hand, it has been argued that the apparent peculiarities of language in Attic tragedy are signs of 'old Attic', a more ancient form of the dialect that thus survives in tragedy but is not otherwise known.[5] I follow the majority in regarding the ᾱ-forms and their kin as Doricisms.

Not all non-iambic sections of tragedy show the same type of language. The strophic lyrics, which were sung, show the maximum of non-Attic forms. But in the sections with anapaestic dimeter or tetrameter the language is much more like Attic, and in particular has η for original ᾱ.

Seven passages were mentioned above as having μὴ οὐ (universally read, or proposed), and as being non-iambic. Of these *P.V.* 1056 is in an anapaestic passage: for the language occurring there in the same metrical section, cf. ἀνάγκης, ἥ, τλητόν. So

[1] Schmid-Stählin, *Gr. Lit.* i. 1, p. 520.

[2] Thumb-Kieckers, *Gr. Dial.* i, p. 219.

[3] Schmid-Stählin, i. 2, pp. 148, 290, 485–6.

[4] Pickard-Cambridge, *Dith. Trag. and Com.*, p. 147.

[5] So more recently G. H. Mahlow, *Neue Wege durch d. griech. Sprache u. Dichtung.* The author is making a most useful and necessary point

when he argues so frequently that we expect too much uniformity in Attic, and that we establish our rules concerning what may be Attic with too much rigidity in view of the incomplete nature of the evidence available. But despite this I cannot agree that α and η for the same IE. sound existed in Attic side by side, as Mahlow supposes.

too Soph. *Ant.* 936 (cf. μούνην); *El.* 107 (ἡμετέρου); Eur. *Tro.* 797 (μήτηρ); *Iph. Aul.* 42 (θνητός). There are only two passages remaining, and they are Soph. *O.T.* 1091, a strophic passage with Doric forms (γνώμαν, τάν, ματέρα): and likewise *El.* 133 (τάκεις, κακᾷ). These isolated examples I would explain, as the Doric forms in iambic sections are explained by Pickard-Cambridge (*v. supra*), as occurring through infiltration. The dialects in tragedy are not separated with complete rigidity. For example, to go no farther than the lyric passage in Soph. *El.* which has μὴ οὐ at line 133; we find here such forms as φιλότητος and ἀμήχανον, which are Ionic-Attic, and yet this is definitely a 'Doric' passage.

It is possible, then, that the μὴ οὐ construction, being of Ionic origin, was most at home in the iambic parts of tragedy; and that it spread to those choral passages where the language was akin to the speech of dialogue; and then, as a result of the literary speech-mixture that partly destroyed the original distinctions of language, even penetrated into two purely lyric passages. The occurrence will be of greater interest as providing a syntactical example of the speech-divisions in tragedy, beside the familiar ones from phonology. The Ionic dialectal origin of the construction cannot, I think, be regarded as proved, but deserves consideration. If it is true, then the lack of consistency in its use, that was proved above, becomes still more explicable.

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SOME HERODOTEAN RATIONALISMS

It is no longer the fashion to imagine Herodotos a liar when he tells marvellous stories, for some of his most extraordinary statements have long since been shown to contain at least a substantial measure of truth. It is perhaps not sufficiently realized, however, that on occasion he misleads his readers and himself by too much critical unbelief in his materials and consequent application of the crude methods of mythological investigation then current. In other words, he often rationalizes in the only way then possible, superficially altering the story so as to rid himself of the incredible details, or at all events, as I think, attributing to the actors motives which a somewhat drily rational mind could understand and approve or condemn. It is of course well known that at least the former method was a commonplace of the sophists, whose influence on Herodotos is manifest and widespread; it has been said, indeed, that it is much older than they and characteristically Ionic. L. Radermacher[1] finds traces of it in the *Odyssey* itself and adds that, although we can sometimes catch the rationalizer (or *Fälscher*, as he impolitely calls him) at work, we cannot be sure of always doing so and 'müssen annehmen, dass der Glaube an die Geschichtlichkeit ihrer Sage manche griechischen Autoren früh verführt hat, sie geschichtlicher zu erzählen als eigentlich erlaubt war'. This is a true and useful statement. Modern criticism has long learned to set aside ancient allegorizations of myths, about which I need say nothing, for the subject has been repeatedly and well handled by my colleague, Dr. J. Tate; it has often, however, confused ancient interpretation of myth with ancient criticism of saga. Euhemerism indeed is usually recognized for what it is, although even this is not always so; but *uixere inepti ante Euhemerum multi,* and their efforts are by no means always distinguished either from allegorizing or from real sagas. For an example of the former confusion I may refer to Stallbaum's note on Plato, *Phaedrus,* 29 C–D, where the reader is referred to the account given by Lobeck[2] of the rise and growth of allegorization. But Plato says nothing at all of allegories in this passage. He quotes, with ironical admiration of its 'wisdom', a version of the story of Boreas and Oreithyia according to which she was knocked off the Areiopagos, or some other place, by a strong north wind, and so was killed and consequently said to have been carried away by Boreas. He adds that it would be a laborious and dismal business to go through all the tales of wonder in that way, rationalizing the Hippocentaurs, Gorgons, Chimaira, Pegasos, and the rest out of existence; a wise saying which was uttered in vain for Palaiphatos and his kind. However, most moderns know a myth from a saga and an allegory from a crude rationalization which accepts the story as true except for the incredibilities and is quite ready to believe, for instance, in Romulus if we will but postulate that he was not snatched up to heaven but murdered and his body hidden.[3] There is a much more subtle snare, consisting of a story which, although rationalized, is well told, and Herodotos in this respect can be a notable offender, for he never tells a story ill.

It is evident, even on the most superficial reading of his work, that for him stories which he has heard or read fall into two classes. The first is frankly incredible, but too good to be omitted: ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον, he says by way of introduction to a piece of anti-Argive propaganda;[4] the tale that Onetas and Korydallos showed Xerxes the way around Thermophylai is οὐδαμῶς ἔμοιγε πιστός.[5] The rest are more or less to be credited,

[1] *Mythos und Sage bei den Griechen*, Baden bei Wien–Leipzig, Rohrer, 1939 (?), p. 21 f.

[2] Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i, pp. 133 ff.

[3] See Livy, i. 16. 4, a version of the death of Romulus which has, incredibly, misled Sir J. G. Frazer, *G.B.* [3] ix. 258.

[4] Herod. vii. 152. 3.

[5] vii. 214. 1.

although there may be two different accounts[1] between which writer or reader must choose. But, if there are several versions of a story, or rather if there were several when he wrote, Herodotos does not always trouble to set them all forth, but may confine himself to the one which is either novel or credible. Of the latter, we have a clear example at the very beginning;[2] he tacitly assumes that everyone knows the common story of Io and the legend of the rape of Europa, and so contents himself with telling the rationalistic versions which certain 'learned Persians' have set forth. One would gladly know more of these mysterious informants who, although Orientals, think along the very latest Greek lines; holding, as I do, a high opinion of the veracity of Herodotos, I have little doubt that he was here the victim of some sophist or logographer's forgery, put into the mouth of an imaginary Persian and alleged to have been translated from an original which never existed. But however this may be, no harm is done to our understanding of the legends in question; we have authors in plenty to give us the true traditional accounts of Io's wanderings and Europa's arrival in Crete. No one, I suppose, at least in recent times, has ever imagined that the rationalizing account was anything but what it is, posterior to the true legend and growing out of it. There is another passage where confusion has been caused by a very similar treatment by the historian of a folk-tale, quite possibly Oriental, certainly popular, whereof by good fortune Plato has given us the original version, or at all events the substance of it; for it is not to be assumed without further ado that he, any more than Herodotos, will tell a tale without leaving on it the imprint of his own genius. I refer of course to the often-quoted legend of how Gyges became king of Lydia.[3] That it was Gyges Plato himself informs us;[4] but his story differs so much from that in Herodotos[5] that so learned and judicious a man as the late James Adam[6] prefers to think that the two accounts refer to different persons, Plato speaking of a fabulous ancestor of the historical Gyges, the 'Gugu of Luddi' of Assyrian records,[7] while Herodotos means the historical king himself. Briefly, the difference is that in Plato Gyges finds a magic ring which confers invisibility; aided by this, although a simple shepherd, he contrives to become the queen's lover and to murder and succeed the king. In Herodotos, Gyges is a trusted officer in the service of King Kandaules, a favourite of his master and in the habit of being consulted by the queen as well. There is no magic in the story; Kandaules hides Gyges in the royal bedchamber, that he may judge for himself of the queen's beauty, whereat she, having caught a glimpse of the intruder, is bitterly offended with her husband and compels Gyges to help her assassinate him. He afterwards becomes king after a period of civil strife, by verdict of the Delphic oracle. Adam's doubts, however, that the two tales are really one and the same seem to me of the feeblest. 'The resemblance', he says, 'is confined to two incidents, viz., the joint murder of the reigning sovereign by the queen and her paramour, and their succession to the throne.' But as these two incidents are the whole point of the story, it is hard to see what closer agreement, short of sheer copying of one author by the other, could be expected. The difference, however, in the machinery is striking, and the question of priority arises, unless, with Adam, we accept the idea, to me perfectly incredible, that there were two stories concerning two different men who were both called Gyges and both became kings of Lydia by the treacherous murder of the reigning monarch, with the assistance of his queen.

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[1] e.g. iii. 32. 1.

[2] i. 1 f.

[3] Plato, *Rep.* 359 c ff.; see Adam, *Republic of Plato*, i, p. 126 f., where to his citations of later authors who copy Plato add Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* iv. 94.

[4] *Rep.* 612 B 4; the reading at 359 B 1 is doubt-ful, but apparently no ancient reader of earlier date than Proclus fails to identify this Gyges with the historical king.

[5] Herodotos, i. 8–13.

[6] Adam, loc. cit.

[7] Quoted by How and Wells on Herod. i. 7. 2.

It is fairly evident that Herodotos' story is Greek. One can hardly suppose an Oriental knowing so little of the customs of his own country as to make an official, un-related to the queen, be sent for as a matter of course to her apartments without arousing his own or anyone else's suspicion;[1] nor is it likely that an Eastern story would introduce Delphoi as the final arbiter of a Lydian dispute, at least at any date likely for the origin of the tale. But this of course does not exclude, or even make in the least unlikely, the supposition that a really Eastern tale underlies the Greek one. On the other hand, Plato's story seems to have characteristically Oriental details, not only in its easy acceptance of magic but in the mysterious underground chamber in which Gyges finds his talisman. No reader of the *Thousand and One Nights* will lack for parallels to this motif. That Plato might have information about such things is in no way incredible, considering the evidence that he was acquainted, if only at second hand, with Persian thought at any rate.[2] There are, therefore, two possibilities. Either Herodotos' story, that is to say the Oriental tale on which he draws, was known to the teller of Plato's version, who embroidered it to suit his own fancy and so passed it back again to Greece, or else Plato has hold of the earlier, more nearly popular account. It does not seem to me that there can be any serious doubt on this question. Plato's narrative, if we subtract the beauty of his language and the moral application which he makes, has the characteristic flavour of a folktale. It contains no name, save that of Gyges himself, the king and queen alike being nameless. It is in itself totally non-moral, the hero using his invisibility to enter the royal harem and the queen's bed and then, no doubt having greatly impressed her with his clever use of magical powers, drawing her into a plot against the king, whose throne he usurps without further trouble, once he has performed the easy feat, for an invisible man, of killing its occupant.[3] It is quite possible that such a story could spring up out of the fact that a new dynasty had replaced the old one; it is also perfectly understandable that an entirely nameless tale of wonder should be attached, as such tales often are, to the conspicuous personality of the historical Gyges. But Herodotos' account bears un-mistakable signs of rationalization. His Gyges had no powers of invisibility; the king had brought him into the royal bedchamber to satisfy a silly whim of his own, and had cleverly hidden him behind the door, in the one place where he could escape quickly and yet had a chance of not being seen by the woman on whom he was spying. The queen was not his paramour, but took action on a point of honour; since two men had seen her naked, both were in the position of husband to her, and since she could not have two husbands, both could not be allowed to live. Gyges being comparatively innocent, she gave him the first choice, and he naturally preferred life and kingship to immediate execution. Nikolaos of Damaskos[4] has yet another account, which saves the credit of two principal actors. The queen has told the king of improper proposals made to her by Gyges before her marriage; the king proposes to kill Gyges and the latter, warned by a friendly servant-girl, anticipates him. Whether Nikolaos had Herodotos' text in mind or not, it is clear that he or his source is getting rid of further improbabilities, the whole tragi-comedy of the visit of Gyges, by the king's orders, to the bedroom where the queen undresses, with its corollary that King Kandaules (Sadyattes in Nikolaos) was in the hands of a higher power which had determined his ruin, in fact was feeling the madness which precedes

[1] Herod. i. 11. 1; the incident is rightly called 'purely Greek' by How and Wells, *ad loc.*

[2] This matter will be discussed in J. Bidez's Gifford lectures, *Platon et l'Orient*, shortly to appear; see meanwhile J. Bidez and F. Cumont, *Les Mages hellénisés* (Paris, 1938), i, pp. 12 ff., where Eudoxos of Knidos, Hermodoros of Syracuse, and Herakleides of Pontos are suggested as the intermediaries.

[3] Gyges, says Plato (360 B 1–2), set upon the king with the queen's help and so (οὕτω, implying 'without more ado') got the throne, τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν.

[4] Frag. 49 Müller (*F.H.G.* iii, p. 384 f.).

ruin.[1] We have therefore three accounts, all ultimately due to popular imagination, of one and the same event, the accession of Gyges; Plato's is substantially the popular one (whether actually Lydian or not we have no means of telling, but pretty certainly Oriental), while Herodotos and Nikolaos give us two grades of rationalization.

With this in mind, we may try to analyse the strange tale of Phye which adorns the history of Peisistratos.[2] The tyrant, says Herodotos, after having been expelled from Athens for the first time, plotted with Megakles to return. By way of feigning divine approval, the conspirators got hold of a tall and fine-looking woman, named Phye, of the deme Paiania, dressed her as Athena and sent heralds on ahead to proclaim that the goddess herself was bringing Peisistratos back; whereon, says the historian, 'there came a rumour to the demes that Athena was bringing Peisistratos home and those in the capital, believing that the woman was no other than the goddess, did obeisance to the wench and received Peisistratos'. Herodotos does not doubt the story,[3] but is surprised that so silly a device should impose on so shrewd a people as the Athenians. It becomes less remarkable if we start, not from the story but from the rumour which it is said to have set about. Peisistratos was very popular, as is to be seen from Herodotos himself, who places on record that he governed καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ,[4] herein, as often, repeating the ordinary Athenian account, and further from Aristotle, or pseudo-Aristotle,[5] who says that his tyranny was remembered as the Golden Age and has a good story of his kindness to the poor. To the pious mind of the average Athenian of his day, therefore, it would need no prompting nor jugglery to suggest that he had been brought home by the popular goddess; it would soon follow that some would persuade themselves that they had seen her leading him back. The next century, which presumably, even in its early years, was less believing, produced some who saw Theseus fighting the Persians.[6] Before long, there would be a sufficiency of people who thought they remembered glimpsing the divine figure, and years before Herodotos heard the tale it would have passed into the accepted traditions of Athens, at all events among the less educated and less politically minded. But to the more thinking it would be doubly unwelcome. First, probably few of them had such unswerving faith in the existence of the mythological deities as their poorer or duller neighbours; Athena doubtless was somehow a reality, but that her precise shape was ever visible to mortal eyes, outside the pages of Homer or some other imaginative author, and that supposing her to appear, she would infallibly be in the likeness of a tall and beautiful virgin wearing a man's armour could hardly have been things to be lightly assumed among the generation which succeeded the fighters at Marathon. Secondly, if this divine intervention had really taken place, it showed very poor taste on the part of the goddess of a republic, a state which since the days of Theseus had tended towards the rule of the sovran people, to exert herself on behalf of a wholly unconstitutional claimant of power. Therefore, since the tradition was persistent, the witnesses to so strange an event must have been deceived, obviously by some ruse on the part of the unscrupulous tyrant. The rationalizing story, as we can see from later authorities,[7] itself gave rise to some difficulties. How did it happen that any decent Athenian woman lent herself to such treachery, to say nothing of impiety, and how was the secret kept? Kleidemos and the author, whoever he was, whom the 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία

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[1] χρῆν γὰ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς, Herod. i. 8. 2, i.e. he was in that condition of ἄτη which makes the evil appear good, according to the κλεινὸν ἔπος in Soph. *Ant.* 621.

[2] Herod. i. 60. 3 ff.

[3] The words μηχανῶνται . . . πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον . . . εἰ καὶ τότε γε, κτέ (ibid.) do not cast any doubt on the truth of the story, being merely the com-

mon use of εἰ after any word or phrase expressing surprise.

[4] Herod. i. 59. 6.

[5] 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία, 16. 6–7.

[6] Plutarch, *Thes.* 35.

[7] 'Αθην. πολιτ. 14. 4; Athenaios, 609 C–B, quoting Kleidemos.

follows give us the answer, which does not lack ingenuity. To begin with, she was a person of very humble station, a seller of garlands, and not an Athenian at all but a Thracian, whether slave or freedwoman. Such a one might be expected to have fewer scruples, and her mouth was effectively stopped by marrying her to Hipparchos, son of Peisistratos, who no doubt would see to it that she did not go abroad too much nor indulge in unseasonable reminiscences of how she came to make so distinguished a marriage. Here again, therefore, we catch a glimpse of the progressive improvement of a rationalizing story in the hands of would-be historical critics.

When we turn to another story, the famous one of Xerxes punishing the Helles-pont,[1] it is not so much the alleged facts which raise a difficulty as Herodotos' inter-pretation of them. It is a common mental limitation of rationalists, especially in the early days of a rationalistic movement, that having themselves got rid of certain ancient superstitions and other prejudices they become quite incapable of realizing that other men who are not as they are in this respect are neither liars nor fools but simply of a different temperament. Furthermore, they seem incapable of picturing to themselves a cultural or educational atmosphere qualitatively different from their own. That is to say, they may perceive that certain persons are ignorant of facts or unacquainted with theories which they themselves know, but never seem to grasp that they may reason well and accurately from supposed facts and real beliefs whose existence the rationalists do not recognize and so conceive that no one in his senses can recognize. Euripides is an outstanding example of this paralogism. It is notorious that the story of Orestes has a fascination for him. Now there can be no doubt that the original Orestes, as we find him in Homer and as he perhaps was in fact, is a perfectly sane and normal man with a proper sense of duty, who carries out, to the satisfaction of the public conscience of his day, a difficult and presumably distasteful task. His father had been murdered by his mother; but in his age blood revenge was a sacred duty and moreover the senior male of a family was its sole judge, as regarded the actions of the junior members. It was no business of the State to interfere with what the house-father should see to in his own inherent capacity. Rome recognized this when her law was far more developed than that of Homeric or pre-Homeric Greece, by handing over women to the family council to deal with[2] and admitting, at least in theory, that the *paterfamilias* had the right to put his sons to death if he saw fit.[3] But Euripides did not, and therefore to him a man who would kill his mother under any circumstances whatever must be a disagreeable maniac, as his Orestes is both in the play to which he gives his name and in the *Electra*. It is perhaps the strongest testi-mony to the greatness of Euripides' mind that when once he learned, probably by personal experience in Macedonia, that there were some people to whom enthusiastic religion, however foreign to him, was the very breath of life, he recognized this, im-aginatively and intellectually as well, when he composed the *Bacchae*. Indeed, he even goes so far as to introduce, with a touch of humour very rare in him, a half-comic

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[1] Herod. vii. 35.

[2] Livy, xxxix. 18. 6: 'mulieres damnatas [of being implicated in the Bacchanalian affair] cognatis aut in quorum manu essent tradebant, ut ipsi in priuato animaduerterent in eas; si nemo erat idoneus supplicii exactor [these must have been cases of women who, being non-citizens, had no *gentiles* and whose *patroni*, if they were freedwomen, were not to be found or had themselves been condemned already] in pu-blico animaduertebatur'.

[3] Gaius, i. 25, with the notes of Poste-Whittuck. Gaius is of course mistaken in saying that the *patria potestas* in this respect is 'proprium ciuium Romanorum, fere enim nulli alii sunt homines qui talem in filios suos habent potestatem qualem nos habemus', at least from the historical point of view, however right it may be as a statement of the then existing facts in the civilized world (he admits that something like it existed in Gaul). The truth is that the Romans in this respect were very conservative and the ancient patriarchal institutions, as they used picturesquely to be called, were less broken down among them than among more progressive peoples.

picture of a rationalist in the person of the time-serving old rascal Teiresias,[1] who makes a most effective foil to the silly but somehow lovable Kadmos. To return, however, to his unregenerate days, he not only thinks Orestes mad for killing his mother, but makes him a heartless brute in his manner of disposing of Aigisthos.[2] His telling of the story itself therefore follows conventional lines, and he does not try to invent a version in which Klytaimestra should die in some other way; his shallow rationalization comes out in the portrayal of the characters. The result, since he is a poet, is that he produces a telling play in both cases, but as an interpretation of the legend he is as absurd as Sophokles is clear-sighted.[3]

In the case of Herodotos, there need be no doubt that he tells the facts. By order of Xerxes, three hundred blows were administered to the Hellespont and a pair of fetters thrown into the water. The latter detail has often been interpreted as a too literal understanding of Aeschylus' words[4]

> ὅστις Ἑλλήσποντον ἱρὸν δοῦλον ὡς δεσμώμασιν
> ἤλπισε σχήσειν ῥέοντα, Βόσπορον ῥόον θεοῦ,
> καὶ πόρον μετερρύθμιζε καὶ πέδαις σφυρηλάτοις
> περιβαλὼν πολλὴν κέλευθον ἤνυσεν πολλῷ στρατῷ.

For this I see no cogent reason. The action was a perfectly natural piece of sympathetic magic, if it really took place, and Aeschylus is so clear at this point that to suppose his hearers or readers did not understand him is to introduce a piece of rationalism the more into a text already suffering from it. The only real objection to this detail is that it may be an enlargement of the false interpretation of the beating set forth below. But as to the beating itself, it seems quite clear that it was a charm to keep the sea from raging as it had done when the first bridge across the Hellespont was destroyed. This is interesting enough in itself, contrasting as it does with the deep reverence for the sea which, if we may judge from Tiridates' scruples in Pliny,[5] a Zoroastrian showed. We are not told that the ceremony was performed by the Magi, however, and it was probably a survival of an older state of mind than that of Zarathuštra and his followers. Parallels are not far to seek. Perhaps the nearest, in ritual though not in geography, is an Eskimo ceremony.[6]

> 'Storms and bad weather', says Franz Boas, 'when lasting a long time and causing want of food, are conjured by making a large whip of seaweed, stepping to the beach, and striking out in the direction whence the wind blows, at the same time crying "Taba" ("It is enough").'

[1] Eurip. *Bacch.* 266 ff. Fond though Euripides is on occasion of etymological speculations and plays on words, I cannot think that he seriously accepted the nonsensical explanation of Dionysos in the thigh of Zeus (291 ff.), which is worthy of Palaiphatos at his worst. See Additional Note.

[2] Eurip. *Electr.* 774 ff. I have elsewhere (*Handb. Gk. Lit.*, p. 194) mentioned the remarkable legal anachronisms which the *Orestes* contains.

[3] The reference is to the entirely Homeric portrait of Orestes' character and actions in the *Electra* of Sophokles. Attempts to read into the play doubt, remorse, or the like on the part of the hero or his sister strike me as absurdly fanciful.

[4] Aeschylus, *Pers.* 745 ff. Groeneboom (*Aeschylus' Persae*, den Haag, 1930) in his note interprets the Herodotean story correctly, but supposes that the notion that Xerxes treated the Hellespont like a slave 'vond nieuw voedsel' in Aeschylus' lines. That it is all an invention based on Aeschylus was the opinion of Gaisford in his note on Herod., loc. cit. (vol. iv, p. 795 of his ed., Oxford, 1824). He cites a note of Stanley on the Aeschylean passage, which I have not been able to find; it seems not to occur in his London ed. of Aeschylus, 1663.

[5] Pliny, *N.H.* xxx. 16: 'magus ad eum (Neronem) Tiridates uenerat . . . nauigare noluerat, quoniam exspuere in maria aliisque mortalium necessitatibus uiolare naturam eam fas non putant'.

[6] Quoted in Sir J. G. Frazer, *Anthologia Anthropologica*, iv (*Native Races of America*), p. 28.

Here we have the Eskimo Xerxes, like his Persian equivalent in Juvenal, though not in Herodotos,

> in Corum atque Eurum solitus saeuire flagellis.[1]

Nor would Xerxes' conduct appear totally inexplicable to a Highlander, seeing that, according to Gordon Cumming,[2]

> 'There is an angry tide off Mull called the "Men of Lochaber", because some men of Lochaber, crossing over to Mull, were so angry with the tide that they stabbed it with their dirks.'

It seems far from unlikely that these Lochaber men were moved as much by some vague recollection of an old magical practice as by mere loss of temper. The term 'Keltic' is ethnologically very vague, but there may be some racial kinship between them and those barbarians whose conduct in face of a storm puzzled Aristotle.[3]

But Herodotos clearly knew nothing of beating off the anger of wind and sea by threats of physical violence, although he might have found one or two slight analogies in Greek myth, at least, if he had looked for them.[4] To him, such conduct was the mad insolence of a man who could not realize that his power, admittedly great, had sharply-defined boundaries, in fact of one afflicted with $\ddot{v}\beta\rho\iota s$. Therefore he draws the scene in his liveliest colours, making the agents of Xerxes' orders deliver a speech which he characterizes as $\beta\acute{a}\rho\beta\alpha\rho\acute{a}$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\grave{a}\tau\acute{a}\sigma\theta\alpha\lambda\alpha$ and pairing them with the executioners who beheaded the overseers of the bridge-building. He further suggests that the offerings made to the Hellespont on crossing it[5] may have been intended as compensation for the irreverence shown, and therefore are to be taken as a slight sign of grace on the king's part. Later tellers of the tale knew no better than Herodotos himself, as indeed is generally the case with his critics and imitators, save Thucydides; Plutarch has a good story of Xerxes uttering threats to Mt. Athos,[6] which, wherever he found it, is an excellent enlargement on the phantasmal figure of a tyrant completely mad with lust of power which had grown up out of the historic king of Persia.

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[1] Juvenal, *Sat.* x. 180.

[2] Frazer, op. cit. iii, p. 376.

[3] Arist. *Eth. Eudem.*, 1229[b] 28, among examples of foolhardy rage, which is to be distinguished from true courage: $o\mathring{\iota}ov$ $o\mathring{\iota}$ $K\epsilon\lambda\tau o\grave{\iota}$ $\pi\rho\grave{o}s$ $\tau\grave{a}$ $\kappa\acute{v}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\mathring{o}\pi\lambda\alpha$ $\grave{a}\pi\alpha\nu\tau\hat{\omega}\sigma\iota$ $\lambda\alpha\beta\acute{o}\nu\tau\epsilon s$.

[4] See W. Fiedler, *Antiker Wetterzauber* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1931), pp. 31 ff.

[5] Herod. vii. 54, 3.

[6] Plut. *Moralia*, 455 D. For other accounts of Xerxes, mostly rhetorical, see Mayor on Juvenal loc. cit.

ADDITIONAL NOTE (*cf. p.* 83, note 1.)

It seems possible that we can find a curious example of that form of rationalization which consists in supposing that a word or phrase in an otherwise true tale has been so misunderstood as to introduce a marvel, if we examine the story of Taurosthenes as told by Pausanias, vi. 9. 3, and Aelian, *V.H.* ix. 2. Both tell how Taurosthenes won an Olympic victory and his father, in Aigina, heard of it the same day from an apparition, $\phi\acute{a}\sigma\mu\alpha$, which Pausanias adds was like Taurosthenes himself, in other words was his fetch or wraith. Opinions of the credibility of this must differ according to the views the reader holds of the occurrence of such apparitions; there are plenty of instances in such works as Gurney–Myers–Podmore, *Phantasms of the Living* (abridged ed., London, 1918), pp. 184 ff. But evidently it did not satisfy all Greek readers or hearers, for Aelian has another version according to which Taurosthenes used a carrier-pigeon, to which he attached a bit of purple cloth, a nice allusion to the legend of Theseus, as told by Simonides, fgt. 33, Diehl. But is it not quite possible that the suggestion for this particular explanation of the story was given by the resemblance between $\phi\acute{a}\sigma\mu\alpha$ and $\phi\acute{a}\sigma\sigma\alpha$?

A NOTE ON THE DELPHIC PRIESTHOOD

In a recent number Mr. O. J. Todd has discussed the clumsy scansion of a line in a Delphic oracle, and has called fresh attention to the problem of the Pythia's prophesyings in verse.[1] The chief difficulty consists in the differences between the indications on this subject as given by our various sources. The conventional phrases in most authors from Pindar and Herodotus until late periods describe the responses as uttered by the Pythia herself. This picture seems to imply that the Pythia originated the verse form of the oracle. But this view would take no account of the existence of the official known as the προφήτης whose business was evidently to deliver the response to the inquirer.[2]

The basic principle of Delphic procedure was that the Pythia under the influence of Apollo uttered his answers to inquiries in the god's own words. That is why the first person, which is used frequently in early responses, always refers to Apollo.[3] But the usual mention of the Pythia as delivering the prophecy must not be taken to exclude the mediation of the prophet. We should picture him as speaking the response directly to the inquirer, after having listened to the Pythia. The only instances which are inconsistent with this statement are when the Pythia is described as directly addressing the inquirers immediately on their entrance or as retorting after they have questioned the purport of her original response.[4] But these exceptions all appear to be unhistorical in this form at any rate. It was a favourite motive in legends about the oracle to suggest that, even without hearing anything about the inquirers, the Pythia could spontaneously exhibit her foreknowledge of them, and the examples of dialogues between the Pythia and the inquirer are all contrived *ad maiorem gloriam Apollinis*.

Did the προφήτης or his assistants utilize the occasion of transmitting the response from the Pythia to the inquirer, so as to reduce it to the form of verse? Strabo, IX. iii. 5 (p. 419) and Plutarch, *De Pyth. Oracl.* xxv. 407 B, record a tradition that, when the Pythia had prophesied in prose, certain poets in the sanctuary turned her responses into verse and then delivered them in this form to the inquirers. By his use of the past tense Plutarch implies that the institution, if it had ever existed, need not have survived into his own time. But this would be likely in any case, as at that period it was not usual to issue responses in verse.[5]

Apparently the Delphic authorities never officially admitted that the prophet modified the form of the Pythia's prophecy. It is impossible to decide now whether the inquirer was in any position to judge of this for himself. If he was seated within earshot of the Pythia when she spoke, he might have been able to distinguish occasionally between the official version delivered by the prophet and the Pythia's original utterance. But some modern authorities believe that the οἶκος where the inquirers sat was a separate room from the ἄδυτον where the Pythia prophesied seated on the tripod.[6] On the latter supposition the prophet's version was the only

[1] *C.Q.* xxxiii (1939), pp. 163 ff.

[2] For the προφήτης cf. Herod. viii. 36, and Eur. *Ion*, 415, which is discussed further below.

[3] For some examples see Parke, *The History of the Delphic Oracle*, p. 38, note 1.

[4] For these instances see Parke, op. cit., p. 32, notes 2 and 4.

[5] Mr. Todd, *C.Q.*, loc. cit., did not cite the Plutarch passage. It would be the more important reference of the two, as Theon, the speaker

in the dialogue, probably represents Plutarch himself (cf. R. Flacelière, *Sur les Oracles de la Pythie*, p. 22). But the following sentence is so corrupt in our MSS. that one cannot ascertain positively whether Plutarch accepted this theory or not.

[6] For the view that the inquirers and the Pythia were in one room cf. Courby, *Fouilles*, ii, pp. 66 ff. and Leicester B. Holland, *A.J.A.* xxxvii (1933), pp. 208 ff. For the view that

one which the inquirer could ever hear, and so it remained entirely beyond control whether the prophet had altered the form or even the entire substance of the Pythia's words.

For the difference between the common view that the Pythia was responsible for the verses and the probable explanation that they originated with the prophet, we can compare the position of the Apolline oracle at Claros. Here the popular opinion was also that the person whom the god inspired gave prophecies directly in verse; in this instance the person was a man, not a woman. Our authority is Tacitus, *Annals*, ii. 54: 'non femina illic, ut apud Delphos, sed certis e familiis et ferme Mileto accitus sacerdos numerum modo consultantium et nomina audit; tum in specum degressus, hausta fontis arcani aqua, ignarus plerumque litterarum et carminum edit responsa versibus compositis super rebus quas quis mente concepit'. This picturesque and imposing description of a priest inspired to answer the unspoken questions of inquirers in spontaneous verses is strangely at variance with the official inscriptions at Claros.[1] These are headed with the name of the state inquiring and record the names of the πρύτανις and the προφήτης, followed by those of the ἱερεύς, the θεσπιῳδός, and the γραμματεῖς. Cagnat appears to be certainly right when he explains the duties of these officials as follows: the προφήτης is the *sacerdos* of Tacitus' account. He is the vehicle of prophecy. The θεσπιῳδός translates this utterance into verse, and the γραμματεῖς record it in writing. The inscriptions at Claros date from Hadrian's reign, and so are not more than a score of years later than when Tacitus wrote. One may suppose that there had been no change in procedure. More probably Tacitus just recorded the popular superstition about the oracle and its methods. The authorities at Claros did not trouble themselves to contradict it, but made no secret of the fact that they actually appointed an official versifier to assist the prophet to put his responses into proper shape.

The Delphic authorities were never so candid. As Mr. Todd says, we have no evidence 'that, like poets laureate, the prophets were chosen for their poetic ability'. In fact Ion in Euripides' play describes them as chosen by lot.

> Ξοῦθος.   τίς προφητεύει θεοῦ;
> "Ιων.   ἡμεῖς τά γ' ἔξω, τῶν ἔσω δ' ἄλλοις μέλει,
>   οἳ πλησίον θάσσουσι τρίποδος, ὦ ξένε,
>   Δελφῶν ἀριστῆς, οὓς ἐκλήρωσεν πάλος.[2]

But it would be a mistake to suppose that the use of the lot must necessarily imply that a new prophet was thrust at haphazard into the onerous position of versifying the Pythia's words. Mr. A. S. Owen, the most recent editor of the *Ion*, has given an explanation of these lines which appears to lack adequate support in ancient evidence. He writes: 'From the ἀριστῆς were chosen five ὅσιοι, who acted in regular rotation in the office of προφήτης. They were the heads of five families who traced their descent from Deucalion (Plut. *Quaest. Gr.* 292 D). It was the order of their service

there were separate rooms, Flacelière, *Annales de l'École des Hautes Études de Gand, tome* ii (1938), pp. 99 ff., who lays stress on their separateness, and Schober, *P.W.* Supplement v, col. 125, who still emphasizes their connexion.

[1] See Cagnat, *I.G.R.R.P.*, vol. iv, nos. 1586–9.

[2] Eur. *Ion*, 413–16. In *The History of the Delphic Oracle*, p. 29, I was rash enough to write that those admitted to the sanctuary included 'some representatives of the Delphic community selected by lot'. At that time I was inclined to suppose

that this passage referred to some civil representatives such as those whom we find in the regulations of the oracle of Apollo Coropaeus (Ditt. *Syll.*[3] 1157, 17) present beside the religious officials. But this interpretation is far-fetched. In answer to Xuthus' simple question Ion must be referring to the Priests, as has been usually supposed. I can only plead in extenuation of my previous aberration that these difficult problems of Delphic organization are full of pitfalls.

which was determined by lot.' This revives the old equation of προφήτης with ὅσιος, which would be better abandoned.[1]

The term ὅσιος as a title of a Delphic official occurs only four times in ancient literature, all the references being in Plutarch's *Moralia* (292 D, 365 A, 437 A, and 438 B). The first passage states: πέντε δ' εἰσὶν ὅσιοι διὰ βίου, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ μετὰ τῶν προφητῶν δρῶσιν οὗτοι καὶ συνιερουργοῦσιν, ἅτε γεγονέναι δοκοῦντες ἀπὸ Δευκαλίωνος. Here the five ὅσιοι are definitely distinguished from the προφῆται, though they co-operated with them in their work. In *Moralia*, 365 A, when discussing the Delphic belief that the remains of Dionysus were interred beside the sanctuary, Plutarch mentions: καὶ θύουσιν οἱ ὅσιοι θυσίαν ἀπόρρητον ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, ὅταν αἱ Θυιάδες ἐγείρωσι τὸν Λικνίτην. This is the only activity of the ὅσιοι where they are mentioned independently from the προφῆται. In *Moralia*, 438 B, there is mention of a contemporary incident at a consultation of the oracle when ὁ προφήτης Νίκανδρος καὶ οἱ παρόντες τῶν ὁσίων are compelled to flee abruptly from the ἄδυτον. Once more the ὅσιοι, though associated with the προφήτης in his function, are distinct from him. In the final instance only (*Moralia*, 437 A) the ὅσιοι appear to be closely associated with the office of the ἱερεῖς. Plutarch alludes to those responsible for offering the preliminary sacrifice before consultation as οἱ ἱερεῖς καὶ ὅσιοι. But actually the reading in our texts is an emendation. The MSS. read οἱ ἱερεῖς καὶ ὅσοι, and though the last word should no doubt be changed to ὅσιοι, one may wonder whether that emendation fully restores the original wording.

Recent discussions in English on the subject of the ὅσιοι confine themselves to the literary evidence and fail to notice the Delphic inscriptions which mention them in such a way as to distinguish them from the ἱερεῖς. The best instance is the record of a liberation of a female slave for which the two ἱερεῖς and four ὅσιοι are named as witnesses. The ἱερεῖς named are quite distinct from the ὅσιοι, and evidently all but one of the ὅσιοι were present. The fact that four of the ὅσιοι acted as witnesses excludes the possibility that the ἱερεῖς should be reckoned with them to make up the number of five.[2]

If we can take it that this proves that the ὅσιος and the ἱερεύς are distinct officials, we can go on to show that the ἱερεύς and the προφήτης can be identical. The best evidence of this is that the προφήτης Nicandrus, whom we have already mentioned, is elsewhere described by Plutarch as ἱερεύς and is known thus from a number of Delphic inscriptions.[3] This accords with the passage cited above where Plutarch distinguishes the προφήτης Nicandrus from the ὅσιοι.

The Delphic inscriptions show that there were two ἱερεῖς τοῦ Πυθίου.[4] They were appointed for life. But naturally this normally meant that one of them was senior to the other, and so, when usually the senior died first, his junior stepped in to take

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[1] Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, iv, pp. 189–213, assumes throughout that the προφῆται and ὅσιοι are identical, and without further discussion he alludes to the oracle as the work of the 'Holy Ones'. For discussion of the subject see Malten, *P.W.* viii., col. 2492, s.v. 'Hosioi'; Miss Harrison, *Prolegomena*[3], pp. 500 ff.; Dempsey, *The Delphic Oracle*, appendix B; Halliday, *Plutarch's Greek Questions*, pp. 57 ff. Miss Harrison and Dempsey in distinguishing the ὅσιοι from the priests both associate the ὅσιοι with the Dionysiac cult. Halliday's discussion is the most balanced.

[2] *B.C.H.* xxii (1898), pp. 76 and 77, dating from the end of the 1st century B.C. Cf. *B.C.H.* xlix (1925), p. 83, an inscription in honour of

one Theonice, daughter of the ὅσιος Timaeus and granddaughter of the ἱερεύς Hippocrates and the Pythia Theonice, dating about A.D. 200.

[3] Plutarch, *Moralia*, 386 B, and Pomtow, *P.W.* iv, col. 2606.

[4] See, e.g., Pomtow in *P.W.* iv, cols. 2586 and 2588, and G. Daux, *Delphes au IIe et au Ier siècle*, p. 54. The earliest epigraphical evidence on the ἱερεῖς dates from the beginning of the 2nd century B.C. when the decrees of fictitious sale to the god were first inscribed. But there is no reason to suppose that the priestly organization had changed since the classical and archaic periods.

his place, and another priest was appointed as junior. Hence at any given moment one of the priests at least was almost certain to have long experience of office. Either or both ἱερεῖς might be present at a consultation, but the one who delivered the response to the inquirer was for the time προφήτης. Otherwise the use of the terms varies with the occasion. On Delphic inscriptions, which are all of a general character and not specially concerned with consultations, the officials are always called ἱερεῖς —the more general term. In literary contexts which are more usually concerned with consultations the title used is προφήτης.[1] But Plutarch, when mentioning the sacrifice preparatory to consultation, appropriately writes ἱερεῖς.

Apart from the fact that one ἱερεύς was always appointed to replace a vacancy among the two, we have no evidence for the mode of their appointment, except the statement in Euripides. The use of the lot was no doubt intended to enable the god to exercise an influence on the choice.[2] It was evidently in no sense a demo-cratic device, but the panel of names was confined to the Delphic nobles. One cannot tell, therefore, how far the selection was determined in advance before the ballot.

As for the ὅσιοι, we are never told how they were appointed. All that Plutarch records is that the victim offered at their appointment was called a ὁσιωτήρ.[3] He describes them as collaborating with the προφῆται on the ground that they were reputed to be descended from Deucalion. This certainly suggests that their rights to attend at consultations were based, not so much on their being priests of some deity, as on their status as senior representatives of some families of traditional sanctity. Claros again provides a curious analogy for this arrangement. One of the official inscriptions there records as present at a consultation τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἄρδυος Ἡρακλειδῶν Πατροξενίδου next in order after the ἱερεύς.[4] Cagnat emphasizes that Patroxenides is present not as an office-holder, but by reason of birth. So perhaps at Delphi five heads of ancient families acquired a right to attend and co-operate in the chief priestly ceremonies. But it would appear that, however the ὅσιοι secured their position in the Delphic sanctuary, they did not attend merely as privileged spectators, but were active participants in the ritual of consultation, and were the officiating priests at a secret sacrifice in the temple of Apollo on the occasion of a Dionysiac festival. This isolated piece of evidence on their specific functions has suggested to some scholars that the ὅσιοι represented the intrusion of Dionysiac influence into the Pythian sanctuary. This theory is supported by the fact that the terms ὅσιος and ὁσιωτήρ can be plausibly connected with the cult of Dionysus.[5] The inscriptional evidence gives no confirma-tion to our literary evidence on this connexion, in so far as it concerns the Delphic ὅσιοι. In fact, in two late inscriptions it is possible to restore the reading ὅσιος τοῦ Πυθίου which suggests that the 'Holy Ones' were regarded, in the second century A.D. at least, as dedicated primarily to the service of the Pythian Apollo.[6]

If they were the five heads of families, I would surmise that perhaps they were not appointed by lot, but simply filled the vacancies by right of hereditary succession. In any case all our evidence shows that the προφῆται were not allotted for each

[1] For the προφήτης cf. the passages in Plutarch already quoted, and Herod. viii. 36, where it is preceded immediately by a reference to consulting the god; also Aelian, *Nat. An.* x. 26 and Berlin Pap. 11517 (Schubart, *Hermes*, lv, 1920, pp. 188 ff.).

[2] For the use of the lot in the oracle cf. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, pp. 210 and 211, and Parke, op. cit., pp. 13 and 29.

[3] *Moralia*, 292 D. Halliday, *Plutarch's Greek Questions*, p. 57, note 1, supposes that Euripides

in the *Ion* included the ὅσιοι in his reference to appointment by lot. This is possible, but the plural might merely be meant to cover both ἱερεῖς.

[4] Cagnat, *I.G.R.R.P.*, vol. iv, no. 1586.

[5] See Miss Harrison, *Prolegomena*³, pp. 500 ff.

[6] *B.C.H.* xx (1896), p. 719, ὁσίου τοῦ [Πυθίου], where the first upright of the Π is preserved, and *Fouilles*, iii. 2, no. 118, line 5 (p. 119), restored ὁσίου τ[οῦ] Πυθίου.

occasion from among them. That their co-operation in the consultation of the oracle consisted in supplying the verse is also a matter of sheer conjecture. They may have done so; but the references in Strabo and Plutarch to the poets in the sanctuary need not be attached to the ὅσιοι.

Finally, as to the ἱερεῖς or προφῆται, one cannot tell whether they relied on poetic assessors in the days when oracles were issued in verse, or produced the poetry themselves from the Pythia's utterances. But at least the oracle need never have been without an experienced προφήτης. The existence of two ἱερεῖς could usually guarantee that one at least was a man of considerable training in the functions of his office, and one may suppose that the junior ἱερεύς was allowed to acquire the necessary facility by dealing first with the routine inquiries. Even at the height of the oracle's fame prose was the medium for the majority of the responses.[1] Verse need only be furnished for the important questions of city-states. Then it was both more dignified as a medium and more adapted to cover expedient ambiguities.

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[1] Cf. Plutarch, *Moralia*, 403 E.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

LANGUAGE

INDOGERMANISCHE FORSCHUNGEN LVI (1938).

1. HEFT. O. Hoffmann argues that **Weichbild** (*wikbilede*) originally denoted a wooden or stone sign set up in a *wik* (village where traders live, market-place) to denote the possession of the *ius mercatum constituendi*. Hence it came to denote the privilege itself and finally the community possessing this right. H. Hendriksen connects *cura* with Sk. śeṣaḥ 'remainder', the basic meaning being 'leaving over, saving up', hence 'watch, care'. The root **keis *kois* he also finds in κίστη. **keis* is an extended form of **kei* and = 'leave lying'. *lētum* is connected with *latere*, a semantic parallel being Mid. Ir. *cel* 'death', Lat. *celare*. Lith. *kišù, kišti* further is derived from **keis*, although the exceptional treatment of the palatal is difficult to account for. Sk. *ślakṣṇáḥ* 'slippery, soft, fine, delicate' is derived from **slēg* seen in λήγω, λαγαρός. E. Lewy writes on (1) *a-priori* construction of speech types, (2) primitive I-E. inflection, (3) Sakian miscellany. He (4) connects *idus* via Etruscan with the Sumerian *itu* 'month', (5) discusses the sound -tsch- in Mod. Germ., and (6) connects *Gabel* with *geben*.

2. HEFT. H. Lommel agrees with Duchesne-Guillemin on the non-existence of Avestan compounds with a nom. sing. as first member, but holds that the final *ō* and *a* are two transcriptions of an Arsacidian sign representing a real *o* whereas D-G. considers that the original sound was *a*. Duchesne-Guillemin replies. H. Frisk holds that *ācer* is a vṛddhated adjectival derivative while ἄκρος is an adjectivization of a subst. ἄκρον. J. B. Hofmann discusses some Latin exx. of assimilation and dissimilation, syllabic division, and derives the late Lat. *tottonarius* 'trotting horse' from a Germanic **troddō*.

3. HEFT. J. Wackernagel apropos of Pāṇini's rule concerning the order of the members of dvandva compounds recalls that the second component of biverbal combinations frequently begins with a labial (e.g. *hurly-burly*, etc.), and connects this phenomenon with Winkler's Aleph-Beth rule. A. Debrunner discusses the dissimilation of O.Ind. *śviti* to *śiti*, holds that O.Iran. *ā-ka* is a graphic variant of *a-ka*, and discusses the change of O.Pers. *zv* > *zb*. He disposes further of a supposed form εἶς 'thou art' in a papyrus. W. Prensler traces certain syntactical peculiarities of English to Celtic and beyond to a pre-I-E. substratum. The phenomena became general after the thirteenth century and the Welsh examples are taken from Caradar's *Welsh Made Easy*. E. Hermann makes some suggestions on the lay-out of etymological dictionaries, holding that μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν. P. Trost argues that O.Ind. *strī* is < **sr-ī*. V. Georgiev attempts to connect both *orbis* and *urbs* with Slav. *gradu*. What of the treatment of **ghṛ-* in *hortus*? R. Pfister connects *crumina* with γρυμέα via Etruscan. V. Machek relating Toch. *klop* with Slav. *globa* suggests that the Toch. word = 'sorrow' rather than 'pain'.

4. HEFT. F. R. Blake discusses language from a semantic point of view and sketches a system of fundamental semantic categories. O. v. Essen attempts an 'explanation' of the changes of σ in Greek. His physiological analysis seems to confuse the 'how' and 'why' of the process. Why do these physiological changes take place specifically in Greek? R. Rosenkranz argues that Luvian was a colloquial language of the Hittite Empire, Hittite being the language of the court and chancellery. V. Pisani connects *cuparessus* with Mod. Pers. *sarv* and argues that the change of

k to s is a comparatively late phenomenon. He does not explain how such a change, spreading as a 'sound-wave' (a question-begging term), could transgress linguistic boundaries and spread northwards as far as the Baltic.

ERRATUM

The Editors wish to apologize for an error on p. 4 of the General Index of vols. i–xxxii, where the article on 'The Portents in Horace' is attributed to Miss G. Hirst. The author is Miss M. E. Hirst.